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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is based on the belief that Richard Casey played 
a greater role than has been attributed to him in the 
foundation of the wartime  alliance between Australia and 
the United States. Throughout his distinguished political 
career, Casey lived in the shadow of the Prime Ministers 
Robert Menzies and John Curtin. Casey was widely praised 
by contemporaries and scholars for his tireless efforts as 
Australia’s first ambassador to the United States in 1940-
42, yet there is little public recognition of his role in laying 
the foundation for the alliance between Australia and the 
United States. Bridge and other academic historians have 
rehabilitated Casey;  this has not, however, flowed through 
to popular culture and writers of popular histories.  
Instead, most accounts misleadingly credit Prime Minister 
John Curtin with the fact that Australia successfully ‘looked 
to America’ for its salvation in World War Two. It will be 
argued here that one reason for the neglect of Casey is 
that, while he is often credited as a superb publicist and 
networker in Washington, he is not normally given much 
credit in the American decision in December 1941 to turn 
Australia into its Pacific base. It will be argued here that 
there needs to be greater recognition of Casey as a 
strategic thinker who, more than Curtin or any other 
Australian, facilitated the transformation of Australia into a 
key American ally. 
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Introduction 
Richard Gardiner Casey was, by any standard, a 
distinguished Australian.  Trained as an engineer, he 
became, in turn, a decorated soldier, diplomat, 
parliamentarian, member of both the British War Cabinet 
and the Australian Cabinet and Australian War Cabinet, 
company director, party chief, peer, Privy Councillor and 
twice, vice-regal envoy. His efforts were usually attended 
by success and encomium. For the most part, his abilities 
were recognised by his peers. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs in Canberra is today housed in a building named in 
Casey’s honour. Australia’s Antarctic base also carries 
Casey’s name. Yet, in the eyes of many of his fellow 
countrymen, he was not, and is not, held in the high regard 
that his accomplishments would suggest is warranted.  His 
devotion to his country, even his patriotism has been seen 
as qualified by self-interest. Moreover, within the confines 
of his political reference groups, his limitations robbed him 
of the political reward that he most coveted – the prime 
ministership. 
Thus, the perception of Casey in Australian history accords 
him a minor role.  Because of his failure to achieve any 
kind of domestic political eminence, he has been relegated 
to that large band of political identities who had the 
misfortune to reach near the top, but never the top itself, 
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of the political plum tree during the long period of what has 
become known as ‘the Menzies years’.   
This thesis is an attempt to conduct a closer examination of 
Casey in one specific period in his career, 1940 to 1942, 
when he represented Australia in Washington. This period 
has been chosen because his responsibilities as Australian 
Minister in Washington could be regarded as the most 
important responsibilities he ever undertook. In the years 
immediately leading up to the outbreak of the war in the 
Pacific, the government and the people of Australia 
realised, with increasing dismay, that the nation would be 
virtually defenceless in the event of attack by the forces of 
Japan, an attack long feared and expected.   With Britain 
fighting for its very survival and unable to offer any kind of 
military or naval aid and much of the Australian defence 
forces engaged in the Middle East and the European 
theatres, Australia increasingly perceived the United States 
as the only power capable of bestowing assistance.  
It is not an original observation to argue that the years 
1940 to 1942 included the most significant events of the 
twentieth century. The historian, Ian Kershaw, claimed that 
1941 was the most momentous year in modern 
history.1According to Kershaw: ‘That year, the most awful 
                                               
1  Ian Kershaw. Fateful Choices. Ten Decisions That Changed The World. 1940-
1941, (London: Penguin, 2007), p. xv.  
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in history…took its shape largely from a number of fateful 
choices made by the leaders of the world’s major powers.’  
This was certainly true of Australia’s situation too. As Harry 
Gelber described Casey’s mission to the United States: 
‘never before and never since has any Australian 
Ambassador been called upon to serve in so vital a post at 
such a critical turning point not only in Australian but world 
history’.2 
While ever the United States remained the focus of 
Australia’s endeavours to enlist massive military aid in the 
feared conflict with Japan, Casey’s role as Australia’s chief 
representative in the United States carried grave 
responsibilities. It was he who would argue the justification 
for American participation in the defence of Australia, not 
only with the Roosevelt Administration but with the 
American people, who were deeply committed to an 
isolationist stance, as the rest of the world erupted into 
war. 
When Casey first arrived in the United States, he received 
the worst possible news from the American President. 
Roosevelt confirmed to Casey that his Cabinet had decided 
that assistance in the event of war breaking out in the 
                                               
2 Harry Gelber,  ‘Turning Points. Richard Casey and the Development of An 
Australian Foreign Service’, Quadrant, April 2009, Vol. 53, pp 74-79, p. 79. 
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Pacific could not be offered to Australia, which was so 
distant from where the United States’ principal strategic 
interests lay. Casey was quickly made aware that one 
reason for the Roosevelt Administration’s view was that 
public opinion would not allow any offers of help to 
Australia. For the entirety of his term in the United States, 
Casey strove to turn around public opinion, Administration 
thinking and American naval and military strategy.  
It would not be too blunt to claim that the American refusal 
to come to the military aid of Britain in May-June 1940, 
when that nation was seemingly threatened with invasion, 
boded ill for Australia. The survival of Britain was  far more 
important to the United States than Australia, yet 
Washington was not prepared to give that aid. Australia, 
obviously, was not seen as being worthy of more 
sympathetic consideration. Casey’s mission therefore was 
to convince the United States that Australia should be 
looked upon not as a distant outpost of the British Empire, 
but as a key element of its strategic thinking.  
This study seeks to add to our understanding of the degree 
to which Casey’s adroit lobbying took the concept of an 
Australia-America alliance to the point where United States 
strategic thinking perceived Australia as an integral part of 
that thinking. Casey’s efforts were directed to the coming 
together of Australia and the United States and the 
creation of an alliance between the two nations, an alliance 
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that preserved Australia in 1942. Casey’s efforts in 1940-
42 were undertaken in the context of Australia’s very 
survival being guaranteed only with American help. Casey’s 
achievement was that, more than any other Australian, he 
facilitated the movement of Australia from the periphery to 
near the centre of the United States’ strategy in the Pacific 
War. 
Yet this is not the most common or popular view of Casey’s 
achievements in the United States. Although there is a 
general recognition of Casey’s active and successful efforts 
in making Australia better known to influential figures in 
the Administration and the American media, there is little 
recognition linking Casey with the United States’ strategic 
decision to use Australia as the base for the repulse to the 
Japanese attack. In most academic studies, Casey is 
accorded only a minor role, given that the Americans only 
entered the war after the events at Pearl Harbor seeminlgly 
gave them no other choice than to turn Australia into their 
Pacific base. Popular representations and much of the 
historiography of this period clearly perceives the Prime 
Minister John Curtin as the catalyst in the Australian 
defence strategy moving from its traditional reliance on 
Britain to a new alliance with the United States. As the 
historian James Curran explained Curtin’s enduring 
popularity: 
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In a land that has seen no civil war or engaged in no 
act of military rebellion against the ‘mother country’ to 
act as the baptismal font for a self-sustaining national 
mythology, the Curtin story offers a tale rich in the 
vital ingredients of nationalist drama and human 
experience..3 
Or to quote the journalist Allan Ramsey: ‘If anyone was 
ever the political father of Australia’s security ties with 
Washington, however much they were formalized by the 
Menzies coalition government’s negotiation of ANZUS in 
1951, it was without question, Labor’s John Curtin’.4 
The conventional wisdom holds that Curtin’s initiative in 
gaining American support at this very crucial time led to 
the development of close and enduring ties with the United 
States, ties that since 1941 have remained the foundation 
of Australian defence policy, endorsed by both major 
political parties. As one recent study has put it, ‘the alliance 
with the United States remains the universally-supported 
centrepiece of Australia’s foreign policies’.5The role of 
Curtin in this hugely significant development in Australian 
defence and foreign policy has become part history and 
part folklore, made immeasurably easier to understand by 
                                               
3 James Curran, Curtin’s Empire, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
p. 5.                                         
4 Alan Ramsey, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 October 2001. 
5 Mark Beeson, ‘Australia, the United States and the Unassailable Alliance’,  in  
John Dumbrell and Alex Schafer (eds), America’s ‘Special Relationships  (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 76. 
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the adoption of the simple tag, ‘Australia Looks to 
America’.  This was a key phrase in the statement, issued 
by Curtin as a New Year’s Day message to a Melbourne 
newspaper on 27 December 1941. As Lionel Fredman has 
put it: ‘Curtin’s statement of 27 December, 1941, has 
become a landmark in our history’.6 Or as former Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke put it in a forward to a book entitled 
John Curtin: Saviour of Australia, Curtin was ‘the greatest 
of Australians’.7 This link between Curtin’s appeal, the 
wartime alliance with the United States, the transformation 
of Australia into an American bridgehead for the Pacific 
War, and the formalising of the alliance in the ANZUS 
treaty of 1951 appears well established.  
 
‘Australia looks to America’ has come to convey a precise 
meaning of where Australia stands in relation to the rest of 
the world. Because Casey’s work was what might be 
described as ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy, his writings 
left no such identifiable marker to compare with ‘Australia 
Looks to America’. Writing in 1982, Carl Bridge noted that 
Casey’s mission to the United States was widely 
understood to have produced little that was positive:  
                                               
6L.E Fredman, The United States Enters the Pacific, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1969), p. 55.              
7R.J.Hawke, ‘Foreword’ in Norman E. Lee, John Curtin. Saviour of Australia,  
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1983).     
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Existing accounts are harsh in their assessments of the 
effectiveness of Australia’s first Washington legation in 
the two years from its establishment in March 1940 until 
the fall of Singapore in February 1942.8 
Over the years, Bridge and others have fought to correct 
this impression of Casey as a failure, but, even today, 
doubts remain. Certainly, there is no widepsread 
recognition of Casey as the foundation stone of Australia’s 
alliance with the United States. Bridge, in 2008, noted the 
continuing neglect when he wrote that: 
Few today realise that when Curtin issued his famous 
“Australia looks to America” statement in December 
1941 he was actually following the trail blazed and 
prepared brilliantly by Casey over the previous two 
years. It was then that the seeds of the future 
Australia-United States alliance were planted.9 
As Bridge is acknowledging here, the standard accounts of 
the dramatic events of 1940-42 rarely if ever directly credit 
Casey with an important role in the American decision to 
turn Australia into its base in the South-West Pacific. Yet 
there are good reasons for thinking that this was Casey’s 
legacy.  
                                               
8 Carl Bridge, ‘R G Casey, Australia’s First Washington Legation and the Origins of 
the Pacific War, 1940-1942’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 1982, 
Vol. 28, No 2. pp. 181-189,p. 181. 
9 Carl Bridge ‘ The Other Blade of the Scissors’, in Baxter, Christopher and Andrew 
Stewart, Diplomats At War, British and Commonwealth Diplomacy in 
Wartime.(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) p. 148.  
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It was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941 that caused the United States to come to the aid of 
Australia. In the weeks that followed Pearl Harbor, General 
George Marshall and his staff came up with a new plan for 
war against Japan which situated Australia as its principal 
Pacific base for waging that war. The standard accounts of 
how Australia became an American base make the point 
that the decision was ‘coldly strategic’.10 With the 
Philippines under attack and likely to fall, Australia, which 
had barely entered the consciousness of the United States 
eighteen months earlier, now became a strategic 
priority.11Perhaps General Douglas Macarthur summed it up 
best when he told Curtin in June 1942 that the interest of 
the United States in Australia was purely ‘from the 
strategical aspect of the utility of Australia as a base from 
which to attack and defeat the Japanese’.12 Implicit in that 
was the cold, hard fact that emotional ties between the 
United States and Australia had no bearing whatsoever. 
Yet, what is striking about the American decision is how 
quickly and easily it was made, and how effectively it was 
implemented. An awareness of Australia and what it had to 
                                               
10 See, for example, Anthony Burke, Fear of Security. Australia’s Invasion Anxiety 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 74. 
11 Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 68. 
12 Quoted in Peter Stanley, Invading Australia. Japan and the Battle for Australia, 
1942 (Camberwell: Penguin, 2008), p. 168. 
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offer the United States had obviously grown, thanks to the 
efforts of Casey and others. Casey learned of this felicitous 
turn of events from Harry Hopkins, and recorded the news 
in his diary: 
December 22, 1941 Winston Churchill and the Chiefs of 
Staff arrived in Washington... Harry Hopkins 
telephoned and cheered me up a good deal by saying 
that he thought I would be pleased at what was in train 
so far as Australia was concerned.   I told him that I 
was feeling a little “blue”, at which he said that I had 
no reason to do so, as the representations that I 
had made were bearing very promising fruit ( my 
emphasis).13 
Harry Hopkins, a former Secretary of Commerce, was 
Roosevelt’s personal and unofficial representative to the 
British government. His closeness to the President is 
exemplified by the fact that he lived in the White House. 
The implications of the Hopkins’ message are worth noting. 
They convey the thoughts of a close Presidential adviser, 
probably the closest Presidential adviser. Hopkins’ 
comments clearly recognise the work and effort that Casey 
had put into the campaign to make Australia front and 
centre of the new American political and military strategy.  
At one level, the decision to turn Australia into its Pacific 
base was an obvious choice in the context of December 
                                               
13  Casey Diaries,  22 December 1941. The Casey Diaries are held at the National 
Library of Australia,  Canberra, at MS6150, Vol 1, Box 24.  In this thesis, I simply 
cite “Casey Diaries”  and the date of entry. 
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1941. As a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
Americans had few options and so decided to ‘look to 
Australia’. A more accurate way of looking at the matter is 
to view the United States as being gradually drawn towards 
looking at Australia as a base.  As Bridge has described this 
evolution, the Roosevelt Administration was badly shaken 
by the fall of France. In September 1940, Roosevelt and 
Churchill signed the ‘Destroyers for Bases’ deal, which 
provided no real military help to Britain but proved that the 
‘biased neutrality’ of the United States favoured the Allies. 
In early 1941, the secret military ABC1 talks in Washington 
suggested that ‘Australia would be a principal Pacific base 
and a significant supply provider for the global war effort’.14 
On 1 December 1941, the United States finally made an 
‘explicit guarantee to come to Britain’s and Australia’s aid 
should the Japanese attack Malaya’.15 Finally on 17 
December 1941, Roosevelt signed off on the 
Marshall/Eisenhower plan to turn Australia into its Pacific 
base. From that moment, the ‘saving’ of Australia was 
more or less assured.  
Casey’s achievement was to encourage this process of 
American recognition of what Australia had to offer to the 
                                               
14 Carl Bridge, ‘Poland to Pearl Harbour’ in Carl Bridge (ed), Munich to Vietnam. 
Australia’s Relations with the United States since the 1930s, (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1991), pp. 45-47. 
15 Bridge, “The Other Blade of the Scissors”,  pp. 140-143. 
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United States. Roosevelt himself, after Pearl Harbor, 
credited Casey with being in tune with his own thinking. 
Casey quoted the President as saying that: ‘As I have 
always realised and as you have said in your speeches 
here, the South West Pacific is one unit’.16It will be argued 
here that the story needs to be recast so that at the centre 
of Casey’s achievements is the successful promotion of 
Australia as the principal American base and bridgehead in 
a war with Japan.  
For Casey personally, the wartime alliance between 
Australia and the United States represented a recognition 
of the correctness and the effectiveness of his arguments 
that he had first developed when arguing for American 
assistance to Britain during the Battle of Britain in the 
summer of 1940. Casey’s years in Washington therefore 
represent a key area of study and examination. While the 
ultimate decision by the American president to wage the 
major response to Japan from Australia might  have been 
made on purely strategic grounds, there are sound 
justifications for concluding that Casey prepared the 
American leaders, including the President, for an inevitable 
involvement in the South Pacific. Clearly, the decision by 
Washington was one which had profound effects on the 
survival of Australia.  
                                               
16 Casey Diaries, 17 December 1941. 
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As for why Casey has not been acknowledged for what he 
achieved, several factors are at work. Bridge and others 
have pointed out that Casey is a convenient villain in a 
nationalist  myth. According to this myth, it was only after 
conservative United Australia Party politicians, such as 
Casey, left the stage that the Labor team of Prime Minister 
Curtin and Minister for External Affairs ‘Doc’ Evatt carved 
out a new independent path for Australia that genuinely 
reflected Australia’s national interests.17 Casey as a 
consequence is more likely to be remembered as too 
attached to the British Empire to have been of much use to 
Australia.18 
It can also be added that in the context of Australian 
politics, Casey does not present as a dynamic, engaging 
personality capable of turning around world events. Casey 
never boasted publicly that he had played an important 
role in the creation of the Alliance. Over time, Americans 
came to realise the value of Australia to American strategic 
interests. The remarks by Harry Hopkins, speaking on 
behalf of the President and referred to earlier, have been 
allowed to remain largely unknown.  
                                               
17 Bridge, ‘Poland to Pearl Harbour’, pp. 38-39. 
18 Christopher Waters, ‘Casey. Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign 
Policy’, p. 381. 
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Finally, Casey’s achievement in the United States is often 
described in terms of his remarkable publicity and 
networking achievements. What is often forgotten was that 
Casey was a true diplomatic ‘renaissance man’. With 
experience of the academic, military, business and political 
spheres, Casey was better placed than most career 
diplomats when faced with the task of convincing 
Americans to come in on the side of the Allies in World War 
Two. Casey was a superb salesperson of Australia in the 
United States and a tireless ‘networker’, but he was also 
capable of thinking strategically and mastering the 
technical detail of Australia’s military needs. Australia was 
indeed fortunate to have Casey as its representative in 
Washington in 1940-42. 
The thesis argues that Casey should be remembered as a 
highly effective advocate of Australia’s national interests 
because he, more than any other Australian politician or 
diplomat, facilitated the changed perception of Australia in 
the United States. Casey was successful because he 
understood an important fact of political life, that national 
interest - and not brotherly concern or the ‘civilisational 
ties’ of the British speaking world - would stimulate 
American interest in Australia.Where he saw his role, was 
to endeavour to change the perception of what the United 
States thought its national interests to be.   
20 
 
As Christopher Waters has put it, Casey was a realist in 
international relations terms.19According to Michael Wesley, 
Australian realism has three key elements. The first was 
‘experientialism’ – meaning a consciousness of Australia’s 
isolation and its security threats. Secondly, Australian 
realists are skeptical about the stability of the international 
system and are prone to see the world in terms of threats. 
Thirdly, Australian realism favours pragmatic or ‘common 
sense’ solutions to international problems. There is little 
faith in multinational efforts to solve problems or keep the 
peace. Instead, realists recommend that Australia look out 
for its own interests, usually through bilateral 
relationships.20 These views were a clearly identifiable part 
of the conservative tradition of Australian politics and not 
simply a product of Menzies’ political strategies in his fight 
with the Labor Party.21 
Casey is a prime example of this type of realism. Casey’s 
experiences of diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s led him 
to the conclusion that national interest was what mattered 
in the world. He was deeply pessimistic about the 
enforceability of the Treaty of Versailles and sceptical about 
                                               
19 Christopher Waters, ‘Casey. Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign 
Policy’. p. 383. 
20 Michael Wesley, ‘The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism’, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History: Vol. 55, Number 3, 2009, pp. 324-334, p. 325.  
21David Lowe, ‘Brave New Liberal: Percy Spender’, The Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2005, pp.389-399, pp. 390-91. 
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the League of Nations.22Casey was an enthusiastic 
‘appeaser’, long before the word took on its defeatist and 
pejorative connotation of submission to naked power. 
Casey, understandably, favoured negotiation over war. 
Appeasement, for Casey, was the logical way to maintain 
the peace for an Australia that had nothing to gain and 
much to lose from a new world war.  
It was this realism and pragmatism that underpinned 
Casey’s approach when he arrived in the United States in 
Fenruary 1940. Casey quickly came to the view that 
interesting Americans in Australia’s defence on the basis of 
a common civilisational bond was simply futile. He was 
proved right on this score.  As Bridge has put it: 
When the United States came to Australia’s defence in 
1941 and 1942 they did so not just to protect ‘kith and 
kin’ or to reward an ally, but to protect a vital source of 
human resources, food supplies and other materials for 
the global war effort and to preserve a basis for the 
reconquest of their territories in South-East Asia.23 
Understanding this reality was one of Casey’s strengths 
almost from the outset of his work in the United States. 
Casey was immediately struck by the fact that isolationism 
in the United States meant that there was virtually no 
solidarity at all among what is today described as the 
                                               
22 Waters, ‘Casey. Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign Policy’ in 
Australian Journal of Politics and History. Vol 51, No 3, 2005, P 383. 
23 Bridge, ‘Poland to Pearl Harbour’, pp. 50-51. 
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‘Anglosphere’. There was no way that the United States 
was going to save Australia because of their shared 
civilisational values. Casey had to sell Australia as a vital 
American economic, political and military resource. This he 
did brilliantly.  
Casey’s barnstorming of the United States was done in two 
separate stages.  For the first six months, the thrust of his 
efforts were directed to attempting to generate greater 
American support for Britain in her hour of need. By the 
end of 1940, when the threat of a German invasion of 
Britain was over, Casey threw himself into the real purpose 
of his appointment, that is greater recognition of the 
significant role Australia could play in the event of 
hostilities breaking out in the Pacific. This, after all, was 
going to be a global war. Casey endeavoured to emphasise 
the strategic value of American involvement in the South-
west Pacific, specifically the huge landmass of Australia.  
Casey’s prioritising of Britain in the first phase would lead 
to the unwarranted tag that Casey was, as one historian 
has put it, just ‘another good boy scout for the Empire’.24 
Yet this type of criticism is unjustified. For Casey, Britain 
was the first line of defence for both Australia and the 
United States and its defeat would be a military 
catastrophe for both counties, indeed for the whole world. 
                                               
24  Stephen Alomes, A Nation at Last. The Changing Character of Australian 
Nationalism 1880-1988, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1988), p. 116. 
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Once the threat of a German invasion of Britain had been 
deferred or, as quickly became evident, cancelled in the 
northern autumn of 1940, Casey concentrated on getting 
Australia included into American strategic planning for the 
looming conflict in the Pacific. Casey mingled with key 
Administration figures, tirelessly worked the press and 
town halls, and, especially in the second half of 1941, 
shared his view with key American military leaders, 
gradually improving American appreciation of what it was 
that Australia had to offer. 
At this point, it is fair to ask, what if Casey had been 
ineffectual?  Would the Americans have come to the same 
conclusion about Australia, given the turn of events?  No 
doubt the US would have eventually seen that Australia 
was a logical choice from which to fight.  However, Casey’s 
groundwork not only in the political sense, but in providing 
details of harbours, airfields, geographical possibilities, his 
own WWI experience assisting his assessments, meant that 
the US decision to use Australia as a base could be made 
quickly with no need for detailed enquiries.  The speed with 
which the decision could be implemented is demonstrated 
by the arrival of the Pensacola convoy in Australia on 22 
December 1941.25 
                                               
25 Mauriec Matloff and Edwin snell, The War Department Strategic Planning for 
Coalition Warfare 1941-42, (Washington, DC:  War Department, 1953), pp. 72-73. 
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The task of discovering, examining and documenting 
Casey’s actual impact on the development of American 
strategic thinking has been an exhausting one, extending 
over more years than the author cares to count. The 
research has involved documentation from a variety of 
secondary and primary sources in Australia, in Britain, and 
an even greater number of primary sources in the United 
States. It must be admitted that the secondary literature is 
daunting and much the same is true of primary sources, 
given that this was an era when powerful players kept 
diaires, sent letters, and wrote long confidential reports 
that are now available to the public. 
Casey is already the subject of a vast academic 
literature.26Casey’s harshest critics have been an academic, 
David Day, who knew him not, and a colleague, Paul 
Hasluck, who knew him well. Casey wisely intended to 
make sure that his side of the story would be told by 
keeping a diary. Menzies’ biographer A.W. Martin described 
                                               
26 W.J. Hudson, Casey, (Sydney: Oxford University Press, 1986),  Carl Bridge, ‘R G 
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December, 2004, pp.1-20, Harry Gelber, ‘Turning Points. Richard Casey and the 
Development of an Australian Foreign Service’, Quadrant, April, 2009, pp.74-79, 
David Ellery, ‘Furphies a’plenty in Long ANZUS Alliance’, Canberra Times, 18 
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Casey as ‘Canberra’s most notorious diarist’. Martin tells of 
Casey almost daily distributing to friends and colleagues his 
versions of daily events.  Menzies was apparently opposed 
to the concept of diary-keeping and told the Governor-
General, Lord de Lisle, that he did not trust people who 
kept diaries.27 Although Menzies instructed Casey to cease 
his diary-keeping, Casey clearly ignored his Prime Minister. 
Instead, he became more discriminating in choosing 
readers of his daily thoughts. His diaries for the period 
March 1940 to March 1942 have been minutely examined 
and published as The Washington Diaries edited by Carl 
Bridge.28The unabridged Casey diaries, used for the 
research for this thesis, are available at the National 
Library of Australia.29Casey’s diaries are testament to the 
multiplicity of repeat meetings with officers and officials 
holding senior positions in their respective fields, which 
clearly show that Casey occupied an unusual, if not a 
unique position of both importance and influence in the 
Washington firmament.  Of course, with any diary, one 
needs to question the audience for which it was intended.  
As Casey’s will left his diaries to the National Library of 
                                               
27 A.W. Martin, The Whig View of Australian History, (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2007), pp.122-123. 
28 Carl Bridge (ed.) A Delicate Mission. The Washington Diaries of R.G.Casey, 1940-
1942, (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 2008). 
29 The reference is National Library of Australia  MS 6150, Vol.1, Box 24. All further 
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Australia, he clearly meant them to be publicly available 
after his death.  He knew they would be an addition to 
archived official documents and so they add a personal 
aspect to formal documents and provide an insight into the 
commitment to official duties and participation in the ‘social 
whirl’ and the manner in which Casey combined the two to 
achieve his aims. 
There were three Prime Ministers – Robert Menzies, Arthur 
Fadden and John Curtin, and four Ministers for External 
Affairs– Henry Gullett, John McEwan, Frederick Stewart and 
Herbert Evatt - while Casey was in the United States. 
Casey, of course, wrote cablegram reports and letters to 
them all. Much of this correspondence is available through 
the National Library and the National Archives.  
Despite the high offices that Casey held in a singularly 
successful life, his ability to mix easily with the powerful 
and the influential and his propensity to gravitate towards 
the centres of action, there has been only one full-length 
biography, by W.J.Hudson, published in 1986.30 Hudson’s 
work is an important source of biographical material about 
Casey, but, by no means, the only source. Apart from 
familiarity with the more commonplace documents and 
personal writings, Hudson had the advantage of having 
worked on the publication of a large volume of 
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correspondence that flowed between Casey and Stanley 
Melbourne Bruce, Australia’s eighth Prime Minister and 
Casey’s principal supporter.31 
Hudson recognised perhaps the major hazard confronting a 
biographer: ‘If one invests some years of one’s own life in 
the exploration and presentation of another’s, one tends to 
justify the investment by exaggerating the qualities of the 
subject’. Hudson, to his credit, achieved exemplary balance 
in his account, noting Casey’s strengths and weaknesses. 
According to Hudson, Casey sought to live ‘a highly 
gregarious life and a very public life’. Yet, Hudson, after 
years of researching the ‘millions of words’ that, as a 
compulsive writer, Casey left behind, concluded he was 
extremely careful in what he wrote.32 Carried through to his 
personal relationships, this characteristic would have 
ensured a good fit into the higher echelons of government 
in both London and Washington and an acceptance by the 
diplomatic communities in both capitals.   
Yet Casey’s discretion and modesty present a real difficulty 
in assessing Casey’s achievements. In some ways, Hudson 
concedes the frustrations of writing Casey’s biography in 
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Hudson’s failure to reveal the complete man, because of 
Casey’s refusal to ever reveal his innermost thoughts.  
Although he left behind a massive amount of personal and 
official records, some going back to childhood, there was 
nothing intimate or confessional in any of his papers, his 
personal relations with men and women were seldom 
explored in any detail, and the daily reality of politics was 
rarely described. Perhaps the lowly, almost invisible place 
that Casey occupies vis-à-vis the Alliance lies in Casey’s 
own inability to talk about himself, or create any written 
record of his personal feelings, a characteristic that Hudson 
found deeply frustrating.33 
Since Hudson, it has been Bridge who has brought to life 
Casey’s efforts as a diplomat and Australian representative 
in Washington.34 Bridge described Casey’s achievement 
thus: 
As Australia’s envoy, Casey had two objectives: to gain 
American support for the Allies’ war effort against 
Germany; and to alert the Americans to the common 
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danger from Japanese aggression in the Pacific. He set 
about achieving these in three ways. First, he mounted 
a public speaking and media campaign which 
succeeded in putting Australia on the mental map for 
millions of Americans. Secondly, he networked, 
particularly among the Washington administative elite. 
And thirdly, he made some timely, well-directed and 
effective diplomatic inteventions.35 
This thesis endorses this summary of Casey’s goals and 
achievements, but argues that it is because Casey is not 
given the credit he deserves for Australia’s transformation 
into a wartime base of the United States that his public 
reputation and recognition is not what it should be.  
In terms of American sources, I have looked at State 
Department archival records. Historians have not needed to 
accept Casey’s own account of his role in Washington; all of 
the important American decision makers of this period have 
left behind observations about Casey. I have used the Adolf 
Berle papers, especially Berle’s diary, which Bridge has 
used but which are not often cited in the Australian 
literature, to understand Casey’s thinking and 
influence.36According to the historian David Reynolds, Berle, 
Assistant Secretary of State, ‘combined one of the sharpest 
minds in the State Department with an obsessive hatred of 
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Britain’.37 Winning over Berle was the type of challenge that 
Casey relished. I was also able to consult other documents 
not much cited in the Casey literature such as the blatantly 
anti-British ‘Briefing Notes’ produced by the State 
Department for use by President Roosevelt,  when 
preparing for the visit to Washington of Prime Minister 
Menzies in May 1941. A number of official notes kept by 
Dean Acheson, another Assistant Secretary of State, were 
consulted. In neither the archives of the State Department, 
nor the personal writings of Berle and other leading figures 
in the Administration, is there any hint of Casey being 
regarded as less than a diligent, worthy representative of 
his country.  
The author was able to interview only two people who 
knew Casey personally, his daughter Jane and the former 
Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser. I was also fortunate 
enough to engage in correspondence with  Hudson, Casey’s 
biographer. 
Out of this long search and study, it became impossible to 
avoid the conclusion that Casey exercised an influence way 
beyond that ascribed to him.  All the networking, the 
speeches, the interviews, the meetings, the conferences, 
the dinners, the arguments that took him from the Oval 
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Office to the backwoods of small town America, his close 
relationships with the opinion makers and decision makers, 
with the editors and publishers of the major American 
newspapers and periodicals,  with the top echelons of both 
the army and the navy, with the diplomats and politicians 
and in particular, with the American President, bore fruit. 
He was preaching the ‘gospel’ (his phrase) of the need for 
a close relationship between Australia and the United 
States. The relationship that exists today can be traced 
back to Richard Casey in 1940-1941, albeit through a 
tortuous journey with many vicissitudes.   
Few aspects of Australian foreign policies or Australian 
defence policies have been subject to the same forensic 
examination as the American connection. It needs to be 
emphasised that this thesis is not concerned with the place 
of the Australia-United States alliance in contemporary 
Australia. Rather, the present-day existence of the alliance 
is acknowledged and recognised.  It is the beginning of the 
alliance and Casey’s place in that beginning that prompts 
this study. Nor is it being asserted that the ANZUS alliance 
of 1951 flowed naturally from the wartime alliance that was 
in place after Pearl Harbor. The United States looked to 
Australia as its wartime basis, but this was not in itself a 
guarantee of continuing American interest in Australia. 
After the war, the United States reviewed its commitments 
in the context of the Cold War. Percy Spender, Casey’s 
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predecessor as Minister for External Affairs, contributed to 
the decision made by the Americans in 1951 to extend 
their security network southwards from the Philippines to 
Australia and New Zealand.38 Casey welcomed ANZUS, but 
the focus here is Casey’s mission in 1940-42, which 
revolved around engaging the United States in the defence 
of the South-West Pacific.  
Chapter One is an examination of the literature about 
Casey. This chapter offers a brief account of Casey’s career 
with a view to helping to understand why Casey has not 
received the accolades that at least some historians believe 
that he deserved. His career was one of both remarkable 
achievement and nagging doubts about his capacity to 
influence events. Judgments about Casey often carry the 
suggestion that he was too ‘British’ to be an effective 
representative of Australia, too ‘good’ a man to be 
successful in politics, and that he was a politician of style 
rather than substance. It will be argued here that many of 
the alleged political weaknesses ascribed to Casey were 
also his strengths during his period in Washington.  
Chapter Two looks at the context of Casey’s Washington 
appointment by describing the state of Australian 
diplomacy before the sending of the first legation to 
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Washington. In the 1930s, the senior members of the 
Lyons’ and Menzies’ governments were for the most part 
supporters of appeasement as the most likely way to 
achieve a lasting peace.39It is argued that while Casey can 
be criticised as an advocate of appeasement, his decades 
of involvement in shaping Imperial foreign policy should be 
viewed instead as excellent preparation for his taking up 
the post in Washington. He saw the world of the great 
powers, accurately, as driven solely by considerations of 
power and self interest. 
Chapter Three looks at what Casey was faced with when he 
arrived in the United States. It is often assumed that the 
Roosevelt administration was waiting its chance to involve 
itself in the war against Nazi Germany and only the 
November election of 1940 prevented earlier assistance to 
the Allies. Yet the evidence suggests that much the reverse 
was true. Casey found himself confronted with a vast array 
of challenges, including Anglophobia, ignorance about 
Britain and Australia, and an isolationist public. At his first 
meeting with Roosevelt, the American president confirmed 
that Australia was too far away to interest the American 
public. 
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Chapter Four looks at how Casey developed his strategy 
during spring 1940, the Phoney War period. This was an 
information-gathering period where Casey set down his 
basic operating principles. It was also a period when Casey 
established the contacts needed to influence events in 
Washington. It was at this point that Casey showed one of 
his greatest skillls – the careful use of information – to 
advantage. 
Chapter Five looks at the summer of 1940 and why saving 
Britain became Casey’s focus in that summer. It was during 
this period that Casey developed a much more accurate, 
global picture of the war. Despite his tireless efforts to 
involve the United States in the defence of Britain, his 
gospel placed Australia at the centre of his strategic 
message about American security concerns in the Pacific. 
Chapter Six looks at the autumn and winter of 1940-41 
when Casey was able to turn most of his attention to Pacific 
affairs. After the November election, there was an 
expectation that Roosevelt would offer more wholehearted 
support to both Britain and Australia. There was no firm 
commitment from Roosevelt and Casey worked hard in 
particular to make the United States pay attention to the 
strategic keys to the south of the Philippines, that is, 
Singapore and Australia.  
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Chapter Seven looks at the Spring and Summer of 1941 
especially the Menzies visit. By this time, the Americans 
perceived Australia as important to its security needs in the 
Pacific. The devil was in the detail, however, and Casey had 
now to fight skilfully to convince American strategists that 
the South-West Pacific was one unit and that concentrating 
upon the defence of the Philippines at the expense of 
Singapore and Australia was unwise.  
Chapter Eight argues that the contribution of Casey to the 
‘saving’ of Australia is best understood in the context of 
comparing Casey’s efforts with Curtin’s ‘Look to America’ 
appeal. While Curtin’s appeal achieved virtually nothing 
except some hostility in the United States, specifically with 
the President, Casey achieved much more tangible 
outcomes.  
Chapter Nine looks at events after Pearl Harbor. They 
confirmed that Casey was a superior strategist, at least by 
Australian standards, with a remarkable mastery of the 
technical and tactical detail that Australia needed if it were 
to wage war against Japan. 
Chapter Ten concludes the thesis, summing up the 
argument for crediting Casey with impressing upon the 
Americans why it was in their interests to turn Australia 
into their principal Pacific base. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Casey and the Literature 
 
 
In this chapter, Casey’s biography is considered in the 
context of the vast literature about his achievements and 
shortcomings. Casey’s stay in Washington represented only 
two years of an extraordinarily rich political and diplomatic 
career. Three main themes emerge from an examination of 
this literature. The first theme might be described as 
Casey’s personal attributes. He was often described as a 
‘good man’ but an indifferent politician who lacked the 
necessary toughness to influence events. The second 
theme is Casey’s allegedly incompatible loyalties to 
Australia and the British Empire. Thirdly, Casey’s well-
known ability to charm his audience has been interpreted 
as the triumph of style over substance. Casey is 
remembered as a ‘networker’ but not as a thinker, 
strategist or policy maker.  
 
It might be profitable first to outline Casey’s biography. 
Hudson describes Casey as a child of his class and his time.  
He was born in Brisbane in 1890 into a prosperous family, 
one of ‘the landed families of Queensland, the Australian 
robber barons of the nineteenth century’, according to the 
historian, Manning Clark.40 As described by his daughter, 
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Jane MacGowan, there is no denying that despite his being 
a conservative politician, Casey formed friendships with 
people on the other side of the political spectrum.41 His 
grandfather, Cornelius was a medical practitioner who, 
after arriving in Australia in 1833, married Loetitia 
Gardiner, daughter of an Army captain. Their first son, 
Richard Gardiner Casey senior, born in 1846, became a 
successful businessman and a member of the Queensland 
Parliament before losing most of his fortune through the 
gambling activities of his partner. By diligent work, he later 
recovered and with wise investments in the new Mount 
Morgan Gold Mining Company and, later, Goldsbrough Mort 
and Company, rebuilt both a fortune and a reputation. He 
moved to Melbourne with his family in 1893, where his 
growing prosperity enabled his two children, Richard junior 
and his brother Dermot to step into what Hudson referred 
to as a  ‘comfortable bourgeois life’.42 
Although Richard could number a father, maternal 
grandfather and maternal great-grandfather as past 
members of the Queensland Parliament and a great-uncle 
as a former Premier, Hudson claims that Richard and 
Dermot would have found social and school life intolerable 
had it been known that their mother’s great- grandfather 
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had been sentenced to death at the Old Bailey for theft or 
that one of her great-grandmothers was an unknown 
convict woman. According to Hudson: ‘From the time that 
he became aware of the world about him, Richard Casey 
knew only material privilege. Emotionally, he was less 
privileged’.43Writing of him at the beginning of his career, 
Clark less kindly described him as ‘a young man of 
promise, one of those men known to his friends as a man 
of infinite desire and limited capacity’.44 It is not clear how 
Clark formed this conclusion. It might well be that Casey’s 
failure to meet his own goal of becoming Prime 
Ministerjustified Clark’s judgment.  
The Australian Who’s Who entries for Casey over a period 
of some years are hopelessly confused with alternating 
references to a B.A. and an M.A. The University of 
Cambridge has advised that he gained B.A. in June 1913 
and M.A. by proxy in November, 1918, as is the custom as 
both Oxford and cambridge Universities.45 Casey was not an 
academic star at Cambridge, but it is worth noting 
Hudson’s observation that he engaged with American 
students more successfully than with British students.  His 
writings show that their gregariousness appealed to him 
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more than the reserve he found in the British-born 
students. Possibly, Casey’s favourable introduction to 
Americans at Cambridge may have played some part, years 
later, in his achieving such easy rapport during his 
diplomatic appointment in Washington. 
In World War One, Casey served as a Staff Officer at both 
Gallipoli and the Western Front. Hudson makes the telling 
point that although he spent the entire war years on staff 
duty, he never commanded men.46  On the other hand, 
Casey was an engineer, a technical training considered 
useful by the military. He collected both a Military Cross 
and a Distinguished Service Order. His status as a staff 
officer did not provide him with any sort of immunity from 
danger. He was frequently under fire at Gallipoli and was 
with General William Bridges when the Australian 
commander was picked off by a sniper, a shot that proved 
fatal. 
After demobilization in 1919,Casey served in the Army 
Reserve, working part-time as an Intelligence officer in 
Melbourne. Casey pursued various business interests after 
the war and visited the United States in an unsuccessful bid 
to convince Ford to use an Australian-designed motor 
engine. Casey’s friendship with newly elected Prime 
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Minister Stanley Bruce led to his appointment as Australian 
Liaison Officer with the British Cabinet Office in 1924. He 
was in effect, Bruce’s political agent, separate from the 
High Commission. Although the High Commissioner kept 
Bruce and the Australian government well informed of 
decisions made in London, Bruce considered it necessary 
for this information to be supplemented by a close observer 
capable of discerning ‘developing problems before they 
reached crisis and decision point’. 47 
Casey thus became Australia’s first diplomat, garnering 
information and gossip not only from Whitehall and 
Westminster but from the various strata of London society. 
Casey’s easy fit into that London society as well as his 
ready acceptance by the mandarins of Whitehall enabled 
him to offer an interpretation of whatever intelligence he 
passed onto Bruce.  Moreover, his distinguished military 
career led to his acceptance by Britain’s service chiefs. 
Hudson is clearly impressed with Casey’s performance in 
London, describing him as ‘Bruce’s eyes and ears at the 
Imperial centre’, reporting to Bruce on everything from 
British defence policy to club gossip.48 Edwards remarks 
that when Casey was appointed to the London post in 
1924, he was given an office in 2 Whitehall Gardens, the 
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office of Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary and 
probably the most influential and best-informed civil 
servant in Britain. Far from resenting the presence of a 
colonial outsider in his sanctum, Hankey eventually came 
to regard Casey as his ‘confidential Australian assistant in 
imperial policy-making, rather than as a prying foreign 
diplomat’.49 
Bruce himself described Casey in glowing terms, suggesting 
that his role embraced not only reporting on matters but 
influencing them:  ‘From the time (that) Casey went to 
London as my liaison officer until I ceased to be the High 
Commissioner in 1945, Australia was invariably better 
informed on international affairs, and had far more 
influence on the U.K. government and its policy, than all 
the rest of the Empire put together’.50 While in London, 
Casey married Ethel Ryan, known as Maie, herself from a 
well-connected family in Victoria and later remembered as 
an author, artist, composer, aviator, and bon vivant. The 
Caseys slottted easily into inter-war British high society. 
With the defeat of Bruce in the 1929 Election, Casey had 
no further purpose in remaining in London. He returned to 
Australia and won election to the Federal Parliament as a 
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United Australia Party (UAP) candidate. Casey was in 
Federal Parliament as the member for Corio from 
December 1931 to January 1940. Prime Minister Joseph 
Lyons appointed Casey Assistant Treasurer in 1933 and 
Treasurer in 1935. Under Menzies, Casey served in the 
crucial role of Minister for Supply and Development in 
1939.  
Hudson claims that although he was a worker, what would 
now be called a workaholic, Casey left no significant 
monuments as treasurer.51The problem, according to 
Hudson, was that Casey was not a natural politician: 
The 1930s had been for Casey years of remarkable 
success.  Without any grounding in local government or 
state government and without the basic political gifts of the 
gab and a thick skin, through some highly placed 
connections, he had entered Federal Parliament at his first 
attempt, becoming a junior minister after less than two 
years and a senior minister after less than four…placed to 
enter the Privy Council and to challenge for the prime 
ministership.  In career terms they were successful years. 
In terms of concrete accomplishment, the times, the 
company and Casey’s own inability to wheel and deal made 
the decade for him less memorable.52 
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It was this apparent inability to ‘wheel and deal’ effectively 
with his Cabinet colleagues that presents as an enduring 
criticism of Casey throughout his career. Years later, Casey 
himself virtually confirmed this judgment by admitting the 
failure of his strenuous efforts as Treasurer to convince his 
Cabinet colleagues to boost defence expenditure in the 
years immediately before the outbreak of the Second World 
War.53  Of Casey’s tenure in the Lyons Ministry, the 
economic historian, Boris Schedvin wrote that ‘Casey was 
energetic but uninspired in his several Treasury 
capacities’.54 Casey can take some credit, however, for the 
fact that, in the case of Australia, rearmament did finally 
get under way in the last years of the decade so that ten 
times more was spent on defence in 1938-39 than was the 
case at the height of the Depression in 1932-33. Indeed, 
the case has been made that Casey and other UAP 
politicians did a great deal to help Australia save itself in 
the Second World War by strongly developing its industy 
and military technology.55 
The suspicion that Casey, who had spent the best part of a 
decade in London, had a dual allegiance to the Crown and 
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to the Australian government was a constant refrain from 
his critics.56In his examination of Anglo-Australian defence 
relations during the inter-war years, J.M. McCarthy accuses 
Casey of revealing Cabinet discussions to the British High 
Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, in 1936, during the 
negotiations about the construction of aircraft for the 
R.A.A.F. Descriptions of Casey as ‘British’ or ‘English’ in 
appearance and style abound in the literature. Gavin 
Souter, quoting the U.S. Consul-General J.P. Moffatt, 
creates a vivid word picture of Casey sounding and looking 
like ‘an Englishman, perhaps a Guards’ officer in well-cut 
mufti, rather aloof most of the time, but affable when he 
chose to be…travelled widely in Europe and North America, 
spoke good French and some German, and had the knack 
of impressing people in high places’.57Fred Alexander noted 
that ‘in dress, manner and personal appearance, he 
possessed ‘many of the outward marks of an Englishman- 
‘the Anthony Eden of Australia’.58Evatt’s close friend, Sam 
Atyeo, described Casey as ‘the poor man’s Anthony 
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Eden’.59Clark’s word picture of Casey follows the familiar 
theme: ‘English, Melbourne Grammar and Cambridge, 
while his manners were impeccable, his clothes straight 
from Bond Street and his voice from the Old Country’.60 
A Parliamentary colleague, James Killen, wrote of Caseyas 
‘English in appearance, in manner, in dress, with a clipped 
English style of speaking…’.61 In a review of Parliamentary 
performers in 1950, Casey was said to have ‘a rapid, eager 
stutter’ found more often in Britain than Australia.62 
There was both an irony and a practical difficulty here 
given that the man who had to explain Australia to the 
Americans at the outset of World War Two looked and 
sounded like a stereotypic English diplomat. Fred Daly, a 
Labor Member of Parliament with a reputation as a 
humorous participant in debates, tells how he ridiculed 
Casey by asking him a prank question during Question 
Time and Casey taking it seriously, suggesting either a 
poor sense of humour or unfamiliarity with the sardonic 
aspects of Australian humour.63Trevor Reese considered 
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Casey’s parliamentary speeches ‘unimaginative and 
woefully tedious’.64 
 
Given these attributes, it may well have been that Casey 
slotted easily into a more formalised relationship with the 
colleagues that he had found in London than the more 
robust and casual relationships found in Australian male 
groups. It is also possible that the very qualities that were 
seen as detrimental to political success in Australia were 
regarded highly in London and Washington.  Indeed, more 
than one observer concluded that Casey appeared more at 
home when overseas than he did in Australia, a personal 
characteristic occasionally applied to Menzies. T.B. Millar, a 
former Director of the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, while judging that Casey was an excellent choice as 
Australia’s first Minister to Washington, claims that he was 
‘perhaps more at home in foreign fields than in his own’.65 A 
similar belief is expressed by W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way: 
‘Casey was wealthy, more at ease in London society’.66It 
would be fair to say that his Labor opponents disliked 
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Casey’s upper-class origins, imperial politics, and British 
loyalties. Given Australia’s relative isolation from Europe 
and North America at that time, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that Casey’s upbringing, including a Cambridge 
degree and a long sojourn in the British Foreign Office, had 
prepared him not so much for the rough and tumble of the 
Australian political milieu but rather for life in the upper 
reaches of British society.  
Having a dual allegience to Britain and Australia was 
commonplace in inter-war Australia. Casey, as Waters has 
put it, ‘was a firm believer that the English-speaking 
peoples had a special role in world affairs’ and in the saving 
of ‘Western civilisation’.67Casey in the 1930s was an 
enthusiastic imperialist on both economic and defence 
grounds, and as a strong supporter of the ‘one voice 
theory‘ of imperial foreign affairs. Yet Casey emphasized 
that Australia had very practical reasons for its close 
relationship with Great Britain. In 1938, Casey summed up 
his reasoning thus:  
 
between Australia and Great Britain there is a 
community of interest that probably does not exist with 
equal force between any other two countries in the 
world. On those very material grounds we are in a 
unique degree dependent on the continued existence of 
Great Britain, and that is why I say I am an Imperialist 
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as well as an Australian.68 
 
Thus, Casey emphasised the ‘material’ link to empire and 
believed that the security of Australia and Britain were 
closely linked. Given that the United States was in no mood 
to offer protection to Australia and given the parlous state 
of Australia’s military preparedness, Britain’s was the 
logical, indeed, the only source of protection on offer. Like 
most Australian leaders, Casey wanted to forge closer links 
to Britain with a view to influencing British thinking. This 
did not rule out a closer relationship between Australia and 
the United States. Bringing the United States and the 
British Empire closer together was a strong theme among 
Australian politicians, as well as the British Prime Ministers, 
Chamberlain and Churchill.69 
 
Lyons’ sudden death in 1939 enabled Casey to stand for 
the leadership of the United Australia Party (and Prime 
Ministership) but he was easily beaten by Menzies. Hudson 
claims that the leadership was denied Casey because he 
was ‘far too modest and too inept in organizing support for 
himself’.70 As Bridge has pointed out, Casey ran an abysmal 
third after Menzies and the indefatiguable former Prime 
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Minister, Billy Hughes, having made the dual mistakes of 
first backing the candidature of Bruce and then courting the 
Country Party.71Thereafter, Casey’s role was always focused 
upon the international arena, though Casey himself 
continued to harbour leadership ambitions in the decades 
that followed. 
Both Lyons and Menzies made use of Casey’s international 
connections and diplomatic skills.Casey was an important 
contributor to the Imperial Conference of 1937 which he 
attended with Lyons, Hughes, Archdale Parkhill  and Bruce, 
High Commissioner in London since 1933. Casey in the 
1930s, like Menzies, Gullett, Lyons, and the majority of 
Australia’s political class, sat firmly in the appeasement 
camp. Or, as David Lowe has put it,‘to divide Australians 
into ‘appeasers’ and ‘anti-appeasers’ is an historic 
nonsense, collapsing a broad range of positions, most of 
them involving concessions or efforts to improve relations 
between the major nations, into opposing camps’.72 
Casey, as Bridge has put it, was one of the ‘ultra’ 
appeasers.73 The aim was to keep Australia out of a war 
with Japan and to ensure that Britain did not become 
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entangled in a war in continental Europe with the result 
that it would be unable to assist in the security of Australia.  
Australian political leadership on both sides of the left-right 
divide recognised Australia’s vulnerability in the face of 
German aggression, Japanese militarism, and the threat 
posed by the arms race. After the beginning of the 
European conflict, it was not difficult for Menzies to be won 
over and to agree to a rapid expansion of Australia’s 
diplomatic positions. Despite the prohibitive cost of a 
legation with its own staff and premises, Australia would 
now have a voice in Washington as insurance against the 
ever-increasing danger of Japan embarking on a rampage 
in the Pacific. In June 1939, the British Prime Minister, 
Neville Chamberlain had promised Menzies: 
in the event of war with Germany and Italy, should 
Japan join in against us, it would still be His Majesty’s 
government’s full intention to dispatch a fleet to 
Singapore…it would be our intention to achieve three 
main objects, (1) the prevention of any major 
operation against Australia, New Zealand or India, (2) 
to keep open our sea communications, (3) to prevent 
the fall of Singapore.74 
Menzies gave every indication that already he was 
convinced that Britain could not sustain war with Germany 
and simultaneously send vast resources to defend British 
interests in the Pacific and Asian regions. This showed no 
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great perspicacity. Britain’s long period of running down 
defence preparations during the 1920s and 30s inevitably 
raised doubts about her ability to cope with major conflicts 
in two parts of the globe. Even Bruce was privately 
doubtful that Britain would or even could live up to its 
commitments.75 
Menzies sent Casey to London late in 1939 to evaluate 
assurances from Britain about the Far East; the 6th Division 
of the Australian Imperial Force was about to be sent to 
Britain to help in the war against Nazi Germany. Casey 
reported that he found the assurances of the British 
government about Singapore satisfactory. Casey had his 
doubts about how much of the British assurances should be 
believed, but on balance accepted the view that the main 
enemy for Britain and Australia in 1939 was Nazi Germany. 
In reality, unless Australia could interest the United States 
more in the South-West Pacific, the Australian government 
had little choice other than to hope that Britain would live 
up to its promises.76 Menzies and his cabinet made the 
decision to send the 6th Division on the basis of Casey’s 
recommendations.77Bridge explained Casey’s logic in the 
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following terms: ‘regardless of all else, the Pacific defence 
situation depended upon the survival of Britain and her 
fleet. Thus by defending Britain, the Australian 6th Division 
would be indirectly defending Australia’.78 
While Casey was in London, Menzies appointed him as 
Minister heading the Australian legation in Washington. 
Casey was not Menzies first choice, but he was the obvious 
appointment. As Waters has put it, Casey was ‘Australia’s 
first diplomat of significance in the 1920s and a well-
connected senior minister in the 1930s’.79 Casey was 
certainly better versed than most in United States 
government affairs. In July 1937, Casey, as Australian 
Treasurer, visited Washington and spoke to Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull and other high-ranking American officials 
about the contentious Empire-United States trade relations.  
By that time, Britain was viewing favourably the signing of 
a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States, a 
development that owed as much to Britain’s desire for 
closer ties to the United States as it did to easing up trade 
restrictions. However, this would involve Australia losing 
much of its advantages under the Imperial preference 
scheme and abandoning high protective tariffs. Casey’s 
talks achieved little. He was able to give the Americans an 
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assurance that the Australian government would be 
prepared to make concessions, but only on the condition 
that the United States government indicated beforehand 
the extent of its concessions. This was the stumbling point. 
From the American viewpoint, Casey’s offer was an 
advance in negotiations but in effect, it achieved nothing. 
His talks with leading figures in the State 
Department,however, had left a very favourable 
impression. According to Moffat, the American Consul-
General in Australia, the Washington officials believed 
‘Casey the smartest of the lot…a future P.M’.80 
Yet the context of Casey’s appointment to the United 
States revealed personal qualities in Menzies that would 
eventually contribute to his downfall in 1941 and cast a 
shadow over Casey’s suitability for the job of leading the 
Australian legation in Washington. Despite knowing of 
Casey’s reluctance to terminate his political career in 
Australia for the diplomatic posting to the United States, 
Menzies advised the Dominions Secretary in London, 
Anthony Eden, that Casey would be going to Washington. 
This was before Casey had definitely accepted the post.81 
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Casey, from London, told Menzies that he (Casey) could 
render more valuable service in Australia, but that he 
would go if that was what Menzies wanted.82 At this time, 
Casey confided in Bruce that the reason he wanted to 
remain in Australian politics rather than take up the 
Washington appointment was to be available should 
Menzies cease being Prime Minister, a distinct possibility at 
that time.83  Casey’s response to Menzies’ request may be 
seen as loyalty to his leader, especially in the increasingly 
fraught times or alternatively as reluctance to press his 
own interests. His language in the reply to Menzies carries 
some significance: ‘With the knowledge I have acquired 
here (in London) I feel that I could be of some assistance 
to you in the serious times that lie ahead…my judgment is 
that I could render more valuable service in Australia (than 
in the United States)’. He was thus arguing, perhaps to 
himself, that taking over from Menzies would be of far 
greater service to Australia than accepting the Washington 
post.  Yet, he seemed incapable of asserting that 
argument.84 
In a cablegram to Bruce in London asking him to visit 
Washington ‘to negotiate with the American administration 
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for establishment of reciprocal Legations and to inaugurate 
our own’, Menzies let slip his doubts about Casey: ‘I have 
had some reservations about Casey, but on the whole I 
think that a man of political experience is essential at 
Washington, and he appears to be the most suitable of 
those available’.85 No matter how it is read, this was hardly 
a ringing endorsement of Casey.  
In taking up the post of Australian Minister to the United 
States, Casey was breaking new ground. Australia had 
never had An independent diplomatic presence in the 
United States. Given the fact that Casey was not Menzies’ 
first choice, it could be seen as almost serendipity that 
Casey was appointed to be Australia’s first senior 
diplomatic appointment. Certainly the appointment was 
fortuitous given Australia’s lack ofexperience in foreign 
relations; Casey was, by Australian standards, a veteran of 
international diplomacy.As Cecil  Edwards has put it, before 
the outbreak of the Pacific conflict, Australian foreign policy 
was ‘being formulated largely by the triangular traffic of 
cables between Bruce in London, Casey in Washington and 
Menzies in Canberra’.86 On the other hand, the United 
States certainly represented a major personal challenge for 
Casey. After the years spent in London, working with 
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British mandarins at the centre of the Empire, would Casey 
be able to assert an Australian role in international 
diplomacy?  
The verdicts are mixed. For his supporters, Casey’s 
appointment to the Washington post enabled him to 
exercise the diplomatic and public relations skills that he 
had exercised so effectively in London. For the 
representative of a small nation, entirely without influence, 
Casey, after assuming the post on 6 March, 1940, quickly 
gained frequent access to President Roosevelt, himself 
renowned as a politician of engaging charm. Casey 
cultivated Administration officials and the service chiefs. As 
the Australian Dictionary of Biography put it: ‘Although he 
was now 50, boyish charm and courteous deference 
opened doors to him, and he was a keen convert to the 
American craft of public relations’.87  Indeed, he engaged 
the services of a public relations consultant and showed 
remarkable energy in promoting his mission. While not a 
typical day, Casey’s account of his movements for 3 
December 1940 illustrates his energy in undertaking what 
he saw as his responsibilities, his diary noting simply: ‘Saw 
the Secretary of State, Dinner at Legation, Justice 
Frankfurter, Joseph Alsop (Columnist) Admiral Stark (Chief 
of Naval Operations) John Foster and Danish Minister. Left 
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on midnight train to Hartford Connecticut’.On this occasion, 
Casey was to remain in Hartford for just one day, meeting 
persons of influence, especially newspaper and university 
people, inspecting munitions factories and addressing 
meetings before flying onto Boston and then New York in a 
similar routine.88 
The American press certainly approved of Casey. The New 
York Times, commenting on his appointment to 
Washington, reported that ‘Australia has given her best in 
sending us Richard G. Casey’.89 Hudson makes the point 
that Casey had a rare talent for charming important 
people, evident in both his London and Washington years: 
His natural shyness and boyishness now a little at odds 
with his age (when he arrived in the United States he was 
nearly fifty) made for a socially powerful combination.  
President Roosevelt liked him and took him up, and when 
Maie (Casey) arrived in Washington, the President’s wife, 
Eleanor, had the Caseys to tea at the White House. He 
melted the austere heart of Cordell Hull, also a shy man.  
He wisely took the precaution of courting Harry Hopkins, 
Roosevelt’s closest and most privileged adviser …and paid 
close attention to the President’s man at the State 
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Department Adolf Berle…Cabinet members, Supreme Court 
justices and servicemen.90  
According to Millar, Casey became ‘a trusted, informal 
intermediary’.91  Millar also argues that so far as anyone 
could do it, he put Australia on the map in America.92Alan 
Watt, who took over from Keith Officer, an Australian 
diplomat in the Washington legation, noted that, ‘it is clear 
that Roosevelt had a high opinion of Casey’, and recounted 
a number of incidents when Roosevelt and the Roosevelt 
Administration employed Casey on delicate diplomatic tasks 
that were apparently beyond the capabilities of their own 
people. 93 
 
An example of Casey’s high standing became apparent 
when United States Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, avowedly pro-Allied and a personal 
acquaintance of Casey, requested Casey to give to 
Churchill a personal message before he met Harry 
Hopkins, who was about to spend some time in 
London with the Prime Minister. The Justice was 
anxious that Churchill express to Hopkins his great 
admiration for the American president, to match 
Hopkins’ admiration which bordered on worship. It 
says a great deal about the relationship that 
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Frankfurter selected Casey as the one most suitable to 
carry the message.94  
 
 
Maie Casey is worth special mention at this point. Although 
Maie Casey remained in the background of Richard Casey 
for most of her life, in the words of the writer, Kay 
Saunders, she was a bohemian, adventurous and 
unconventional at one level but deeply status conscious, 
snobbish and demanding on another. Saunders describes 
the marriage as close but puzzling. Saunders claimed that 
she moved in the highest international circles, ‘a confidante 
of Gandhi, Churchill, Noel Coward, Dame Judith Anderson 
and Eleanor Roosevelt’.95  The inclusion of the name of the 
President’s wife in Maie Casey’s circle may have gone some 
way towards Casey’s apparent ease of entry into the Oval 
Office and his attempts to establish an influential presence 
in the White House. Eleanor Roosevelt’s winning personality 
and the active role she played in the Roosevelt 
administration is well documented. Maie Casey was a 
talented artist who furnished her Washington abode with 
her private art collection brought from Australia and 
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enchanted Washington with an exhibition of Australian 
settler and Aboriginal art.  
Edwards views Casey as having successfully worked 
towards a better understanding between Britain and the 
United States. One of Evatt’s biogpraphers, Kylie Tennant, 
takes a similar view: ‘Casey’s extraordinary charm had 
brought him such success in Washington that the British 
Embassy had been only too glad to follow his advice’.96 A 
like judgment by Watt throws some light on Casey’s actual 
activities in America:  ‘Casey was an excellent host, with a 
flair for starting a conversation and inducing men of 
different outlook and views to carry it on’.  Further, Watt 
writes of Casey that: 
His university and official experience in England and his 
understanding of the English temperament and outlook 
made it possible for him to explain Englishmen to 
Americans and Americans to Englishmen, and often to 
bring together on social occasions representatives of the 
two countries whose direct contacts had been formal 
rather than close.97 
Paul Hasluck, usually numbered among Casey’s critics, had 
no reservations about Casey’s Washington appointment: 
‘Early in 1940, the appointment of Casey as first Australian 
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Minister to the U.S. had robbed the government of an 
experienced, energetic and tactful minister who could push 
ahead with a job and still be pleasant about it’.98 Bridge 
claims that Casey’s contribution to Australian war policy 
was ‘fundamental’: Casey ‘served with great distinction, 
especially in the dark and difficult days before Pearl 
Harbor’.99Tennant refers to Casey being popular in 
Washington, ‘in the handsome tradition of old-time 
diplomacy’.100 Taking a slightly different slant, Hudson has 
claimed that Casey personified to Americans ‘the Hollywood 
notion of a handsome Britisher enlivened by New World 
zest’.101 Hudson also notedthat senior British services 
personnel ‘liked the cut of his jib’.102 
On the other hand, it should be noted that Casey worked 
hard at achieving his preferred self-image. Hudson goes so 
far as to claim that this meant that Casey used ‘a mask’ 
when his views differed from those of the person to whom 
he was speaking.103  Hudson may be referencing an earlier 
book by Percy Spender, who knew Casey for over thirty 
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years and wrote of him: ‘In many ways, his demeanour 
appeared to mask the inner man, and the mask and the 
man, it may happen, become in the end, indistinguishable 
one from the other; the mask indeed can become the man 
behind’.104 Spender suspected that, despite his confident 
image, Casey, at heart, was a somewhat shy man and ‘this 
may account for the mask which I think was always with 
him’.  
An alternative explanation is that Casey had learned from 
his diplomatic experience that masks were a necessary part 
of the job. Indeed, Casey’s Washington diary is full of bitter 
and sarcastic comments about influential Americans and 
the American people more generally, but no hint of these 
heartfelt views were allowed to contaminate Casey’s gospel 
of goodwill to the United States from Australia.Casey 
certainly made no secret of his admiration for British 
stoicism in the face of the Nazi onslaught, telling his diary 
on 27 June 1940 that ‘The British race is the finest race in 
the world’.105 The contrast was with the Americans and their 
complete failure to live up to their duty to ‘come in’ and 
join Britain’s fight against the dictators.  In one of his 
darker moments, Casey speculated on the reason for the 
American failure to help Britain in 1940: 
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May it not possibly be that there is the same sort of 
feeling between U.S.A. and Britain as there is between 
Japan and China? – ie the one having drawn its 
civilization from the other – hating to acknowldedge it 
– having a sense of inferiority from it?106 
Casey met Roosevelt one-on-one on no fewer than eleven 
occasions.107  Although he is on record noting the difficulties 
in arranging to see Roosevelt, his relations with the 
President became closer over time.108Before Pearl Harbor at 
least, these Presidential conversations tested Casey’s 
patience, though he usually described their outcome as 
useful.Casey described an interview with Roosevelt as 
being something of a monologue: ‘It is not easy to get an 
opportunity to express oneself and you have to hop in 
while he’s pausing for breath’.109Hudson confided to this 
author that ‘in my judgment, Casey had so recommended 
himself at every level in Washington, including the White 
House, that there was nothing inherently improbable in 
Roosevelt having confided in him’.110 
Even so, the critics have tended to disparage even Casey’s 
seemingly easy access of Roosevelt. David Day has noted 
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that Casey mostly accompanied Lord Lothian, the British 
Ambassador, when he visited the White House. For Day, 
Casey did on occasions make Australia’s voice heard but he 
was more likely to be perceived as a British cipher.111It is 
certainly true that the British Embassy in Washington, was 
soon drawing attention to Casey’s skills in the area of 
disseminating its message.112 Just about every source noted 
that Casey worked closely with Lothian, who had the 
principal responsibility for arguing Britain’s case in 
Washington. Casey was himself so good at arguing the 
British case that some American press assumed that Casey 
would replace Lothian when the latter unexpectedly died in 
December 1940.113 All of this makes Casey an easy target 
for those who prefer to see Casey as a British ‘agent’ 
pushing the ‘Empire’ line.  
 
The diplomat Malcolm Booker summed up the charge 
against Casey: ‘Throughout his stay in Washington, Casey 
invariably deferred to the British Ambassador, as is 
indicated in his own writings’. While conceding that Casey 
and his wife occupied an influential position in Washington, 
Booker claims that he used that influential position not so 
much to promote a specifically Australian point of view as 
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to act as a broker between the British and the Americans.114 
Booker claimed that, as a senior cabinet minister in the 
Menzies Cabinet, Casey showed surprising humility in 
accepting the secondary rank of ‘minister plenipotentiary’. 
This was a rank below ambassaor, making it clear that 
Britain was the senior partner in the Imperial allliance. 
Booker makes the point that the terms of his Washington 
appointment placed him in a position of inferiority to all the 
important diplomatic representatives in the capital. 
According to Booker: ‘In particular, it symbolized to the 
rank-conscious Americans, Australia’s readiness to accept a 
role subordinate to the British’. Booker asserts that this 
relationship was doubtless confirmed by the Note which the 
British Ambassador delivered to the State Department 
declaring that the Casey appointment was not to be 
regarded as denoting ‘any departure from the diplomatic 
unity of the Empire’.115  In the words of the historian, 
L.E.Fredman: ‘The fiction of the diplomatic unity of the 
Empire was still maintained even in announcing this first 
appointment’.116 
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Stephen Alomes is even less kind, portraying Casey as an 
‘imperial boy scout’ and ‘another good boy scout for the 
Empire’.117According to Alomes, Casey was ‘more British 
than the British’.118 A similar conclusion can be drawn from 
Roger Bell’s account of Casey’s years in Washington. 
Conceding that the Australian minister developed close 
associations with Roosevelt’s personal adviser, Harry 
Hopkins and with Secretary of State Hull and close but 
unofficial contacts with Generals Marshall and Arnold and 
Admiral King, Bell claims that these were inappropriate and 
insufficient to meet the needs of intimate war-time 
collaboration.119While acknowledging that Casey is entitled 
to some of the credit for a changed American attitude to 
Australia’s defence needs in 1942, Reese claims that ‘Casey 
had a high opinion of his own work in 
Washington’.120According to Alomes, Casey was ‘more 
concerned with bringing the United States into the war (as 
Britain wanted) than with avoiding a Pacific war (as 
Australia wanted)’.121 
Writing of the withholding from the Australian government 
of the policy adopted by Churchill and Roosevelt to ‘Beat 
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Hitler First’ in 1941, Day describes the violent reaction by 
Evatt upon learning of the existence of this policy when 
visiting London in May, 1942.  Day speculates who was 
responsible for concealing the ‘Beat Hitler First’ decision 
from Evatt and the Australians up to that time and lays the 
blame primarily with Churchill, ‘connived at by Roosevelt’ 
and ‘aided and abetted by Australia’s representatives in 
Washington and London who did a grave disservice to their 
duty when they became involved in this campaign and 
withheld vital information from their political masters. Of 
those representatives, Day is unsparing in his criticism: ‘As 
former or present conservative MPs, Page, Bruce and Casey 
proved ill-suited to serve the needs of a more nationalistic 
Labor government’.122 
The centrality of Curtin’s ‘Look to America’ has led to the 
popular view that politicians of that era could be divided 
into ‘Australia first’ and ‘Britain first’ camps. Yet the charge 
that Casey withheld information about the ‘Beat Hitler First’ 
policy from the Australian government does not hold up, as 
Bridge has shown. The Australian War cabinet saw the 
report of the ABC1 talks of January-March 1941, which 
decided the ‘Hitler first’ issue.123As Curran has pointed out, 
there was general agreement in Australia upon the 
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importance of Britain to Australia’s survival.124Up until Pearl 
Harbor, it was not only Casey and his fellow UAP members 
who prioritised the need to win the war in Europe. Upon 
becoming Prime Minister in October 1941, Curtin did not 
change Australia’s military strategy or question the 
commitment of troops to Britain. As late as November 
1941, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, Curtin agreed to 
reinforcing the AIF in the Middle East.125 In other words, it 
was not just conservatives, but Labor politicians too who 
saw the good sense from Australia’s perspective in ‘saving 
Britain’. 
Joseph Maiolo writes of a noticeable change of mood in 
Washington in the last months of 1941.  Hull had become 
convinced that further negotiations with Japan were futile.  
Frank Knox, Political Head of the Navy, and Henry Stimson, 
Political Head of the Army, both former Republicans in the 
Hoover regime, were firmly of the view that hostilities with 
Japan were inevitable.  Knox had been Republican Vice 
President nominee in the Presidential race of 1936.  
Stimson had been Secretary of State in the Hoover 
Administration. It is significant that two experienced men 
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from the conservative side of politics came to these 
conclusions about Japan.126 
The advent of a Labor government in Australia in October, 
1941 initially gave Casey no reason to consider his future, 
after he was refused permission to return to Australia for 
consultation.127  Curtin, the new Prime Minister wanted him 
to remain at his post in the United States.128Casey’s 
relations with the new Minister for External Affairs,Evatt, 
however, were not amicable and Casey ultimately accepted 
the offer of the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to 
become Britain’s Minister of State in the Middle East, based 
in Cairo. Casey accepted this appointment despite knowing 
of Curtin’s strong preference for him to remain in 
Washington.129 
Few events in his long career attracted as much criticism 
from both his political opponents and, in the long term, 
writers and historians, as his acceptance of the Cairo 
appointment.130  Curtin wanted Casey to remain as the 
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Australian representative in the United States and his 
decision to accept Churchill’s offer has been often 
portrayed as a snub to Australia in its hour of need. 
Curiously, some observers who were not impressed with 
his efforts during the two years he spent in the United 
States were critical of his leaving. The intensity of the 
debate about the posting to the Middle East may be gauged 
by Churchill’s response to Curtin’s objections: 
Both principal Ministers I have consulted and Chiefs of 
Staff are agreed in wanting Casey for this most 
important post which requires military experience and 
knowledge of public affairs both ministerial and 
diplomatic.  I had a whole evening in the train with 
Casey when I was in America and learned from him 
that he was very anxious for a change.131 
Churchill went on to suggest that Curtin appoint Menzies to 
replace Casey in Washington, a suggestion that fell on deaf 
ears. 
This was at a time when the war situation created 
unbearable tensions, pushing tempers to a knife edge. For 
instance, on virtually his last day in Washington, Casey 
noted: 
Splenetic reaction from Mr. Curtin and from the 
Melbourne Herald about my accepting Mr. Churchill’s 
proposal. Mr. Curtin is hard pressed —and in respect of 
him, I believe I have happened, by bad chance, to come 
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between the hammer of his and the anvil of Mr. 
Churchill.132 
The sometimes acrimonious exchanges between Curtin and 
Churchill over the latter’s offer to Casey of a senior 
Ministerial position in the Middle East in 1942 reveal a 
duality in Casey’s personal relationships.  Hudson observes 
that Casey never forgave Curtin for objecting to and 
attempting to stop him leaving Washington for the Cairo 
appointment. His unforgivedness extended to refusing 
invitations in later years to write about Curtin. Yet Hudson 
also sees a  redeeming quality in Casey in that he never 
allowed his personal animosity to affect his official 
responsibilities. According to Hudson, Casey ‘went out of 
his way’ to sell Curtin and Evatt in high places.133 
So far as the Cairo appointment was concerned, Hudson’s 
observations suggest that Casey should have realised that 
he was not qualified for the job, which according to 
Hudson, ‘was awesome in its scope and complexity’. 134 
Casey’s difficulties in the Middle East would do great harm 
to his reputation.The post was so complex that it is 
doubtful if any one person, no matter how experienced, 
could have juggled, successfully, the many competing 
interests that formed the area of every day responsibilities. 
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On 8 March 1942 the American jurist, Felix Frankfurter, by 
now a close friend of Casey, was moved to commit to his 
diary:  
My sum total impression was that poor Dick Casey never 
in his life gave a thought to the position of the Jew in the 
world in general, or to Zionism in particular, that he 
suddenly is confronted with problems for which he has no 
background… Casey not only knows nothing of the 
Balfour Declaration and of Palestine since then, but he 
doesn’t even know that there is such a history or that 
people like me know it. 135 
Casey’s difficulties in his new, Middle East role emanated 
principally from the British Foreign Office, whose officials 
regarded the Australian as an ignorant outsider who had 
usurped the Resident Foreign Office representative there. 
Yet it was not the case that Casey left the Middle East 
without accolades.  When Lebanon declared war on the 
Axis powers in February, 1945, and became a foundation 
member of the new United Nations, Casey would have been 
entitled to appreciate the comment of a London newspaper 
that ‘the refreshing frankness of Mr R.G. Casey had a good 
deal to do with the agreement’.136 The British 
Representative in Beirut, Louis Spears reported to London 
that Casey had turned out ‘to be a real rock’. 137 In any 
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event, Casey’s efforts apparently satisfied Churchill, who, 
the following year, offered him the governorship of Bengal. 
Despite his stellar career, Casey’s reputation as a politician 
mostly revolved around the perception that he was a ‘good 
man’ well-liked by his colleagues and acquaintances but 
somehow superficial and lacking in political substance. As 
Hudson has put it, ‘All his life, he tried to be a good man 
(and) like all men, Casey could be inconsistent and foolish; 
he could be vain and self-seeking; in some intimate 
relationships he could be inept; especially as he aged, he 
could show lack of proportion in estimates of his own 
importance’.138 
As evidence that Casey was ‘a good man’, Anne Henderson 
has described how, upon the death of Lyons in April 1939, 
Casey gave substantial on-going financial support to Enid 
Lyons and her large family, most of whom were dependent. 
Federal Cabinet, immediately after Lyons’ death, chose 
Casey with his ‘dignity and tact’, as the appropriate person 
to ask the widow, Enid, where she wanted the late prime 
minister to be interred.139 Hasluck, whose career was similar 
to Casey’s to an astonishing degree, wrote of him, ‘Dick 
Casey presented himself well. I am not sure how much of 
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this was studied and contrived and how much was due to 
natural grace…either by early training or by nature, he 
found it congenial to be on parade and met people easily 
and without shyness’.140 Bridge identifies Casey’s gifts as 
being a good listener, a loyal assistant, well-travelled and 
read, and an officer and a gentleman in the old sense of 
those words.141 
The notion that Casey was ‘a good man’ is also taken up by 
Alan Renouf, former Australian diplomat, in his book 
dealing with the foreign policy of Evatt.  Commenting on 
Casey’s advising President Roosevelt of the impending visit 
to Washington of the new Australian Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Casey wrote that Evatt was ‘an intense admirer of 
the United States’.  Renouf called this comment ‘weighty 
testimony as Casey was politically opposed to Evatt. 
Moreover, Evatt, after becoming Foreign Affairs Minister in 
late 1941, left Casey in no doubt of his animosity towards 
him. However Casey was always a fair man’. 142 Indeed, 
Evatt’s attitude to Casey, according to one memoir, may 
have been based on Evatt’s distrust of those members of 
‘the ruling class who were imbued with a sense of social 
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superiority’, including Menzies, Bruce and Casey. Yet the 
same memoir claims that, over the years, Evatt’s opinion 
mellowed. Casey, as Foreign Minister, as a matter of 
courtesy, gave Evatt advance notice of what he planned to 
say in a foreign affairs debate in parliament.143 
Similar attestations of Casey’s generosity of spirit appear in 
the entry of Garry Woodward and Joan Beaumont in an 
anthology of Paul Hasluck’s achievements. As they put it: 
‘The observation of the forms did not stand in the way of 
Casey taking a deep and often generous interest in his 
senior officers’ personal circumstances’. 144 For Hudson, 
Casey was something of a virtuous anachronism.  He 
describes Casey as ‘a moral man…an oddly innocent 
man…an honourable man’, but with notions of honour 
belonging in the early twentieth century rather than later.145 
Hudson notes in Casey what he describes as ‘an Edwardian 
paradigm of secular gentlemanliness’.146 
Yet Casey’s popularity could be interpreted as a flaw. The 
United States’s Consul-General to Australia in late 1941, 
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Nelson T. Johnson, recorded a conversation with Evatt at a 
social gathering at Johnson’s home shortly after the 
formation of the Curtin government, during which Casey 
became the topic of conversation. Evatt had expressed the 
view that Casey was a poor representative of Australia. 
Johnson noted that his polite remark to the effect that 
Casey appeared to have a good reputation and to have 
made a very wide circle of acquaintances in the United 
States brought a heated retort from Evatt: ‘The trouble 
with Casey is that he tries to be so popular.  All this 
popularity business is nonsense. What Australia needs in 
Washington is an unpopular man.  It is the unpopular man 
who gets things (done) because he does not have to worry 
about what people think of him’. 147It must be added that 
while Evatt was regarded in both London and Washington 
with reservations, bordering on hostility, Casey enjoyed 
genuine respect and widespread co-operation in both 
centres.148 
Clearly, Casey in Washington was employing what later 
became known as ‘soft power’, that is, winning hearts and 
minds by building a favourable opinion about, in this case, 
Australia. To the contemporary mindset, this proposition 
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seems blindingly obvious. But in 1930s Australia, a nation 
that hitherto had had no foreign relations and no foreign 
service, international diplomacy, especially in regard to the 
United States, represented something new. If Casey’s style 
did, in fact, add to his substance, it also made his 
substance more acceptable, certainly in Europe and 
Washington. He was not a quintessential Australian 
politician, a shortcoming that inhibited his career in 
Australia. Viewed in a positive light, Casey’s style gave him 
easier entrée into senior levels in Washington and London, 
where his substance would be heard and noted and 
perhaps heeded.  
Casey’s personal characteristics were subjected to 
examination by a colleague, who had the opportunity to 
observe him in a different context to Evatt. Watt, First 
Secretary at the Australian Legation in Washington during 
Casey’s appointment there, described him as ‘a man who 
learned more by personal contact and conversation than by 
reading documents and reflecting deeply upon their 
contents’.149  This practice of employing personal contact in 
preference to studying and responding to the 
documentation, arguably at least, encouraged a more 
effective and possibly more rapid exchange of views.  
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The conclusion that can be drawn is that Casey was good 
with people or that he possessed what today might be 
described as emotional intelligence. The historian M H Ellis 
made the observation, not entirely valid, that Casey had 
talked, at some time with nearly every man of note or fame 
in the world in the preceding fifty years. Moreover, Ellis 
argued that ‘no man in Australia, few in the British-
speaking world, have had such a variety of experiences and 
been associated with so many and so various an 
assortment of offices and personalities…he was accessible… 
he was always working, always had his facts at his 
fingertips’.150 Implicit in Casey’s practice was a belief that 
such exchange of views may well lead to a speedier 
resolution or agreement, rather than the more conventional 
exchange of diplomatic notes, possibly over an extended 
period. This is not to assert that oral negotiations ‘over the 
negotiating table’ invariably lead to a quicker resolution of 
the matter.  Actual personal contact between the 
negotiating parties, however, brings into play those 
qualities of personality, body language, manner, a 
readiness to at least understand and recognise the other’s 
position. 
Casey relied heavily on ‘the personal touch’ in all his 
dealings, whether they be with his colleagues or in his 
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diplomatic duties. He clearly felt the need to discuss and 
explore all aspects of an issue before reaching the point of 
conclusion where a policy position could be taken.Casey 
claimed to be at his best when he had a colleague with 
whom he was comfortable testing out ideas. This was the 
case during his first year in Washington when he worked 
hand-in-glove with Lord Lothian, the British ambassador. 
As Casey put it: 
My mind works best when I have some individual with 
whom I can argue out a problem- someone against 
whom one can fling one’s arguments- and they come 
back at you- and vice versa. This is the way Lothian and 
I worked.151 
Waters cites the example of how, when Casey was later 
Minister for External Affairs, he was at a loss as to how to 
proceed with a review of its organisaiton. His friend, Lester 
Mike Pearson, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, 
was the type of person who could act as a sounding board 
to enable Casey to develop new policies. ‘If only Mike and I  
could get alone somewhere and think it through’, a solution 
could be found’. Casey explained that his senior 
departmental officers were adequate at this sort of 
discussion but that they were so pressed with day-to-day 
problems that they had no time for basic thinking. Casey 
admitted that he was no good ‘at battling this sort of thing’ 
through by himself and that he had to have somebody with 
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whom he could bat the ball back and forth. Lest too much 
might be made of one dinner-table conversation, Waters 
makes the point that studying Casey’s ‘voluminous diaries’ 
reveals little evidence of foreign policy being worked out on 
paper or through memoranda or departmental submissions.  
Rather, ‘it is the private meeting, the personal exchange 
and the lunch or dinner conversation where Casey was at 
his best’.152 
On the other hand, Casey was not often described as a 
deep thinker or significant driver of policy. Edwards, in his 
examination of the making of Australian foreign policy, 
concluded that Casey was not a major Australian policy-
maker while in Washington. According to Edwards, Casey 
was ‘charming, tactful and quick witted, but not a profound 
or original thinker on great issues.  It could be said that 
throughout his career, he was more of a diplomat than a 
politician in the sense that he ably executed the policies 
devised by others’.153 
If accurate, Casey’s alleged lack of substance in the area of 
policy development constitutes a serious impediment to 
leadership. But it is perhaps less of an impediment for a 
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diplomat undertaking representative duties. Casey 
seemingly recognised his failing in this area, even if he was 
unable to overcome it. In a different context, Millar claimed 
that Casey lacked the intellectual skill to out-argue 
Menzies. Given that Menzies has often been described as 
one of the best orators to grace the Australian political 
spectrum, Casey’s inferiority does not necessarily denote a 
significant failing.154 Yet, this inferior status of Casey vis-à-
vis his leader had all kinds of negative consequences. 
Waters suggests that to be an effective Minister for 
External Affairs in Australia requires either a close and 
intimate working relationship with the Prime Minister, such 
as Evatt had with Chifley, or the stature and energy to take 
the initiatives without prime ministerial approval, such as 
Spender did in committing Australian land forces to the 
Korean war without Menzies’ prior approval.155  Yet, by all 
accounts, the relationship between Menzies and Casey was 
anything but close. 
Here too, the evidence is far from conclusive when it comes 
to Casey’s understanding of world events. Casey, for 
example, warned Menzies against involvement in the ill-
fated Suez Crisis of 1956. He was also an early advocate of 
Australia forging closer relationships with non-Communist 
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Asia in the 1950s, relations that he fostered as Minister. 
These are examples of Casey as a perceptive and proactive 
thinker when it came to Australia’s foreign policy 
requirements. Casey was a key player in the Menzies 
years, but was not a stereotypic conservative nostalgic for 
empire.   
Casey, as we have noted, was viewed as sophisticated, 
British and engaging. His ‘people skills’ that came naturally 
to him and which he employed to the full in the varied 
assignments of his long working life created a lasting 
impression.The criticism that he was effectively a British 
agent in Washington does not stand up to any sort of 
scrutiny. Yet, Casey is not considered a heavyweight when 
it came to strategic thinking or planning. The suggestion 
contained in much of the literature is that Casey was a 
follower – a good ‘lieutenant’ as Hudson has put it – rather 
than a leader who can influence events. As we shall see, 
the achievements of Casey’s Washington mission require a 
modification to this picture of Casey as an amiable executor 
of orders given by others. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Casey, Australian Diplomacy and the 
American Challenge 
 
Because the alliance between the United States and 
Australia, formalised through ANZUS in 1951, is the 
bedrock of Australia’s post-war foreign policy, it is often 
forgotten that there was nothing obvious or natural about 
this alliance before Pearl Harbor. Casey’s task in the United 
States has to be situated in the context of the triangular 
Australia-Britain-United States relationship before the war. 
What each nation perceived as its ‘national interest’ was 
more often a source of conflict than agreement prior to 
Pearl Harbor. 
It is a cliche of international affairs that the concept of the 
‘national interest’ is one that is common to all nations.  
Perhaps the best definition came from the British 
statesman, Viscount Palmerston: ‘We have no eternal allies 
and we have no eternal enemies.  Our interests are eternal, 
and those interests it is our duty to follow’.156  Winston 
Churchill famously remarked that Britain does not have 
friends or allies, it only has interests; the French President 
Charles de Gaulle noted that nations have no feelings, only 
interests. The Australian academic Gary Smith defined 
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national interests in basic terms as ‘survival’.157 For less 
powerful states like Australia, the implications of the great 
powers’ prioritising of the national interest are alarming. In 
the words of David Day, national interest constituted: 
… one of the realities of international relations that 
nevertheless seems to demand constant repetition for 
it to be appreciated. It is this, that in the final analysis 
great states will act only to protect their perceived 
interests regardless of treaties and understandings with 
lesser states.158 
Casey understood the concept of the national interest; his 
practice of international politics placed him firmly in the 
‘realist camp’. Michael Wesley has defined ‘Australian 
realism’ in international relations in terms of three 
characteristics – experientialism, systemic pessimism and 
pragmatism. As we shall see, these three characteristics 
clearly apply to Casey’s approach to international 
diplomacy.  
Experientalism, according to Wesley ‘has fostered an 
intensive focus on the particularities of Australia’s 
international position — size, isolation, wealth, population, 
culture — and how these factors can help understand the 
ways in which Australia relates to the world beyond its 
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shores’.159Australia has always participated in, but also 
viewed skeptically, multilateral organisations such as the 
League of Nations or the United Nations. Instead, the 
tradition of Australian realism is to look for pragmatic 
solutions to the existential threats facing Australia.  
The crisis facing Australia in 1941-1942 was not 
unexpected. From the first settlement in the late 
eighteenth century, there has existed in Australia a sense 
of isolation from ‘home’, meaning Great Britain, that was 
keenly felt. As Wesley has put it: 
Since European colonisation, Australia has always been 
a rich, isolated, status quo state. This has fostered a 
particular attitude towards the outside world, and 
imbued Australians’ thinking about the world and their 
place in it with a distinctive character. It is only natural 
that a country’s physical location and basic perceptions 
of itself and its surrounds will be the most profound 
shaper of how its thinkers perceive international 
relations.160 
Although Britain’s navy was the most powerful in the world, 
there remained the fear engendered by the isolation of the 
Australian colonies, and later the Federation, that Britain’s 
seemingly unchallenged naval authority could not provide 
all the protection needed.  Moreover, the colonies were 
dismayed by the application of British diplomacy to 
problems in the Western Pacific even before Federation.  
                                               
159 Wesley, ‘The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism’, p. 326. 
160Ibid, p. 325. 
86 
 
The colony of Queensland, perceiving itself to be the 
closest to the ‘problem’ areas northwards and fearful of 
foreign occupation of New Guinea, in 1883 annexed the 
Territory of Papua.  The repudiation of the annexation by 
the British government and the German annexation of the 
north east of New Guinea heightened anxiety throughout 
the Australian colonies. 
In the two hundred and twenty-five plus years since the 
commencement of European settlement, Australians 
perceived several nations as constituting a serious threat to 
their security: France, Russia, Germany, China and Japan.  
The nearest neighbour, the Netherlands East Indies, was 
not considered in the same hostile terms because it was a 
colony of a friendly European power. These considerations 
lead to an understanding of why there has always existed 
in Australia a need, perceived but not always actual, for  
allies capable of rescuing Australia from conquest by a 
hostile Europan or Asian power.  Robert Menzies graphically 
expressed this need in a phrase that has entered the canon 
of Australian core beliefs: ‘No country in the world more 
than ours needs great and powerful friends’.161 
Critics of this view argue that the perception of an ever-
present threat is based upon an incorrect reading of the 
policy and posture of the ‘other’ nation, or else driven by 
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political imperatives.  Smith, Cox and Burchill suggest that 
Australia’s cultural insecurity explains its attitude towards 
the prospect of external military threats.  Recognising that 
Australia has never been invaded, they make the point that 
Australia has no traditional adversaries.162 
While the question arises as to what extent its secruity 
fears were products of Australian cultural isolation and 
insularity - a settler-colonial outlook projected into 
fantasies about potential military threats – a sense of 
vulnerabiity to external attack and fears of racial 
contamination became enduring themes of Australian 
history. These notions spawned an array of beliefs and 
initiatives, ranging from local defence forces, including 
individual navies in some colonies. However, more astute 
minds believed that the new nation should set about 
establishing friendly international relations outside the 
ambit of the empire. There were notions and ideas 
emerging that questioned the conventional wisdom of 
leaving the matter of ‘international relations’ to London.  
Australia took more than thirty years to develop its voice in 
international affairs. Shortly after Federation, the 
Department of External Affairs was created, but its 
responsibilities revolved principally around Australia’s 
relations with Britain and the Pacific islands and it was 
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eventually abolished in 1916, its functions distributed 
around other departments. As Hudson has pointed out, 
‘external affairs’ did not mean then what it means now. In 
1901, ‘external affairs’ simply referred to the imperial 
connection with London, not to connections with the world 
at large or even with the rest of the Empire. The ‘external’ 
relations of the embryonic Department of External Affairs 
was restricted to the Colonial Office in London.163 
Deakin, the second Prime Minister, recognised that the 
national interest of the fledgling nation of Australia would 
be served by the adoption of a more proactive role in 
international affairs. Deakin, who had become Prime 
Minster and Minister for External Affairs in September 
1903, set a standard of independence in international 
relations, specifically with the United States, that did not 
accord with the wishes of the British government.  One of 
his early clashes with London over this issue occurred in 
1907, while he was attending an Imperial Conference in 
London. Deakin proposed the creation of a permanent 
Imperial secretariat to give the self-governing colonies of 
the Empire an effective voice in foreign policy, defence and 
economic co-operation. The British government, not 
surprisingly, was opposed to conceding any responsibilities 
for foreign relations to the dominions, no matter what their 
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constitutions may or may not have said, but all lacking an 
ingredient that it, Britain, alone possessed, that is, the 
hundreds of years of experience in international relations 
that resided in Whitehall. Yet, Deakin was acting within the 
words, if not the spirit, of the Constitution and the reality 
that the Australian Constitution is a statute of the British 
Parliament, emphasised its arguing strength. Section 51, 
provides for the Commonwealth Parliament ‘…to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to…(xxix) External   Affairs’.  
While the formal alliance between Britain and Japan that 
began in 1902 did little to reassure Australians that their 
island home in the South-West Pacific had been made more 
secure, British politicans and military leaders saw the 
Anglo-Japanese naval alliance as a plus for the security of 
Australia. The alternative, from Britain’s perspective, was 
for Australia to pay more for its own defence. When Earl 
Kitchener produced his Memorandum on Australian Defence 
in 1910, he predicted the possibility of British naval forces 
being fully engaged in European waters and not being able 
to come to the aid of Australia in its moment of need. 
Kitchener saw the solution in compulsory military service 
and a more concentrated Australian defence posture. The 
British Foreign Secretary, clearly repudiating the Australian 
hostility to the treaty, noted in January 1911 that ‘the 
logical consequence of denouncing the Anglo-Japanese 
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alliance would be that Australia and New Zealand would 
undertake the burden of naval supremacy in the China Sea. 
This, they are neither willing nor able to do’.164 
In 1907, Prime Minister Deakin’s interpretation of the new 
Commonwealth’s responsibility took the novel form of 
inviting a visit by a significant American naval fleet then 
making its way around the world, a journey conceived by 
President Theodore Roosevelt to emphasise that the United 
States was indeed a power to be reckoned with. Ignoring 
what London would dictate as correct protocol, Deakin 
issued the invitation to the United States Consul-General in 
Melbourne, the State Department in Washington and the 
American Ambassador in London, without first approaching 
the British Foreign Office or the Governor-General, Lord 
Northcote.165 This was not an oversight, nor was it a 
deliberate snub on Deakin’s part, but rather a clever 
diplomatic ploy. He reasoned, probably correctly, that both 
the Governor-General and the Colonial Office in London 
would reject any request made through the normal 
channels.  By initially issuing invitations direct to various 
arms of the American administration, Deakin placed Britain 
in a position where a refusal became impossible, especially 
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after it was made public that the American Secretary of 
State had accepted the invitation, at a time, when the 
whole matter was a subject of furious debate in London.  
Deakin’s delight upon learning of the American acceptance 
of his invitations was captured by a journalist, who claimed 
that he was ‘trembling with excitement’, when he made the 
announcement.  He wrote that Deakin saw the visit as 
recognition by ‘the other Great White Power of the Pacific’ 
that Britain, the United States and Australia would be 
united ‘to withstand yellow aggression’.166 
The Great White Fleet, as it became known, received a 
tumultuous welcome at its Australian ports of call, Sydney, 
Melbourne and Albany, the reasons being obliquely spelt 
out by Deakin in his address of welcome, when he referred 
to ‘that unnatural treaty, the Anglo-Japanese treaty’ as 
opposed to the similar cultural heritage and traditions 
shared by Australia and the United States.167  Deakin was 
acknowledging both the hostility of many Australians to the 
Anglo-Japanese Agreement and a widespread desire for 
closer links with the United States, which was perceived as 
closer to Australia in outlook, institutions and life-style, 
more forward-looking than Britain and being more relevant 
to Australia’s security as a Pacific nation.  In an editorial, 
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The Age (Melbourne), while advocating the creation of an 
Australian navy, took comfort from America, ‘our friend and 
ally, navally dominant in the Pacific’.168 
Yet, it is possible to make too much of the visit to Australia 
of the ‘Great White Fleet’. In her oft-quoted article written 
in 1970, the historian Ruth Megaw claims that the visit was 
the first public opportunity which Australia had had of 
demonstrating her reaction to a permanent American 
presence in the Pacific. She claims, moreover, that the visit 
cast its shadow to a future American-Australian alliance 
which was not to eventuate until World War Two, but which 
was already present in a formless, embryonic fashion in 
many Australian minds in the early twentieth century.169  
This, surely, is hindsight.  It is true that public comment 
arising from the visit of the Great White Fleet emphasised 
the kinship with America based upon similarity of race, 
language, institutions and what might be termed the 
dynamics of a new nation. Australia was seen as a replica 
of the United States a hundred years earlier. It is true that 
Japan engendered a certain amount of fear, especially after 
her defeat of the Russian navy in 1905.   Yet, if  hopes of a 
mutual Pacific defence alliance between Australia and the 
United States arose from the visit, they would have been 
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laid to rest during the twenty long years of strict American 
isolationism following World War One. It must be admitted 
that the perception of the United States as a ‘saviour’ of 
Australia, should Japan embark on an expansion of her 
interests in the Pacific, was a popular one. Sadly, such 
views were often based on excessive optimism rather than 
an understanding of the real state of American politics.   
Australian interest in more independent foreign relations 
diminished in the governments that followed Deakin’s three 
ministries. The call by the then Opposition Leader, Andrew 
Fisher, in 1914 that Australia would aid Britain to ‘her last 
man and her last shilling’ reflected a patriotic fervour 
shown by many, but by no means, all Australians.170  
Michael McKernan suggests that 28 October 1916 could be 
Australia’s Independence Day when the Australian people 
voted against conscription, refusing to give the government 
of Billy Hughes the power “to compel young Australian men 
to go to war on the other side of the world.”171 He claims 
that it is significant that “so many embraced their 
responsibility” and turned out to vote when it was not 
compulsory to do so, rejecting Fisher’s ‘last man and last 
shilling’ call. Real politics meant that farms, factories, 
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offices, banks and schools all needed to manned.172 Thus  
we see ordinary Australians demonstrating independence 
and exercising an effect on foreign affairs. Although the 
impetus for an independent foreign policy was submerged 
during the Great War, it re-emerged immediately after.  
The British Dominions obtained direct representation at the 
Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 and Dominion 
ministers signed the Peace treaty on behalf of their 
respective governments. The Treaty was later ratified by 
these same Dominion governments. Moreover, the 
Dominions became full members of the League of Nations.                                                
Australia’s voice at the peace talks, due largely to the 
efforts of the Nationalist Prime Minister WM Hughes, was 
more influential than its relative size dictated, to the extent 
that Hughes argued with the American President, Woodrow 
Wilson, and played a small role in the writing of the 
League’s Charter.  Ironically, Hughes sided with Wilson in 
defeating an attempt by Japan to include, in the Covenant 
of the League, a declaration of racial equality.  Hughes had 
perceived this as a threat to the White Australia policy, 
about which he was, in the words of Poynter, ‘almost 
fanatical’.173 Yet Hughes, like Deakin, was able to show that 
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a small power like Australia could influence international 
decision making even if the decisions made after World 
War One created ever more formidable dangers in the 
Pacific. 
Hughes believed that the former German colonies and 
protectorates in the Pacific were potential bases for an 
attack on Australia and persuaded the League to grant 
Australia a mandate over what was previously the German 
protectorate of New Guinea, enabling it to be joined with 
the existing Australian Territory of Papua.174The Pacific 
came under discussion again at the Washington Conference 
in 1921, when three treaties were signed, the Naval Treaty 
being the one most relevant to Australia’s security. The 
terms of this Treaty provided for Britain, the United States, 
Japan, France and Italy to limit their naval strengths to 
specified ratios, that had the effect of the major powers 
reducing their tonnage of warships by about 40%. The 
Treaty also forbade the building of any new naval 
fortifications on the new Pacific mandates. While the ratios 
indicated that the Japanese navy would always remain 
smaller than either the British or American fleets, in fact, 
Japan emerged in a stronger position because her sphere 
of interest was limited to the Pacific, whereas Britain had 
responsibilities to guard an Empire that spanned the world.  
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Britain’s navy had to be spread thinly, while Japan could 
enjoy concentrating hers in just one, albeit large, ocean. 
Similarly, the United States needed to maintain fleets in 
the Pacific and the Atlantic. Thus Japan could become 
virtually dominant in the Pacific, a development that fed 
Australian disquiet.  
The Anglo-Japanese alliance was not renewed at the 
Washington conference and instead Britain decided that its 
strategy for protecting its interests east of Suez was the 
building of a naval base at Singapore. In theory, a British 
fleet could be sent to Singapore in time to check any act of 
aggression on the part of Japan before Australia was 
endangered. The justification for Britain’s building and 
maintaining the Singapore base was the crucial need for 
the south-east Asia region to keep Britain supplied with 
vital materials, such as rubber and oil. Singapore was also 
the key to Britain’s plans for defending Malaya, Australasia 
and India from Japanese aggression.  
The Singapore strategy has been criticised as inherently 
flawed because the British navy was not strong enough to 
fight a multi-ocean war and because fleets of battleships 
were becoming less important, as the naval stalemate of 
World War One showed and the rise of air power 
confirmed. On the other hand, defenders of the Singapore 
strategy have pointed out that fleets remained crucial, that 
naval tactics had improved since the Battle of Jutland, and 
97 
 
that there was no real alternative to British sea power in 
terms of defending Australia. As Christopher Bell has put it: 
During the 1920s Britain possessed a comfortable 
margin of naval superiority over its rivals, and it might 
have maintained a large fleet in the Far East and still 
dominated European waters. This possibility was only 
undermined by the emergence of a triple threat from 
Germany, Italy, and Japan in the mid-1930s, and it was 
only precluded by the fall of France in 1940. These 
events were exceptional, and unpredictable.175 
Casey, a cautious supporter of the Singapore strategy, 
would have to face up to these very ‘exceptional, and 
unpredictable’ events in June 1940. 
Bruce, a vastly different Prime Minister to Hughes, initially 
did not wish Australia to have an independent foreign 
policy but he later modified that position and propounded 
the view that the Dominions should have a greater 
influence in the development of the foreign policy of the 
Empire. A flaw in this argument is that the British Empire 
was made up of such scattered, disparate nation-states 
that it was almost impossible to conceive of a foreign policy 
that would be acceptable to them all.  Casey, writing in 
1938, perceived the difficulty: ‘The basic problem is how 
the immediate and direct interests of the various parts of 
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the Commonwealth are to be reconciled in practice with 
Imperial solidarity in the field of foreign affairs’. 176 
The Balfour Declaration of 1926 strengthened the 
autonomous direction of Australia vis-à-vis the 
Commonwealth. The members of the Commonwealth were 
to be regarded as equal in status and, in no way, 
subordinate to one another in their domestic or external 
affairs, although united by their common allegiance to the 
crown. The Statute of Westminster, passed by the British 
Parliament in 1931, gave legal form to the Balfour 
Declaration and resolutions passed by the Imperial 
Conference of 1930, and conferred on the Dominions (that 
is, members of the Commonwealth), full powers to make 
laws, which applied beyond their boundaries. Although 
Australia did not adopt the Statute of Westminster until 
1942, there were no reasons why Australia could not have 
been more innovative in establishing relations outside the 
Commonwealth. A proper interpretation of the relevant 
clause in the Constitution finally came in 1936, when two 
justices of the High Court, Evatt and McTiernan, held that 
the Federal government was utterly free to deal with 
foreign states.177 
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Writing about the 1920s and 30s, P.D. Phillips argued that 
‘Australia certainly was content to do without a foreign 
policy of its own’.178  Yet Bruce attempted to create a small 
Australian foreign service with its own ambassadors. 
Rejecting his earlier arguments, Bruce brought Allan 
Leeper, an Australian-born officer of the British Foreign 
Office, to Australia to advise on the organization of the 
External Affairs Office that had been re-established in the 
Prime Minister’s Department. It was Leeper who 
recommended the creation of the Liaison Officer post in 
London, to be occupied by Casey (1924-1931).179Casey 
proved to be a valuable source of information to the 
Australian Cabinet, information that otherwise may have 
remained hidden from local eyes. Before Casey, the 
Colonial Office was the main source, and, according to 
Hudson, delivered all material by sea-mail.180  However, 
cables would have arrived expeditiously. 
There were myriad possibilities of conflict between Australia 
and Britain, separated as they were by half the globe. 
Britain was vitally concerned with Europe, both from a 
trading point of view as much as by security 
considerations.  Australia, on the other hand, saw its 
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interests, especially its security interests, totally in the 
Pacific region. Nevertheless, Bruce persisted with the 
notion that Britain should consult Australia in formulating 
foreign policy. 
Edwards makes the point that between 3 March 1927 and 
23 September 1935, the Federal Labor caucus did not pass 
a single resolution on foreign policy.181The last of Australia’s 
‘commissioners’ in Washington, Herbert Brookes, in 1929, 
aware that both the onset of the world-wide Depression 
with the concomitant need for reduced government 
expenditure and the installation of a new Labor 
government in 1929 made his position less than tenable, 
saved Prime Minister James Scullin embarrassment by 
resigning the following year.182 In other words, the structure 
that Bruce had created in the External Affairs Department 
withered after his departure and had to await the arrival of 
a new government led by Joseph Lyons and his United 
Australia Party for some kind of revival. Bruce would play a 
part in this revival when Lyons appointed him High 
Commissioner to Britain in 1933, a post he retained until 
1945. 
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The uneasy relationship of Australia with Britain that had 
characterised the nineteen twenties persisted into the 
nineteen thirties. The basis of it lay in the two different 
ways in which Japan was perceived, Australia believing 
Japan to be a threat, Britain believing that Japan could 
bring a measure of stability to Pacific affairs.  There was 
certainly an element of wishful thinking on London’s part 
with Britain reluctant to commit naval forces to the Pacific 
and nominating Japan as a proxy.  Casey was one of many 
Australian leaders who breathed a sigh of relief when Japan 
turned north to invade Manchuria in 1931; Casey wanted 
Japan to have a ‘free hand’ in Manchuria to lessen its 
appetite for a southward invasion. There is an irony here in 
that one of the constant refrains Casey heard in 
Washington in 1940-42 from the likes of Secretary of War, 
Henry Stimson and Under Secretary of State, Sumner 
welles, was that British and Australian appeasement sowed 
the seeds of Japanese empire building in China. Casey was 
usually quick to respond that the Americans shared the 
blame for offering no guarantee of support for firmer 
British action. 
Appeasing Japan and Germany became a staple of the 
Lyons’ government and of Casey’s engagement with 
international politics.183In the first of several of his forays 
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into foreign relations, Lyons appointed a Minister for 
External Affairs, J.G. Latham, the first time since 1916 that 
the portfolio was not held by the Prime Minister. In 1934, 
Latham led a mission to Tokyo hoping to lessen tensions 
and achieve some kind of understanding with an 
increasingly aggressive Japan. Although he expressed 
sympathy for Japan in its dispute with China over 
Manchuria, Latham declined a Japanese offer to exchange 
diplomatic representatives, claiming that Australia was not 
yet ready to establish its own foreign service.  However, on 
Latham’s recommendation, a trade commissioner was 
appointed to Tokyo.184  The mission to Tokyo achieved little 
beyond laying on Lyons the mantle of belonging to the 
‘appeasement camp’, an appellation that later assumed a 
distinctly pejorative connotation, one which appeared to 
ignore the widespread desire to do whatever was necessary 
to avoid another major war.  
Reflecting somewhat forlorn hopes that the United States 
would become a security blanket for Australia in the event 
of Japanese aggression, Lyons was favourably inclined to 
the establishment of some kind of diplomatic presence in 
Washington. Moffat, the  Consul-General to Australia, drew 
Lyons’ attention to the practical difficulties in Australia 
needing to communicate with Washington by going through 
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London.  Moffat also had difficulties in understanding 
Australia’s reluctance to sever its close, or what he 
perceived as subservient, ties with Britain.185Lyons went 
only some of the way in acting on Moffat’s suggested 
creation of a legation in Washington, electing instead to 
appoint, in 1936, an Australian Counsellor to the British 
Embassy in Washington, an appointment floated by Bruce 
four years previously. Lyons agreed to London’s insistence 
that the officer appointed be ‘subject to the authority of the 
British Ambassador, who has the right to see all 
communications sent to the Commonwealth 
Government’.186 
Lyons, in London in 1937 for the Imperial Conference, 
raised the idea of a Pacific Pact binding nations committed 
to promoting regional understanding and peaceful 
settlement of disputes, a suggestion that drew little 
support. Lyons envisaged a pact embracing all the Pacific 
nations, including the United States and Japan plus those 
European powers with an interest in the Pacific, Britain, 
France, the Netherlands and Portugal. In mounting his 
argument to the conference, Lyons referred to a 
conversation with President Roosevelt in July, 1935, during 
which the American president had expressed his readiness 
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to enter into an agreement with Japan or with any other 
country to secure the preservation of peace.187 At this time, 
1935, relations between Japan and the United Sates were 
deteriorating rapidly and it is likely that Roosevelt’s reply, if 
quoted correctly, simply reflected a non-specific desire for 
an easing of tensions between the two nations without any 
intention of Lyons’ suggestion being acted upon. Certainly, 
no documentation could be found to substantiate Lyons’ 
claim.  
In rejecting Lyons’ plea for a Pacific Pact, the British 
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, claimed that it would 
simply repeat what was already in the Kellogg Pact of 
1928. It was at the Imperial Conference that Casey, who 
was there as a member of the Australian delegation, 
emerged as a strong advocate of greater Dominion 
participation in the formulation of British foreign policy and, 
according to Waters, emerged as spokesperson for the 
‘radical’ appeasers.188 Casey’s contribution could well be 
seen as an attempt to demonstrate that the Dominions 
could contribute to the formulation of what might be 
termed ‘Commonwealth Foreign Policy’, an aim already 
identified as part of the thinking of Lyons’ predecessor, 
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Bruce.  This was also the conference where the Australian 
delegation learnt that it would take between 53 and 70 
days for a British fleet to make the journey from European 
waters to Singapore, a revelation that added to the woes of 
the Australians.189 
Casey’s appetite for appeasement was certainly as 
wholehearted as anybody’s in the late 1930s. His aim was 
to ensure that Britain was not once more entangled in a 
continental war and therefore unable to defend Australia if 
required. After the German reoccupation of the Rhineland 
in 1936, Casey welcomed the speedy dismantling of the 
shackles imposed upon Germany at Versailles.190 Casey 
argued that rather than defend Czechoslovakia against the 
German menace, ‘it would be very much fairer to the 
smaller countries, and particularly those in Central and 
Eastern Europe’ if they were told the truth of the 
inevitability of a Greater Reich.191Strategically, Casey 
wanted Britain to do everything possible to woo Mussolini 
away from Hitler and therefore reestablish Italy as a British 
and not a German ally.192 This was hugely important in  
terms of the balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean, 
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and, therefore, Britain’s capacity to offer credible deterence 
to Japan in the Far East. Waters  makes the point that 
there was general recognition that the terms imposed upon 
Germany after 1918 were too harsh and that it would be 
only a matter of time before Germany commenced a re-
building program to restore her powerful position in 
Europe.193  The appeasement policies followed by British 
Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, most of the British 
Cabinet, and virtually the whole of the Australian ministry  
were  natural consequences of that recognition. There was 
certainly no offer of help from the United States during the 
1930s. Casey, understood all of these international 
currents as well as, and probably better than, any other 
Australian politician.  
Among the Australians, it was only Billy Hughes, Minister 
for External Affairs and a contributor to the Versailles 
Treaty, who argued for tougher action to stop German 
expansion. Even Hitler’s brazen takeover of the remainder 
of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 did not put an end to a 
faith in appeasement in Australia, with Menzies, for 
example, arguing strongly that Poland was not worth going 
to war over. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that 
they failed to realise that Hitler would renounce his 
assurances and become the evil force that would dominate 
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Europe for six years. Yet there are good reasons for 
thinking that appeasement in the 1930s was a sensible, 
perhaps the only approach, short of war, that could have 
been taken. 
Hughes was not the only one wishing to take firmer stand. 
A notable ‘anti-appeaser’ was Percy Spender.  In 1937, he 
won, on ALP preferences, the seat of Warringah over the 
incumbant, Archdale Parkhill, Minister for Defence, 
campaigning on the lack of preparedness for Australia’s 
defence.194  As a newly elected member, Spender did not 
have an immediate effect on government views.  Rather, 
time did that. 
The final Cabinet decision to establish Australian Legations 
in Tokyo and Washington was taken in March, 1939.  Lyons 
sought endorsement from London but, before he could 
make a public announcement, he was dead.  The 
government parties spent the next eighteen days in 
acrimonious debate over the leadership, Menzies emerging 
as the eventual winner of a coalition government riven 
deeply by bitter and deep-seated differences.  In his first 
public announcement after becoming Prime Minister, 
Menzies announced the establishment of the Washington 
and Tokyo posts, appointments that, in the past, he had 
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opposed. The fact that the appointments were a Cabinet 
decision left him little choice. Menzies sentCasey to 
Washington, Latham to Tokyo, William Glasgow to Ottawa,  
and Frederic Eggleston to Chungking. Another of Menzies’ 
acts was to move Hughes from the External Affairs 
portfolio, replacing him with Henry Gullett. 
American isolationism meant that there was little American 
sympathy for Britain and even less for its erstwhile imperial 
outposts. The British Ambassador Lothian told Foreign 
Minister Halifax in November 1939, that ‘there was not I 
think, any particularly strong feeling in the U.S. for 
Australia and New Zealand’.195Australian representation in 
Washington was an obvious and urgent need. Megaw 
argued that the exchange of ministers between Australia 
and the United States was not driven by policy 
considerations but rather brought about by fears of 
Japan.196   Certainly, the proposal came at a propitious 
time. The worsening international situation raised the 
traditional Australian fears about the need for acquiring 
supportive allies.   
Casey’s actual appointment to the United States was 
announced publicly by Menzies on 8 January, 1940. The 
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exchange of diplomats was not consummated for another 
six months when Clarence C. Gauss presented his 
credentials as United States Minister to the Governor-
General in July. According to Menzies, ‘the American 
Minister to be diplomatically accredited to Australia, the 
first such appointment, will become for all Australians the 
living embodiment of a gesture of friendship and 
recognition by the United States’. True as this expression 
may have been, it simultaneously expressed the intense 
ambition of the Australian government for the United 
States to occupy a central role in Australian security.  
In his justification for establishing the office and 
exchanging diplomatic ministers with the United States, 
Menzies stated that he expected Australia ‘to play an 
effective part in the development and strengthening of 
peaceful contacts between all Pacific Powers’.  In answer to 
the obvious question, why the United States but not Japan, 
or rather why not the United States and Japan, Menzies 
was unequivocal: ‘I say…quite frankly that Australia 
attaches importance to have (sic) the friendship of the 
United States and is prepared to do much to improve it’. 
The question of diplomatic representation with Japan, he 
said, was ‘under immediate consideration’. Menzies was so 
anxious to make an appointment to Tokyo that he had 
asked Bruce, in London, to seek the King’s approval to do 
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so.197  Even before reaching Buckingham Palace, the plan 
was nipped in the bud by R.A. Butler, Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Because of the high 
levels of tension between Japan and the United Kingdom, 
especially what Butler called ‘economic warfare’ and supply 
of raw materials to Japan, the appointment of an Australian 
representative in Tokyo could be seen as evidence that 
Australia was dissatisfied with Britain’s handling of the 
situation or even a ‘break in Empire diplomatic and 
economic fronts’.198 
In a message sent to the Australian Counsellor at the 
British Embassy in Washington on 8 January 1940 for 
release to the American media,  Menzies lavished praise 
upon Casey: 
Not only a distinguished representative of his own 
country uncommonly well qualified to fill the 
distinguished office…one of the most influential members 
of the Australian government…the highest qualities of 
capacity, energy and patriotism.  
As for Casey’s mission, Menzies emphasised the common 
civilisational bonds of the two countries: 
we have the same general ideas of government; we 
attach the same supreme importance to the liberty of the 
individual: we have in common the conviction that the 
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proper object of all governments is to forward the 
happiness of ordinary men and women, and not merely 
of a chosen few.  And we are better able to exchange our 
ideas and to forward our ideals by joint effort because we 
speak the same language and share the same 
literature.199 
Menzies, whose oratorical and literary skills were 
recognised equally by his political enemies as much as by 
his ardent supporters, did not normally descend into such 
flowery language. At times, there seems to have been a 
note of desperation in the message. 
Reflecting the growing concern at the deteriorating 
international situation, Menzies ended his announcement 
by defining diplomacy in terms appropriate to that 
situation: ‘The business of diplomacy is not a mere 
business of dexterity in negotiation.  Its real purpose is to 
remove misunderstandings, not to create them.  Its real 
justification is peace’.200 Behind the fine words, the tasks 
confronting Casey were formidable. Essentially, Casey and 
Menzies were relying on Roosevelt to bring the United 
States into a closer orbit of opposition to the German war 
machine.  
                                               
199 Menzies to Keith Officer, Australian Counsellor at British Embassy, Washington, 
8 January, 1940, (cablegram) unnumbered in Documents of Australian Foreign 
Policy, Vol. III, Doc 7. 
200 Ibid.   
112 
 
The question confronting Casey in the Washington 
appointment was not whether to seek greater American aid 
for Britain, or to concentrate on involving the United States 
in Pacific and South-east Asian security affairs, specifically 
those affecting Australia. Clearly there was a need to do 
both.The survival of Britain had as its corollary the survival 
of British naval, military and air forces and the possibility 
that, eventually, Britain might be in a stronger position 
should Australia become involved in hostilities with Japan. 
There was the risk that Casey would be seen as pushing 
the ‘Empire line’, that is seeking access to American 
resources, men, materiel and money in order to preserve 
the British Empire, a fear aired constantly in the United 
States following the end of the First World War. Casey had 
to convince a sceptical American government and 
population that the national security of the United States 
did not allow them the comfort and luxury of standing on 
the sidelines.   
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CHAPTER THREE: - Roosevelt: The Washing of the 
Hands 
In taking up his appointment, Casey hit the ground 
running. The New York Times wrote that ‘Richard Casey, 
Australia’s first Minister to the United States, said today 
that Australians, partly with the aid of American supples, 
were making a gigantic effort to help Great Britain in the 
war’. According to this account: 
Mr. Casey who arrived here last night (my 
emphasis), said that Australia through manufacture 
and purchase, was gathering together 2,500 training 
planes with which to build up a corps of tens of 
thousands of aviators.201 
Casey’s first report to his Minister, Henry Gullett, dated 9 
March 1940, advised that although he had been confined to 
bed for a week with influenza, he had presented his 
credentials to the President, called on Secretary of State 
Hull and begun the ‘long and wearisome business of 
formally calling on each of my (sixty) diplomatic 
colleagues’. Recognising the important role of Trade 
Commissioners, Casey visited the Office of the Australian 
Trade Commissioner (Mr Macgregor) during his early three 
day visit to New York. This  first report signalled the 
manner in which Casey was to approach his 
responsibilities:  
                                               
201 New York Times, 22 February 1940, p. 4. 
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I have of course, seen a good deal of Lord Lothian, the 
British Ambassador, and the senior members of his 
staff---as well as the senior members of the State 
Department and a selection of other people of 
consequence in this capital…I have spent three days in 
New York…lunched with Messrs. Morgan Stanley and 
Company, with the publisher and senior staff of “The 
New York Times”, and with the President and senior 
officers of the Radio Corporation of America…have 
made contact with J.P.Morgan and Company and with 
the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission—as well as a 
number of influential private individuals in New York 
with whom I was previously acquainted. I have what I 
think I may describe as a good reception by the press 
in this country. 
In the same report, Casey set out what could be described 
as operating guidelines: 
the Australian Legation was established solely for good 
relations between the two countries. 
it will studiously avoid being regarded as a war 
propagandist. 
he (Casey) will emphasise the similarity in outlook and 
bearing of the American and the Australian peoples. 
he will emphasise the complete independence of 
Australia in all matters,  domestic and external, whilst 
at the same time stress the voluntary and willing co-
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operation of Australia as a loyal member of the British 
Commonwealth.202 
Casey reported to Gullett that public opinion was 
bewildered about the war. Casey had quickly become 
aware of widespread Anglophobia. The view was 
widespread that Britain had cynically let down the Czechs, 
Poles and Finns. His interpretation at one point struck a 
note of gallows humour: ‘If we (Britain and the 
Commonwealth) are winning, the Americans will sit back 
and be sceptical and – irritating and know-all - but if we’re 
losing, they’ll become worried but much more helpful’.203 
A short time later, Casey noted to McEwen, who replaced 
Gullett as Minister for External Affairs, resentment against 
the war in general because of a discerned attack on 
American exports. The British blockade restricted American 
exports to much of Europe, while Britain’s need to increase 
defence spending reduced her purchases of consumer and 
similar manufactured goods from the United States. This 
view was compounded by what Casey observed as a 
forgetfulness about the reasons for the war:  
When a war has been waged for six months, neutrals 
tend to forget its real origin and causes.  They see it, in 
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this instance being waged largely with economic 
weapons and numbers of people are drawing the 
conclusion that, for this reason, it had an economic 
origin.  The Allies and Germany are, in reality, fighting 
for markets---what has America to do with this sort of 
struggle, except to protect their own export trade?204 
Indeed, solving an economic issue was Casey’s first major 
task. Casey may have believed that his major role in the 
United States revolved around such security considerations 
of Britain and Australia arising from a mutual fear of Japan, 
but awaiting his arrival in Washington was a referral from 
High Commissioner Bruce seeking Casey’s assistance over 
the ‘thorny subject’ of wool.205 It is proposed to examine 
this in some detail, because, firstly, it was Casey’s initial 
major challenge in the United States and secondly and 
more importantly, it illuminates the extent of Casey’s 
prowess in achieving a satisfactory result in a clash of 
interests between Britain, the United States and Australia.  
Casey had a unique opportunity to understand Japanese 
intentions in the years leading to 1942. The two 
ambassadors that represented Great Britain during the 
time of Casey’s posting in Washington (Lothian and Halifax) 
both gave him full access to all their incoming and outgoing 
messages, including Sir Robert Craigie’s reports from 
Tokyo.  In addition, Casey’s close relationship with S M 
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Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London, 
enabled Casey to pick up the general policies of Whitehall 
and Downing Street.  Because of his long spell in London in 
the 1920’s Casey was always regarded as an unofficial 
member of the UK Foreign Office.  He received intelligence 
of the greatest value.  So, it is not surprising that he was 
asked to be involved in the ‘thorny subject’ of wool. 
Conflict had arisen between Britain, Australia and the 
United States over the question of wool sales to Japan.  
Australia wanted to sell as much wool as possible to Japan, 
then still a neutral.  The Ministry of Economic Warfare, in 
London, fearful that Japan was passing on Australian wool 
to Germany, wanted restrictions placed on these Australian 
sales. Britain’s deep interest in the matter was perhaps 
exemplified by the existence of a Committee for Sale of 
Empire Wool Abroad, under the chairmanship of Lord 
Essendon. One such restriction was limiting contracts to 
‘very small quantities and …extremely short periods’. 
Specifically, supplies should be limited to a month by 
month arrangement.  The Menzies cabinet, under pressure 
from Country Party members, considered such restrictions 
to be unreasonable.  The Australian view was that Japan’s 
need for wool was too great for any to be on-sold to 
Germany.  More importantly, any restrictions or conditions 
placed on Australian sales to Japan could jeopardise the 
whole marketing relationship. 
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As explained by now Dominions Secretary Anthony Eden in 
a long cable to the U.K. High Commissioner in Australia, 
Britain was anxious to avoid creating difficulties with the 
United States in the area of withholding exports to 
Germany.206  London, at that time, was negotiating with 
Washington in drawing up a schedule of these vital 
commodities. The American position was strongly opposed 
to allowing any exports of wool to Japan. Britain believed 
that despite the cost to Australia, it would support the 
American position to deprive Japan of Australian wool, in 
the expectation that the Americans would support British 
proposals to halt vital exports to Germany.207 While this 
two-way arrangement clearly served the interests of both 
Britain and the United States in preventing exports to both 
Germany and Japan, it was an arrangement thrashed out in 
the context of Britain’s long-term plan to foster good 
relations with the Roosevelt Administration. Australia’s 
trading interests would have been seen in London as 
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largely irrelevant when placed beside Britain’s perception of 
the threat posed by revanchism in Germany. 
Bruce told Menzies that he would instruct Casey ‘to put his 
back into getting results’ while telling Casey: ‘the matter is 
now to a great extent, in your hands’.208  It was clear that 
Bruce had high hopes of Casey presenting a strong case to 
Washington for Australia to continue to sell wool to Japan, 
with as few restrictions as possible. Casey’s diary shows 
that over three days at the end of March, he met Hull, and 
two influential advisors, Stanley Hornbeck and Adolf Berle. 
He also conducted discussions with the American 
representative of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, 
who was familiar with the current state of the 
Administration’s thinking.  Arising out of all these 
negotiations, Casey, on 25 March 1940, was able to inform 
Menzies that the State Department had agreed that wool 
could be sold to Japan on a three-monthly basis, rather 
than a monthly basis, provided it was not sold on credit.209 
Casey’s assurance to Menzies certainly indicated a more 
flexible approach by Washington. Casey’s well known 
reluctance to speak of his own achievements prevents a 
complete understanding of how this flexible approach came 
about. It may be inferred, however, that Casey was, in 
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some way instrumental in obtaining a compromise 
agreement from Britain and the United States on a matter 
of equal and joint importance to both countries.  The fact 
remains that Bruce and Menzies, on the basis of Casey’s 
apparent early success, may have felt justified in the 
choice of Casey for the Washington appointment. 
This early foray into American politics also shed light on 
Casey’s realism that was on display throughout his time in 
the United States. Some of his countrymen saw the world 
rather more naively. In January, 1940, Dr Ian Clunies Ross, 
Australian member of the International Wool Secretariat in 
London, compiled a report, emphasising the importance of 
the relationship of Australia ‘to the United States’.  Clunies 
Ross saw Australia’s security problems in the Pacific and 
‘the possibility of establishing a better understanding of 
Britain and her problems in the U.S. through the 
interpretation of those problems by Australia’. However, his 
reasoning that followed those arguments were themselves 
woolly. Clunies Ross saw in the United States ‘a latent fund 
of interest in and sympathy for Australian social ideals and 
character’. Accusing ‘Australian opinion of the United States 
and its people as too often influenced by ignorance… and 
the fact that Australians are the heirs to that attitude of 
condescention and superiority too frequently shown by the 
English’, he yet concluded that Americans felt sympathy for 
and appreciation of Australia and her people. He described 
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this attitude to Australia as ‘remarkable’ in view of the little 
conscious effort that had been put into its 
development.210Bruce, in London, enthusiastically 
dispatched the report and its wishful thinking to Menzies 
and to Casey, who at that time was crossing the Pacific.   
Casey was under no such illusions about American 
sympathy for Australia.Indeed, this early triumph was 
completely overshadowed by confirmation from Roosevelt 
to Casey of where Australia stood in American 
perceptions.In what can be described only as the ultimate 
bad news, Casey’s reports during his first weeks in 
Washington contained the first clear indication of where the 
American government stood in relation to any threat to 
Australia. Perhaps aware of the dolorous import of the 
message, Casey buried it in a prolix account of his 
discussion with the President when presenting his 
credentials. Roosevelt had described how some years 
earlier he had asked his Cabinet what the attitude of the 
United States would be in a variety of situations, an attack 
on Canada, an attack on a South American nation and 
lastly an attack on Australia and New Zealand. The opinion 
of the Cabinet was in favour of coming to the aid of Canada 
and those South American countries that were either in or 
above  the northern part of the Continent, such as Panama, 
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Mexico or Guatemala, but less likely if the attack involved 
one of the more distant South American Republics. 
Australia and New Zealand however, warranted no 
American response. The Roosevelt Cabinet believed that 
the element of distance denoted a declining interest on the 
part of the United States, to such an extent that that it was 
impossible to make any public reference to those countries, 
Australia and New Zealand, either directly or indirectly.211 
This was a confirmation, if one was needed, of Roosevelt’s 
doleful message given to Bruce nine months earlier and 
recorded by him on 4 May 1939, but apparently not passed 
on to Menzies or, for that matter, to Casey. In this memo, 
Bruce described how he had raised with the President the 
degree of anxiety he had found in Australia, not only in the 
government but among the people about the future actions 
of Japan in the Pacific region. Bruce reported to the 
President that he was constantly asked about the attitude 
of the United States towards any southward moves by 
Japan. Roosevelt simply repeated the account of the 
Cabinet decision that, in the words of the U.S. Attorney 
general, Australia was ‘a hell of a way off’.212 
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Roosevelt’s comments to Bruce in this same interview 
throw further light upon this phenomenon. The President 
recounted how in initially announcing that the United 
States would respond to any attack on Canada, public 
opinion had immediately expressed shock, but that after 
some thought, they had concluded that it was the right 
decision and had accepted it. However, the President 
believed that the American people would not take the same 
supportive view to a similar statement regarding Australia. 
On this basis therefore, American intervention should 
Australia be attacked was out of the question. Bruce 
summarised his discussion with Roosevelt in the following 
terms: ‘Nothing said to me constituted any binding 
undertaking as to what the United States action would be 
in the event of developments in the Pacific…’.213 
It remains unclear why Bruce did not pass on this message 
to Menzies.  Equally unclear is why Bruce, who was always 
close to Casey, appears not to have warned him upon 
learning of Casey’s elevation to the Washington post. 
Casey, upon meeting the President for the first time as 
Minister Plenipotentiary, ideally should not have been in the 
position where he was ignorant of White House thinking on 
the very matter for which he had been appointed. 
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In some respects, the admission that the President gave 
Casey was more definite, with less room for change than 
the President’s advice to Bruce, nine months earlier. In 
explanatory comments, Roosevelt conceded to Bruce that 
the United States would be ‘vitally concerned’ should Japan 
make any move that would ‘take her south of the Equator’. 
This was clearly not a commitment, but at least, it signified 
that the United States might reconsider her future actions 
in the Pacific region if Japan indicated any aggressive 
intentions.214 Roosevelt’s talk to Casey included no such 
promises. It was, according to Casey, unequivocal in its 
determination for the United States not to get involved in 
aiding Australia.  
The significance of Roosevelt’s unequivocal ‘washing of the 
hands’ message to Casey lies in its timing, presenting it to 
Casey at the very beginning of his engagement with the 
United States. No matter what hopes Australia may have 
held for American aid should the need arise, the President 
wanted to make it quite clear that the present view of the 
Administration eliminated the possibility. However, 
recognising the despair that his advice would create in 
Canberra, the President gave an assurance that he would 
create an opportunity for Casey to discuss the matter with 
him further. 
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For the remainder of his term in the United States, this 
worrying message of American indifference to Australia 
could well have haunted Casey, as he attempted to turn 
around public opinion, Administration thinking and 
American naval and military strategy. As stated in the 
introduction to this thesis, Casey was not given to 
introspection or rather, to disclosing his innermost 
thoughts, but it is not difficult to imagine that the full 
import of Roosevelt’s message must have weighed heavily 
upon him. Yet, so far as can be traced, he never referred to 
it again in either official communications to Australia or in 
personal correspondence, beyond recognising the 
overwhelming strength of isolationism in the U S Congress 
and the Roosevelt Administration.  Perhaps, in 
psychological terms, he either repressed the message or 
alternatively, simply did not admit this clear indication of 
Administration thinking into his own thinking process, 
because it represented the very thing he had been 
commissioned to change. To accept it would be an 
admission not so much of defeat but of a pursuit of a 
hopeless cause.  
It is generally recognised that Casey would have faced 
enormous difficulties in working in Washington. Years later, 
Keith Waller, Ambassador to the United States during the 
Johnson years, described one aspect of these difficulties: 
‘Australia has always been at a disadvantage in the United 
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States in having no constituency. There is a Polish vote, a 
Scandinavian vote, a Jewish vote, an Irish vote, but no 
single constituency which is in any way, dependent on the 
votes of an Australia-oriented section of the community’.215 
For most Americans, Australia was all but invisible. 
Casey understood correctly that it was the State 
Department where much of the hostility towards Britain 
and ignorance about Australia was generated. In his initial 
meetings with Berle and Hornbeck, respectively, Assistant 
Secretary of State and Far Eastern Adviser to the Secretary 
of State, it was confirmed to Casey that American 
reluctance to become involved in any sort of conflict was 
not necessarily the considered opinion of either the 
President or the Administration but rather a reflection of 
public opinion. Hornbeck made the point that in the United 
States, more than any other country, public opinion made 
itself felt on government policy, and that it was practically 
impossible for a President or his Administration to ‘put 
over’ a policy of which a majority of the people 
disapproved.  President Wilson, he said, found that out.  
This was no doubt a reference to Wilson’s  unsuccessful 
attempt to bring the United States into the League of 
Nations. President Roosevelt gave more lead to the people 
than any president for many years, but even he had to 
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frame and adjust his policy to enable him to get 
Congressional approval. Casey quoted Hornbeck’s graphic 
description of Roosevelt’s gamesmanship: ‘He often flew 
kites and if he found that he couldn’t steer north, he 
altered his course to north-east’.216 In an earlier letter to 
McEwen, Casey recognised Roosevelt’s need to dissemble: 
The President …until the Presidential election in 
November…will have to repeat ad nauseam that he is 
determined to ‘keep this country out of a European war’ 
in terms that will carry the requisite amount of conviction 
and at the same time allow him adequate freedom of 
action.217 
Casey was thus able to conclude that in the scope and 
range of his responsibilities, influencing American public 
opinion would be no less important than influencing the 
policy makers.  
The United States’ refusal to join the League of Nations and 
Australian resentment at high American duties on the 
import of Australian wool contributed to a perception of the 
United States as a less than friendly power and in one 
sense, a rival. Nor was the relationship between the United 
States and the British Empire as a whole much stronger. 
The depth of the chasm between these two English-
speaking nations is perhaps illustrated by a remark 
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attributed to Churchill in 1927 that war between the two 
countries was not ‘unthinkable’.218 Kershaw argues that the 
isolationism that had taken hold in the United States at the 
end of the First World War became still further engrained 
during Roosevelt’s first term. He has noted that: 
The impact of (that) involvement on American society 
had been profound. Fifty thousand American soldiers had 
lost their lives in a conflict which, to many, had not been 
their country’s concern…most Americans felt that this 
must on no account, ever  be allowed to happen again.219 
 
Many of the politicians referred to as isolationists often 
preferred the term ‘non-interventionists’ as signifying, for 
instance, a desire for the United States to object to 
Japanese aggression and atrocities by instituting boycotts 
of Japanese products. Far from being a simple withdrawal 
from international discussions and negotiations, the non-
interventionists saw themselves as active participants, not 
interfering in the affairs of other nations but, at the same 
time, steering the United States on a particular path that 
would result in a more peaceful world.  
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‘We are not isolationist’, claimed Roosevelt, ‘except insofar 
as we attempt to isolate ourselves completely from war’.220 
The original Neutrality Act, signed by the President in 
August 1935 arose largely from an attempt by the 
Administration to assist Abyssinia after Italy’s invasion, a 
proposal that aroused much hostility in the Congress.  This 
first Act provided for an embargo on the sale of 
armaments, but not including oil, to all belligerents in any 
war between, or among, two or more foreign states. 
Frequent amendments to the Act meant that there were 
virtually five Acts between 1935 and 1937. It would be 
correct to conclude that the strengthening of the Neutrality 
Acts in April 1937 marked the zenith of the isolationist 
doctrine in the United States. Secretary of State Hull later 
described the 1920s as a ‘crucial period’, when ‘the country 
had gone wildly in favour of isolation, nationalism and 
peace at any price’.  In the 1930s nothing had changed: 
‘…the isolationist sentiment was so overwhelming that 
there was almost total opposition to any armaments 
building, however necessary in the light of world 
conditions’.221In the 1930s, the United States experimented 
with the use of diplomatic and economic sanctions to 
discourage military aggression, and with legislation to keep 
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the United States out of European and Asiatic wars.222Hull 
resumed his efforts further, ‘to advance the economic and 
peace proposals’ he had long been advocating: ‘Economic 
recovery and military disarmament seemed to me the two 
most vital and outstanding factors for peace and business 
recovery’.223 
The later amendments to the Neutrality Act 
inhibitedattempts to assist the Allies. Roosevelt’s 
proclamation of 5 September 1939 imposed an embargo on 
the exports of arms to all belligerent nations and led 
Menzies to protest to the President. Menzies stressed the 
difficulties Australia would face in obtaining ‘vital supplies’, 
including civil aircraft for training purposes, while, at the 
same time, no corresponding disability would be inflicted 
‘upon our enemy’.224 Roosevelt’s reply dumped the whole 
blame on the Congress. As the President put it: 
Earlier this year I endeavoured to bring about the repeal 
of the embargo provisions of our neutrality 
legislation…Congress finally decided to postpone the 
consideration of this matter in spite of the considered 
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recommendations of the Secretary of State and my own 
efforts.225 
Charmley has noted that: 
Historians are still divided about Roosevelt’s real 
intentions between 1939 and 1941. The orthodox 
interpretation has a President whose heart was in the 
right place, that is, anti-Hitler, but who, through 
(according to taste) fear of Congress, or a recognition 
of political realities had to proceed cautiously.226 
On the other hand, Heinrichs noted, ‘Franklin Roosevelt, 
who entirely lacked an isolationist mentality, worried about 
the drift of world affairs, but not to the point of sacrificing 
his domestic objectives’.227Burns considered the President 
‘beguiled by public opinion’.228  According to Burns, the 
President ‘floated helplessly on a floodtide of isolationism’ 
and, as a consequence, was ‘as a foreign policy maker, 
during his first term, more pussy-footing politician than 
political leader’.229As Rock has put it:  ‘It has been 
abundantly demonstrated by American diplomatic 
historians that the isolationist element in Congress was 
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both large and vocal and that Roosevelt, the consummate 
politician, was ultra sensitive to its bellowing’.230According 
to Lowenthal, Roosevelt was torn between his ‘instinctive 
caution and fear of isolationist sentiment, and his desire to 
act as a leader of the democracies’.231 
As a consequence, Roosevelt was largely reactive and 
forced into a series of tactical manoeuvres as those under 
him applied pressure for more or less support for those 
countries resisting the aggresssion of Germany, Italy, and 
Japan. Nonetheless, Casey was optimistic that the 
President would educate the American people, ‘that 
isolationism is not necessarily the best policy in their own 
interests’.232Casey’s judgment of the political situation as it 
affected Britain’s and Australia’s interests led him to 
sympathise with Roosevelt:  ‘It is a tragedy that the 
Presidential and Congressional elections happen to be this 
year.  It is not the President’s fault that America is not 
doing more’.233 
Casey’s description of his first impression of Roosevelt 
bordered on the rapturous. As Casey described the 
President to McEwen: 
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The President is a most remarkable man. Crippled and 
almost completely immobile, he has a personality, 
character and intelligence of a remarkably high-order. 
It is impossible to enter his presence without being 
conscious of being with a great man.234 
Conjecturing on the likelihood of Roosevelt seeking a third 
term, Casey suggested that the German leadership 
believed that if anyone could ‘get America into the War 
against them, then Roosevelt can’. Roosevelt, he argued, 
was Germany’s great potential enemy.  Accordingly, he 
believed that Germany was unlikely to commence a great 
assault on Britain before the Democratic Party Convention 
in mid-July, lest such an assault create a wave of sympathy 
in the United States for the Allies, converting into a certain 
nomination of Roosevelt. Such an outcome, in Casey’s 
thinking, ‘would be a great blow to Germany’.235 In this 
prediction of Hitler’s war plans, he proved to be wide of the 
mark, but Casey’s assessment of Roosevelt’s importance to 
the Allied cause was sound. 
There was, for Casey, no alternative to Roosevelt. 
Republican presidential candidates had no appeal as far as 
Australia was concerned: ‘They are not very inspiring. I 
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have met them all’.236  Offering an outsider’s view of the 
Presidential Elections, Casey was scathing:  
Most of those who have Presidential designs throw their 
hats into their ring, (or their diapers as Secretary for the 
Interior Ickes said of young Mr Dewey), months before 
the Convention and undertake highly organised nation-
wide speech-making tours, accompanied by ‘build-ups’ in 
the Press by wireless and on films.  It is a little 
discouraging, after reading some of the Sunday 
newspapers and illustrated weeklies, to meet some of the 
candidates privately. The strength of character, he-man 
qualities and high statesmanship that one is led to expect 
from the press build-ups are frequently quite difficult to 
discern.237 
Casey reported that all the possible Republican candidates 
for President had expressed themselves publicly for 
Isolationism, varying only in degree. While Robert Taft 
would ultimately prove himself ‘sound from our point of 
view’, Casey reported that Governor Dewey held a 
‘particularly cheap and nasty Isolationist line’. It is ironic 
therefore that the Republican who eventually lined up 
against Roosevelt in November, Wendell Willkie, lost 
support among Isolationists because he was perceived as 
too pro-Allies. Casey became a great supporter of Wilkie 
after the election and wanted him to fly the American flag 
in a tour of Australia and Singapore. 
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With all the Republican contenders firmly committed to 
non-intervention in the European conflict, Roosevelt was 
certainly Britain’s best hope. Roosevelt could have thus 
been excused for reasoning that, on this basis, it was 
imperative that the United States, under his current 
Administration, did nothing to suggest that it was 
considering an active role in the European conflict and thus 
face possible defeat. This optimistic view gradually became 
unsustainable for Casey, who was increasingly alarmed by 
American inaction as the threat to Britain grew.  
After receiving Roosevelt’s baleful report at their first 
meeting, Casey would have better understood an American 
policy that deliberately excluded Australia from 
consideration of material support.  In this respect, he 
would have been mirroring the views of Chamberlain, who, 
not long before, had expressed the view that if Britain ‘got 
into trouble’, she could expect no help from the United 
States.  Indeed, ‘it is always best and safest to count on 
nothing from the Americans but words’.238 
Nonetheless, Casey had reached the prescient conclusion 
as early as April 1940 that an ‘incident’ in which American 
national honour were affronted ‘might well set fire to public 
opinion and lead to an early and active participation in the 
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war’.239  It is unlikely that Casey envisaged the scope of the 
‘incident’ that would engulf the United States at Pearl 
Harbor, but Casey clearly wanted to ensure that the 
greatest possible advantage could be taken from any 
unexpected event. Casey, aware that conflict would 
certainly break out in the Pacific, knew that the United 
States would be reluctant to participate, leaving Australia 
doomed with Britain unable, and the United States 
unwilling to help.  Casey had to pin his hopes on an 
‘incident’ that would make it impossible for the Americans 
to ignore the need to become involved. Casey’s task 
therefore would be to help the Americans develop a new 
sense of the usefulness, even the vital importance, of 
Australia. This was a political task and not something that 
could be left to naval and military attaches. Casey would 
have to take the initiative.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Spring 1940: From Phoney War to 
the Fall of France 
Upon arriving in the United States, Casey was presented 
with an interesting array of challenges in his quest to both 
bring Australia to American notice and to influence public 
opinion about Britain’s urgent need for greater American 
support. One consolation for Casey was that, from the 
outset of his American post, hewas welcomed by the 
American administration, a welcome taken up by the 
American media. The New York Times reported that 
‘Australia has given her best in sending us Richard G. 
Casey’.240  In an earlier report, the same journal had 
emphasised the ‘increasing importance of Australian-
American commercial and other relations’, without any 
reference to common defence or strategic 
considerations.241Elsewhere, the issue of common security 
interests did receive attention. The Washington Post in a 
lengthy editorial welcoming the simultaneous 
announcement in Washington and Canberra of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
nations did discuss the defence interests of both: 
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Because of the war and the continuing crisis in the Far 
East, questions of mutual concern to the U.S. and the 
Australian Commonwealth have greatly increased in 
number and importance…The importance which the 
Canberra government attaches to the newly created post 
of Minister to Washington is seen in the appointment of a 
high official, Richard G. Casey…242 
These different American perceptions of Casey’s role 
pointed to the central issue for Australia – how to translate 
‘questions of mutual concern’ into some form of American 
commitment to the Allied cause. 
Casey arrived in Washington during the period known as 
the Phoney War.  Re-entering the rarefied world of 
diplomacy at a much higher level than his previous London 
role, Casey confronted a world beset with conflicts and 
threats of conflicts. The first battalions of the Australian 
Sixth Division set sail for the Middle East and arrived in 
Suez in February, thus beginning the flow of the Australian 
Army to the other side of the world.In the period between 
his arrival in March and the invasion of France in May, 
Casey worked tirelessly. He needed to improve his 
understanding of the American political scene, to work out 
who his friends and enemies were in diplomatic circles in 
Washington, assess American military capacity, and 
advocate for stronger ties between the United States, 
Britain and Australia. 
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Early in his mission, Casey had discerned where the 
centres of influence lay.  Obviously, the Oval Office of the 
White House was central to United States policy 
formulation but the decisions and directions that flowed out 
of the Oval Office had emanated from a vast array of 
sources that flowed into it. Tracking these inflows and 
exercising his own influence upon them thus became the 
focus of Casey’s attentions.  
Hudson identifies the challenge confronting Casey as 
‘achieving personal acceptance by powerful men’.243 Yet 
because of Casey’s reputation for an inability to win over 
Cabinet colleagues and his seeming inability to garner 
support within his own party, there must have been doubts 
about whether he would be capable of either achieving 
personal acceptance or of influencing American attitudes. 
Yet Hudson offers an interesting interpretation of how he 
was perceived in the United States. The very characteristics 
that had been detrimental to his successful progress in the 
Australian political milieu, that is, a sense of urgency that 
he was unable to communicate to colleagues in the context 
of what Hudson describes as ‘the laconic phlegm of 
Australian society’ and a frustration with the more routine, 
conventional political ethos, were seen in the United 
States, not as nervous tautness but rather as ‘attractive 
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liveliness’.244 Hudson also makes the point that by adopting 
means and methods peculiar to the American environment, 
that is, courtship of the press, personal propaganda and 
cultivation of contacts, Casey easily blended in with his 
American hosts. 
In one of his early messages to the minister, after arriving 
in Washington, Casey described Adolf Berle ‘as a man of 
considerable influence’, and ‘in growing and introspective, 
very intelligent and stubborn, very critical of the English’. 
On the other hand, Casey believed him capable of being 
‘nursed along so far as we are concerned’.245 This would be 
no easy task. According to Reynolds, Berle ‘believed that 
America had the strength, particularly economic, to 
determine the peace and also the moral right, unlike the 
British, whose foreign policy seemed to him, not only inept 
but consistently self-interested’.246 In a letter to Canberra, 
Casey sketched a brief background:  
He is the third man in the State Department, being 
inferior in status only to Cordell Hull (Secretary of State) 
and Sumner Welles (Under Secretary of State)…his 
appointment is political a nominee of the President…not a 
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career man…a man of pronounced ability and a 
recognised force in the State Department.247 
 
Berle was, in fact, a member of the ‘Brains Trust’, a group 
of six men whom Roosevelt had gathered together, mainly 
from academia, before his election in 1932.  In the inner 
circles of the Roosevelt White House, there were two 
classifications of those around the President, informal 
perhaps but brutally valid, ‘B.C.’ and the others.  ‘B.C.’ 
meant those who had joined the Roosevelt camp before the 
Democratic Party Convention in Chicago selected Roosevelt 
as the Presidential candidate, hence ‘Before Chicago’.  
Their numbers were small and generally comprised 
Roosevelt’s personal staff. Their loyalty to FDR was 
unquestionable. Perhaps the most important was Louis 
Howe, who teamed up with Roosevelt in the 1920s and 
who has been described as his ‘closest working 
associate’.248 But seeemingly just as close and vital was 
Harry Hopkins, who has also been described as ‘Roosevelt’s 
closest adviser’.249 Casey early recognised the influential 
place occupied by Hopkins in the Roosevelt ‘family’. 
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Hopkins was to become an important contact in 
Washington  for Casey. 
The second group, those who had joined the Roosevelt 
bandwagon after the nomination, included the Brains Trust. 
They had a philosophical commitment to Roosevelt, a belief 
in Roosevelt’s ability to provide national leadership. Also 
present was an expectation to actively participate in that 
leadership, an expectation that might be ambition or simply 
an altruistic desire to serve the nation at a time of crisis. 
The Brains Trust occupied senior influential positions, 
served as speech-writers and gave Roosevelt a ‘broad 
education in economics’.250 
Berle, who had been professor of corporate law at 
Columbia Law School, Professor Raymond Moley of 
Columbia University, Professor Rexford G. Tugwell of 
Columbia University, William C. Bullitt, a former diplomat 
who had been Roosevelt’s ‘observer’ in Europe and two 
men from the world of finance, James P.Warburg and 
Charles W. Taussig made up this inner group.251 Although 
the Brains Trust was said to have been disbanded once 
Roosevelt won the 1932 election, its members continued to 
wield a powerful and pervasive influence.  In 1933 the 
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complexity and volume of events, both domestically and 
internationally were beyond the grasp and understanding of 
any one person.  It was essential therefore that the 
President surround himself with informed, committed 
advisers, upon whom he could rely.   
The decision-making process that operated in the Roosevelt 
White House has been the subject of much examination 
and speculation. As one commentator has put it: ‘Those 
who knew Roosevelt best, agreed that he was a man 
infinitely complex and almost incomprehensible’.252 Or, as 
Reynolds has put it, Roosevelt was prone to ‘casual 
administrative methods’.253 It seems that Roosevelt took 
advice from as many sources as possible, but the eventual 
decision may frequently have been the initial one grounded 
in his own conclusions. However, even if they were 
sometimes sounding boards, Roosevelt’s inner circle had 
the advantage of personal contact with the President.  
Although only Assistant Secretary of State, Berle appears 
to have had more access to the President than Hull. In 
identifying the powerful position that Berle occupied in the 
Roosevelt Administration and then targeting Berle, Casey 
set himself a formidable, but logical goal. At their very first 
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meeting, it was clear that Berle regarded Casey as simply 
an antipodean representative of Whitehall, a judgment 
Casey did everything possible to demolish.  The plan to 
modify the isolationist and anti-British views of Berle were 
of paramount importance from Casey’s perspective.  
There are two aspects of Casey’s determination to establish 
some sort of relationship with Berle. Firstly, Casey’s early 
identification of Berle as a target for ‘nursing’ recognised 
Berle’s closeness to Roosevelt. In a work devoted to the 
family life of the Roosevelts, one author describes how 
Berle, in correspondence to Roosevelt during the pre-
Presidency years, always began his letters with the 
salutation, ‘Hail Caesar’.254 This practice persisted after 
Inauguration, suggesting a respectful intimacy between the 
two men. Berle was given wide latitude in the day-to-day 
working of the White House, because of the special 
relationship he had with the President. His position as 
Assistant Secretary of State did not require him to report to 
the Secretary of State. Rather he reported directly to the 
President, apparently causing Roosevelt some 
embarrassment: ‘Get hold of Berle and tell him to be darn 
careful in what he writes me because the Staff see his 
letters and they are highly indiscreet’, wrote Roosevelt to 
an aide. Lest he offend Berle, Roosevelt then added to the 
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memo, ‘tell him a little later on I want him to come down 
and lunch with me’.255 
A study of his diaries that recorded his innermost musings 
on a wide range of topics reveals that Berle, in his various 
conversations with foreign diplomats, unsurprisingly, was 
not revealing Administration secrets. That is, Berle’s 
messages to those outside the White House were 
frequently at marked variance with the views he was 
committing to his diary.  The diaries therefore constitute a 
far more reliable guide to understanding and interpreting 
the Roosevelt Administration. For Berle, Casey was an ideal 
source of intelligence. Berle was able to take back to the 
Oval Office Casey’s thinking, which of course represented 
not only a strictly Australian view but, Whitehall’s, also. 
Clearly, it suited Casey’s purposes for Berle to see the 
Australian as a valuable source of information. 
An examination of Berle’s diary shows that Berle was in 
fact torn between his Anglophobia and the stark realisation 
of the fact that a Europe of the dictators was an ever worse 
prospect for the United States.  In other words, Berle 
represented a large section of American opinion in that he 
was anti-German, anti-Russian, and anti-British. Berle had 
already reached some conclusions about the participation 
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of the United States in the conflict as early as the first few 
months of the European war. His diary entry for late 
November 1939 includes: ‘The British and French might 
well be worn out and in that case, we shall have to enter 
the war’. Berle also believed that, were Germany and the 
Soviet Union to combine to become dominant, ‘we should 
have to become a militarist nation’.256 Berle’s apparent 
indifference to the immediate crisis confronting Britain was 
qualified. On 5 December, 1939, he wrote, with his 
pleasure undisguised:  
The change in public opinion here has been 
remarkable. The Russian invasion of Finland seems to 
have stopped everyone in their tracks… the pacifists of 
last month are urging all kinds of measures against 
Russia. Plainly the neutrality of this country is not as 
solid as it was a week ago.257 
Berle often expressed unhappiness that the United States 
might have ‘to defend the British Empire’.258 Indeed, the 
suspicion that Britain was attempting to engage American 
participation in defending the Empire was a constant theme 
in Administration discussion. As referred to elsewhere in 
this thesis, a widely held view in the United States, not just 
restricted to the isolationists or non-interventionists, was 
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that the American involvement in the First World War had 
been costly in men and materiel with no discernible 
advantage to the United States beyond sharing the burden 
of assisting in the preservation of Britain’s colonial 
interests. Casey took it upon himself to unburden Berle and 
others of such fallacies. 
When Casey arrived in the United States, the domestic 
situation had improved dramatically, but the international 
situation was deteriorating rapdily. Casey does not describe 
his reaction when, at their first meeting, Berle asked him if 
Australia had considered what it would do in the future if 
Britain were beaten or even if, as a result of the war, 
Britain were unable to extend ‘adequate defence’ to 
Australia.259  Berle emphasised that the question came not 
from official sources but he was simply interested for his 
own information. Clearly, the defeat and occupation of 
Britain by Germany was seen by Roosevelt’s advisers as a 
possibility. The terms of the question, not ‘what would 
Australia do’ but rather ‘if Australia had considered what it 
would do’ in such circumstances carried an implication of 
Australian unpreparedness.    
Casey’s raison d’etre in Washington revolved around those 
very eventualities, but at that point, probably for tactical 
reasons, he was reluctant to lay open his awareness of the 
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peril that Australia would face. He replied that Australia had 
hardly dared to consider such possibilities. Moreover, 
Australia had such close and important links with Britain, in 
trade, finance and defence that he had no right to 
anticipate that any other country would provide the 
essential background and connections that Britain 
provided.  He did concede, ‘speaking frankly’, that some in 
Australia hoped that should the nation find itself in that 
situation, ‘the United States would not be indifferent to a 
threatened change in the status quo in the Pacific’. Such a 
development, Casey emphasised, ‘was only a hope… 
dependent on the state of public opinion in America at that 
time’. This exchange with Berle preceded the revealing 
interview with the President, when Casey learnt that the 
Roosevelt Administration had already considered the 
possibility of Australia coming under threat of invasion and 
had decided that no American assistance would be granted.  
Berle gave no assurances and, in fact, did not refer to the 
Cabinet decision as conveyed to him by the President, 
simply limiting his comments to a general agreement of the 
reliance of government on public opinion.  He told Casey 
that, in any event, he did not believe that Japan’s deep 
involvement in China allowed her to contemplate any 
‘southward adventure’. Finally, the Far Eastern policy of the 
United States was the most considered and developed of all 
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their regional policies.260Berle’s question to Casey revolving 
around the possibility of Britain being defeated or so 
engaged in the European conflict as to be unable to assist 
Australia, hinted at discussions about the break-up of the 
British Empire under way in the Administration.  
Despite the senior position he held in the White House 
firmament, Berle held dogmatic views that failed to reflect 
an understanding of the history of important issues. Casey 
was quickly made aware of a residual, historical 
antagonism towards Britain that had its beginnings in the 
American Revolution and the war of 1812-1815. According 
to Berle, the British burned the White House in 1812 for no 
reason except spite.  Berle also referred to unpaid war 
debts although he did concede to Casey that ‘it was sheer 
ignorance to believe that you could demand payment of 
war debts and at the same time, steeply raise American 
customs tariffs against all foreign goods.  The two were 
mutually antagonistic’.261 Casey often noted how hard it was 
to change the American perception that the British Empire 
was by definition a bad thing. As Casey noted to his diary: 
‘The British Empire, in the minds of many Americans, was 
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‘the British Vampire’.262 Casey was left in no doubt that 
Berle was one of those Americans who held such views.   
Berle’s understanding of the factors that ended the Great 
War in 1918 betrayed the Administration’s determination 
not to commit forces to a European war. As the Battle of 
Britain raged, Berle reflected upon the end of the last war 
in which the United States fought alongside Britain:  
The World War really ended because the many races and 
groups in Europe rose up and threw off their German and 
Austrian masters. If this war comes to an end, it will be 
by somewhat the same process; I doubt if we are going 
to put several million men on the European plain to 
reconquer the continent; I doubt if the British can do so; 
I doubt if the blockade, galling as it will be, can 
accomplish anything really effective; the ultimate 
reconquest will be psychological and political.263 
Yet, the world situation as it existed in 1940, where there 
was a real possibility that Germany would achieve a status 
of overwhelming power vis-à-vis the rest of the world, was 
way beyond the situation in 1917-1918. These predictions, 
based as they were on dubious foundations, proved wide of 
the mark. Internal revolts certainly occurred in both Russia 
and Germany, but these were, at best, simultaneous with 
the breakdown of fighting. On the other hand, Berle’s 
emphasis on internal revolts reflected American and British 
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strategic thinking. Even in 1941, there was no real thought 
of a large American landing in Europe. The plan was a 
blockade, support for internal revolts and bombing. 
Roosevelt hoped to avoid formal American entry into the 
war.264 
Casey believed that American reluctance to become more 
involved in Britain’s plight could not be modified while the 
Administration’s senior figures, exercising much influence, 
such as Berle, remained indifferent, even hostile. Berle’s 
constant references to the United States being embroiled in 
a war to save ‘the British Empire’ infuriated Casey because 
it ignored the fact that the British Empire was not a series 
of undeveloped nations that were exploited simply to add 
to Britain’s wealth but included Canada, Australia, South 
Africa and New Zealand that contributed significantly to the 
world’s food supply and equally to the world’s energy 
resources. Nonetheless, Casey was surely correct when he 
noted that ‘it will be of good value for me to see as much of 
him as possible’ and that towards that end, ‘I have of set 
purpose created opportunities of meeting him’.  Berle’s 
response showed signs of friendship, ‘although he is by 
temperament, rather without warmth in his personal 
relations’.  
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Casey seems to have enjoyed his jousting with Berle, but 
needed patience given that Berle was fond of rehashing old 
arguments. If Berle could be ‘turned’ or 'nursed’, there was 
no outward sign of a changed outlook. Hornbeck may have 
seemed the more appropriate contact for Casey, but it was 
a key decision on Casey’s part to concentrate on Berle who 
was personally close to the President.265 No doubt, this 
facilitated Casey’s access to the Oval Office. Berle himself 
would never acknowledge any departure from his long-held 
positions. While the British accused the United States of 
failing to stand up for a dying democratic world, Americans 
often expressed dismay at British cynicism. In June, 1941, 
as Barbarossa was about to be unleashed, Berle was still 
denouncing British cynicism and naked self-interest: 
The British meanwhile, are not showing even the 
remotest signs of statesmanship. In a conversation with 
Welles, the other day, Halifax proposed trying to 
“appease” Russia by recognizing her seizures of the three 
Baltic republics, intimating that he did not care very 
much for the Baltic peoples… had a less high opinion of 
them than he did of the Finns.  Considering that the 
British were largely instrumental in setting up the Baltic 
republics at the close of the last war, this is a reversion 
to the old Foreign Office practice which specialised in 
polite dishonour when it served their interests.266 
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On an outing with Berle and his wife in July 1941, Berle 
told Casey that the United States was ‘anti-German’ but 
not ‘pro-British’. Among the sins cited by Berle were the 
‘orgy of slanging of the United States’ undertaken by 
British politicians such as Churchill and Chamberlain on the 
‘Uncle Shylock theme’ after World War One. According to 
Berle, it was the British who cynically made friends or 
enemies of Russians or Finns depending upon their self 
interest and nothing more. These were the arguing 
positions that Casey encountered and grappled with in his 
frequent dealings with Berle. 
Yet it must be acknowledged that Casey’s encounters with 
Berle brought Casey into Berle’s network. The complex but 
blossoming relationship between Casey and Berle was in 
evidence as the Phoney War came to an end. On the 
evening of 11 May, Casey reported on ‘a long talk’ with 
Berle that day, discussing whether the German invasion of 
the Netherlands and Belgium, which had begun the 
previous day, would bring the United States closer to 
joining the war. That this was a matter of high policy 
suggests that Casey could have only considered that Berle 
was senior enough and influential enough to have a 
significant input into White House thinking.267 It was just as 
significant that Berle was prepared to discuss such a vital 
matter with a junior diplomat. There was exhibited in this 
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exchange a clear indication of Casey’s growing stature in 
Washington.  
Roosevelt and British Foreign Minister Halifax met the same 
evening after the Casey/Berle talks, when the President 
told the Ambassador that he had reason to believe that, 
following the German invasion of the Netherlands, Japan 
was contemplating intervention in the Netherlands East 
Indies. The President refused to reveal his source but 
Casey learnt of the President’s remarks immediately.268 
Casey could only have been overjoyed at the President’s 
advice, representing as it did an acknowledgment of 
Japan’s serious intentions in the Pacific, an argument that 
was crucial to Casey’s ‘mission’ to seek greater American 
interest in the Pacific region. Casey’s activities as disclosed 
in his diaries at this time reveal an almost obsessive 
pursuit of his responsibilities in representing Australia and 
a certainty that Japan would initiate some kind of hostilities 
in the Asia/Pacific region. Casey hoped that Berle would 
relay his concerns to the President. 
Casey and Berle traded information and barbs not only 
over history and wartime strategy, but the shape of the 
post-war world. Berle’s specialisation was planning a post-
war world where Britain had given up its empire and the 
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United States played the leading role in the peace.269 Casey 
became a part of that conversation. Berle came to perceive 
Casey as influential, perhaps excessively so. The American 
thought it best to keep Casey in his embrace rather than at 
arm’s length. Casey subsequently became a sounding 
board for Berle and a participant in the discussions about 
the post-war world. For instance, Berle in November 1940 
recorded in his diary:  
a little dinner at home for the Argentine head of the 
Central Bank,  Prebisch, a brilliant man of under 40; 
Felipe Espil, the Argentine Ambassador; Dick Casey, 
the Australian Minister; Ronald Ransom; and myself. 
This was exclusively a party to leave reality behind…we 
planned and re-planned a new world’.270 (My 
emphasis.)  
 
Berle came to value Casey’s counsel, and perhaps his 
company. After  the dinner with the Argentinian banker and 
ambassador, Casey was moved to note…’the main interest 
lay in the fact that Berle had invited the Australian Minister 
to come in on such a discussion’.271 
The relationship that Casey had built with Berle gave 
Australia a voice in American planning that they would not 
otherwise have had. In June 1941, Berle asked Roosevelt 
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for permission to begin tentative outlines of the post-war 
order and the President agreed, emphasising that such a 
study must not be revealed outside the Oval Office.272 Berle 
included Casey in the study. That Berle sought Casey’s 
presence on what the President insisted was a confidential 
study illustrates Berle’s opinion of Casey. If the purpose of 
the study were to ensure that the United States did not 
make the same mistakes as Berle believed it did in 1919, 
the presence of Casey, a representative of the 
Commonwealth, became even more significant. 
Casey cultivated and prized his easy access to Berle and his 
colleagues at the State Department, Dean Acheson and 
Stanley Hornbeck, each an Assistant Secretary of State. 
Hornbeck, like Berle, proved a useful source of information 
and comment. On 27 March 1940, Casey described 
Hornbeck to McEwen as ‘a man of consequence and 
authority’.273 From Hornbeck, Casey soon learned the depth 
of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. According 
to Casey, Hornbeck claimed that: 
The Japanese believe that they were the salt of the 
earth, and their mission on earth was to spread 
Japanese culture, commerce, and authority. All 
Japanese parties and sections believed this. There 
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were, in this respect, no ‘moderates’ in Japan, 
everyone believed it.274 
Hornbeck in June 1940 vented to Casey his gloomy 
conviction that Japanese governments had had a policy 
since 1894 of adhering to an agreement only for so long as 
it suited them and, according to Hornbeck, Japan had 
broken every agreement that it had entered into.275 Casey 
found this snippet interesting, if not necessarily correct. 
Casey, like most Australians, was anxious to avoid war with 
Japan, to buy her off with concessions if possible, or 
encourage her to advance in a direction away from the 
equator. Americans like Hornbeck were opposed to 
appeasing Japan and saw the Chinese as doing the work of 
sapping Japanese strength. 
Casey’s relationship with Hornbeck may not have been as 
close as his relationship with Berle, but it appears to have 
been conducted in a franker manner. Casey recounted a 
long discussion he had had with Hornbeck on the evening 
of 25 June in which both ‘got a little heated’, culminating in 
Casey telling the American that in relation to Roosevelt’s 
refusal to take a more belligerent stance against the Axis 
powers while still continuing to encourage the 
Commonwealth, ‘someone else does the exhorting and we 
do the fighting’. Casey continued that the Commonwealth, 
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in supplying military aid to China, was running the risks of 
war with Japan, whereas the United States by doing no 
more than stationing a fleet in the Pacific was taking no 
risks whatever. Casey noted that, despite the heated 
words, they nonetheless parted friends.276 
With Dean Acheson, the hawkish third Assistant Secretary, 
Casey enjoyed a far more informal, even personal 
relationship.  Acheson was much more likely than Berle to 
sympathise with the British cause. Acheson’s scope of 
responsibilities in the State Department did not include any 
of the areas which Casey perceived as being relevant to his 
own responsibilities.  Yet, the two became quite close in a 
friendship conducted in Washington but not what might be 
described as ‘official Washington’. By May 1941, Acheson’s 
friendship with Caseyhad reached the point of Acheson 
coaching Casey in how to use the new Lend-Lease program 
potentially to effect a new trade treaty while American 
‘vested interests’, usually in ‘full cry’, were distracted by 
the war.277The Casey diaries reveal that their contacts 
became more frequent after Pearl Harbor. Perhaps the 
degree of their friendship and mutual trust may be gauged 
by the fact that when Casey was posted to Cairo in early 
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1942, the Achesons offered to mind the two Casey children 
and did so for several months.278 
It is possible to reach a completely contrary interpretation 
of Casey’s apparent success in the United States vis-à-vis 
his singular lack of success in Australia. Put simply, it may 
well have been that Casey relied more on style than 
substance, a cliché expression that nonetheless remains a 
viable explanation.  Yet, it must also be recognised that the 
sophisticated, battle-scarred politicians surrounding, indeed 
inhabiting, the White House (especially the ‘Before Chicago’ 
crowd) and the upper levels of the Administration were 
able to discern the difference between style and substance. 
After only a few months in Washington, Casey considered 
himself sufficiently accepted within the Roosevelt 
Administration to hold frequent, unscheduled talks with 
senior people such as Hornbeck and Berle. Indeed, a 
cursory examination of Casey’s diaries and cablegrams 
reveals striking evidence of Casey’s extraordinary 
sociability: multiple lunches, formal dinners, parties where 
he met and conversed with Vice President Harry Wallace, 
Hull, Welles, Berle, Hornbrook, Henry Morgenthau and 
Navy Secretary Frank Knox. These were not fleeting 
encounters but discussions, usually pre-arranged and not 
                                               
278  The source here is the author’s interview with Jane Macgowan, Casey’s 
daughter, 21st September, 2011. 
160 
 
infrequently, conducted over a dinner table. Casey was an 
extremely busy man, at the hight of his powers and his 
days so full that it is quite conceivable, likely even, that not 
all of his discussions were recorded in the diaries. It was 
not unusual for Casey to spend an active day in 
Washington, talking to a variety of people whom he would 
consider as worth talking to, hold a dinner party at the 
Legation attended by those who might be regarded as 
persons of influence and then board a plane or train for a 
visit to some city, to begin a round of meetings and talks 
early the next day.  
Casey appears to have made few records of his (no doubt, 
frequent) telephone conversations or casual, unscheduled 
encounters with people who came within the orbit of his 
activities, confirming the fact that his diaries do not 
constitute a complete picture. Nonetheless, his diaries 
suggest astonishing energy and successful networking with 
his principal American targets. Casey’s indefatigable pursuit 
of contacts, mentors and persons occupying positions of 
power as instanced by his ready acceptance into Whitehall 
and the British Cabinet Office and his entry as Head of 
Mission, although a lesser diplomat in the context of 
wartime Washington, being from a small nation, into the 
highest levels of the Roosevelt Administration, including 
the Oval Office, so quickly after arriving in Washington, all 
point to the fact that Casey was capable of not only 
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creating his own luck but was able to discern exactly where 
he could put such good fortune to the most effective use. 
Diplomacy was the world that Casey knew best. Yet, he 
rapidly became aware that the United States would never 
embark on a major policy shift unless it had the support of 
the American people. It thus fell to Casey to tell the 
American people where their interests lay, a task normally 
outside the responsibility of a foreign diplomat. It is a 
matter of record that Casey was able to judge just how far 
he could go on this delicate course. Disputing a proposal 
made by Clunies Ross that American public opinion could 
be formed by using the same techniques employed to sell 
‘a commodity’, Casey emphasised that while changing a 
physical or a buying habit may be achievable, ‘it is quite 
different and much more difficult to set out to change an 
attitude of mind’. Casey saw a grave risk that the American 
people ‘are all too apt to place (such material) in the 
category of propaganda’. He claimed that a great suspicion 
of propaganda, in any of its forms, existed in the United 
States at that time, a suspicion strengthened by a widely-
spread and deeply felt fear of being dragged into another 
European war.  
It is possible to discern Casey’s ability to use and exploit 
the media by referring to a letter he wrote to Prime 
Minister Bruce in December 1924, shortly after taking up 
his position as Bruce’s representative in Whitehall: 
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I think that if you at any time wanted to get anything in 
the Australian press by cable from here—it would be 
very simple for you to cable me in cipher what news you 
wished expressed and for me to have the cable agencies 
quietly inspired, preferably through a third party.279 
This demonstrates that even at that stage of his career, he 
had developed a technique to achieve press coverage that 
was close to manipulation.  Casey further honed his skills in 
manipulating the media as he began his mission in 
Washington. Casey embarked upon a carefully thought out 
program to exploit the American media, press, radio and 
newsreels. As Casey described his task: 
I believe that all references to Australia in the American 
press are to the good.  I want to see them get used to 
seeing the name “Australia” in their papers---and to 
foster the picture of a young and virile nation composed 
of a people like themselves, developing a land the size of 
their own, and at the same time, defending their freedom 
and independence against the forces of aggression.280 
Casey understood the importance of not lecturing the 
Americans but rather of giving the American media 
something of interest to report:  ‘It will be one of my 
objectives to ensure that as many references to Australia 
as possible appear in the daily press…. since I have been in 
this country, there have been widespread press references 
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to my appointment and to the new Legation, together with 
photographs and good reports of my speeches and 
movements’.281 
Casey planned to bring Australia to the notice of the 
American people in a non-threatening way, avoiding ‘the 
taint and taunt of propaganda’.282 He engaged a public 
relations adviser, Earle Newsom, whom he found useful 
and helpful. Casey could not disguise the fact that he was 
Australia’s official representative in the United States and 
that Australia was Britain’s ally in the war against Nazi 
Germany.283 
However, guided by Newsom who knew how far he could 
press his ideas, Casey managed the legal minefield and 
avoided transgressing US sensitivities about foreigners 
pushing their own point of view or illegal war propaganda.  
However, when he perceived the Australian Department of 
Information, headed by Keith Murdoch, stepping over the 
fine line in August 1940 with a plan to spend US$300,000 
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on advertising, Casey consulted the State Department and 
the plan was dropped.284 Casey set himself the task to steer 
a middle course, speaking freely about the Australian war 
effort and the reasons that Australia was in the war, ‘whilst 
studiously avoiding any suggestions as to what Americans 
should do about the war’.285 
In his first few months in Washington, he addressed a large 
number of newspaper executives and journalists in 
Washington, a gathering of the Economic and Social 
Institute Labor Camp, the National Foreign Trade 
Convention in San Francisco (audience eleven hundred), 
the Overseas Press Club in Washington, a Businessmen’s 
Lunch in San Francisco and a further evening address for 
twelve hundred executives, the Commonwealth Club in 
Washington, the New York Herald Tribune Forum in New 
York, the Washington Torch Club, the University of Utah, 
the Twentieth Century Club in Hartford, Connecticut, the 
Harvard Chapter of American Students Defence League in 
Harvard, the East Asiatic Society at Harvard Club in 
Washington, Meeting of Law, Banking and Business Men in 
Miami. His record of radio talks and interviews, beginning 
in April 1940, is equally impressive. Indicating an intensive 
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study of the reactions of the American press to his 
activities, he reported to McEwen: ‘No less than 1400 
inches of single- column press references have appeared in 
the principal newspapers of America…apart from Australian 
news cabled from Australia, that is, it represents press 
references to Australia that would not have appeared had 
the Legation not been created’. Casey told McEwen that 
this press publicity had resulted in his being ‘the target’ for 
a wide range of correspondents (sic) ‘mainly serious and 
worthwhile communications on a variety of subjects, both 
seeking and giving information’.286 Casey opined that ‘the 
success of our endeavours here will be measured by the 
increased references that we can get in the American daily 
and periodical press…’. 
As the Allied position deteriorated rapidly in June 1940, 
Casey was torn, but decided that the lesser risk was to 
take decisive action. Casey was acutely aware that any 
overt attempt to win American support for, let alone 
participation in the European conflict, was anathema. To 
take on these powerful shapers of opinion was to court 
disaster: 
 
One’s mind has to accept the fact that the reality that 
has to be faced is American public opinion.  I believe that 
no one other than Americans can say or do anything that 
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is going appreciably to speed things up—and an 
incautious word or even what might be interpreted as 
going an inch too far might get wide and devastating 
publicity.287 
Despite Casey’s own reservations about the danger of 
speaking out, a few days later in New York City he 
addressed a wide selection of organizations. These included 
No.1 Wall Street, the Union League Club, the Dutch Treat 
Club (a private charity body made up of prominent Wall 
Street figures), India House, making ‘a total of about 400 
leaders of thought in New York’.  Privately, he met and 
talked to Willard Chenery, editor of Colliers Magazine, 
Henry Mertz, editor of The New York Times,  J.M James, 
Managing Editor of The New York Times and Jacob 
Sulzberger, publisher of The New York Times, Colonel 
Patterson, owner of The New York Daily News, the highest 
circulation tabloid, and Lowell Thomas, journalist, explorer 
and film maker. On the same visit Casey also had a long 
talk with Dorothy Thompson, commentator and 
journalist.288 
An examination of the speeches he made reveals that he 
had developed various themes which he repeated in 
different parts of the country. For instance, one which he 
delivered frequently was to explain why Australia was at 
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war when it was not threatened. This involved an 
explanation of Australia’s membership of the British 
Commonwealth, a desirable end in itself, as it corrected 
some of the misunderstandings around Australia’s status. 
Australia was no longer a British colony.  
Casey discerned ‘a curious dualism’ in the United States -
the regard and respect which thinking Americans hold for 
Britain, tempered by jealousy and something of an 
inferiority complex’.289 He soon detected a similar 
dichotomy of views among the major American 
newspapers, with the Chicago Tribune, The Daily News 
(New York) and The Times-Herald (Washington) invariably 
adopting what he termed ‘an anti-British’ view.290 Casey’s 
tactic was to flood the press with information about 
Australia, making himself the subject of the story if 
necessary. Casey, helped by Newsom, over time become 
something of a celebrity. Evidence for this is that a speech 
he gave at the California Institute of Technology in June 
1941 received attention from newspapers on the East 
Coast. 291 
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Casey showed increasing assertiveness and a heightened 
appreciation of how polling created public opinion in a 
conversation over lunch with Dr George Gallup, founder of 
the American Institute of Public Opinion and virtual creator 
of public opinion polls. Casey persuaded Gallup not to 
proceed with conducting an opinion survey. The subject 
was to be Americans’ attitude to a statement by Hull, 
following the invasion of The Netherlands, that Dutch 
colonies in the south-west Pacific must not be allowed to 
fall into Nazi hands. In a report to his minister, describing 
the events, Casey considered that it would be dangerous to 
risk getting an unfavourable reply to such a question from 
public opinion in the United States at that time.  
Australia did not have public opinion polling in the 1930s, 
but Casey was quick to work out that opinion polls did not 
just measure opinion, but ‘created’ it.292 Casey was sceptical 
at first but acknowledged that most Americans believed in 
opinion polls because, despite their small samples, they 
were proving very accurate in predicting the actual results 
of elections. At one level, this was something of a relief. 
Casey, hoping for a Roosevelt win, recognised that, by 
running for a third term, Roosevelt was taking a risk.  He 
was comforted by the fact that a Gallup Poll, released on 
14 April 1940 showed Roosevelt on a 53% approval and 
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possible Republican candidate, Senator Vandenberg on 
42%.293 At another level, the results were sobering; more 
than 90% of Americans wanted the United States to stay 
out of the war. 
Roosevelt’s recognition of the opinion poll as a key factor in 
determining what the American public wanted and didn’t 
want, impressed Menzies, who perceived that characteristic 
as a positive, politically. According to Menzies, Roosevelt 
was, in effect, ‘a master politician, judging public opinion 
accurately, never getting too far ahead of it, never 
impatient’.294 Casey, however, with his long experience of 
the British and Australian systems of government found the 
reluctance of the Roosevelt Administration to get too far 
ahead of public opinion a departure from what he believed 
to be effective leadership. Unlike Menzies, Casey was not 
impressed with the purely political skills exercised by the 
President.   
Casey would often reflect upon the enormous influence of 
public opinion on American decision makers, indeed a 
greater influence than existed in other democracies. All 
politicians were able to use the media, print and radio, and 
talk to established American pressure groups, farmers, 
manufacturers, newspaper publishers and editors, radio 
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executives and broadcaster. Casey needed an edge over 
his rivals and found it in his ability to fly his own aircraft to 
meet his audiences. This both facilitated his activities and 
made him into something of a celebrity, which in turn, 
enhanced his standing and reputation in a nation that loved 
celebrities. It is necessary to note that Casey was a 
wealthy man and the costs of entertaining these important 
Americans could not have been met from the salary and 
allowances that came with the appointment as Minister.  
There was not a great deal about the American political 
system that earned praise from Casey in 1940. Casey 
noted that the President has ‘full information’ but achieves 
very little because he has ‘practically no power over the 
Congress’. To make matters worse, ‘representative 
government doesn’t exist in this country’; instead, ‘Leader 
writers and columnists largely shape public opinion—
admirable people, no doubt but without public 
responsibility’.295 Casey was no more pleased that, in the 
United States, newspaper publishers, who were usually the 
proprietors, set the political stance of their papers.  
Casey recorded that he had had lunch with Henry Luce, the 
founder and publisher of Time magazine and Furnas, 
publisher of the Saturday Evening Post on 25 June, itself 
evidence of his networking skills. Luce was so deeply 
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entrenched in the philosophy of the Republican Party that 
nothing that Roosevelt did or said could be viewed 
favourably. As one commentator put it: Luce’s fealty to 
Republicanism came a close third after God and country 
and indeed, all three were related to in the continuum of 
his ideals’.296 
Casey may have heard unreliable rumours from Luce and 
others in the Republican camp. Indeed, Casey recorded an 
early impression of Harry Hopkins a day after meeting with 
Luce when he noted, at the height of the Battle of Britain, 
that Hopkins was ’(contrary to the usually unreliable 
Republican tittle-tattle) very much on our side and willing 
and eager to discuss practicable means of overcoming the 
defeatism and pessimism that is sweeping over the USA as 
to Britain’s chances’.297 Yet Casey, unsurprisingly, 
nominated Luce ‘as a force to be reckoned with’. In one of 
his discussions with Casey, Luce shared his opinion that in 
any partnership with the United Kingdom, it was the United 
States, the future world leader, that would be the senior 
partner.298 
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During the Battle of Britain, Casey knew that he had to 
tread carefully, lest he draw the ire of more hostile 
columnists:  
I have given a lot of thought to what I can usefully say 
publicly since I have been in this country. I have 
consulted selected Americans who are well disposed and 
have political sense.  There is a great deal that I can 
say—and I have been saying it in public speeches and in 
my N.B.C. broadcast.  There is however, a limit beyond 
which one must not go. An inch over the limit and one 
runs the risk of being ‘written down’ by some ill-disposed 
columnist with a big following.  I can tell them the point 
of view of Australia about the war and what we believe is 
behind the war - but I must be extremely careful not to 
lay myself open to the charge that I am telling the 
American people publicly what to do and advocating 
intervention in the war.299 
Casey then listed the bodies he had spoken to in the terms 
just described. The list was impressive: National Press 
Club, Washington;  University Club, New York; Economic 
Club New York; English Speaking Union, Washington; 
Overseas Writers, Washington; International House, 
Chicago; Women’s Press Club, Washington;  American 
Society International Law, Washington; English Speaking 
Union, Chicago; Daughters of British Empire, Chicago: 
English Speaking Union, Milwaukee; National Broadcasting 
Company Broadcast. However, as events in Europe 
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worsened, Casey noted, ‘…the limits to what I can say have 
progressively advanced’.300 
To maintain the positive image of Australia, Casey found it 
necessary to wear the public ‘mask’ that Hudson and 
Spender referred to. Casey’s private descriptions of the 
American publicoften reflected his utter disdain as well as 
his own prejudices. As Casey put it,  ‘The Irish question is 
not dead.  There are large numbers of Irish in America, 
who hate Britain…’301Two senior American cardinals, 
O’Connell and Dougherty, strongly opposed the United 
States’ entry into World War One.302Casey drew attention to 
a report compiled by the British Library of Information in 
New York about the political inclinations of Roman Catholics 
in the United States.  The report concluded that, while 
strongly anti-Nazi, American Catholics continued to be 
strongly Isolationist.  Casey’s belief in the importance of 
this finding is contained in the following comments to the 
Minister: 
There is no doubt, of course, of the importance of turning 
Catholic opinion, which is very influential in this country, 
in the right direction… the suggestion has been made to 
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me that the Australian bishops, many of whom are of 
Irish origin, might be induced to address an appeal to the 
hierarchy of the United States asserting as vigorously as 
possible, the view that the Allies are defending 
everything which makes the continued practice of religion 
possible and that every  religious authority should rally in 
their support.  
Casey believed that Catholic isolationism was so strong as 
to be almost anti-Allies, thus leading him to justify his 
suggestion by emphasising very strongly the wide-spread 
failure in Catholic circles in the United States to appreciate 
the true character of the present struggle. Casey was 
forthright to the point of proposing how the Catholic 
bishops should publicise their statement.303 
Yet if the Irish came in for harsh stereotyping from Casey, 
this was nothing compared to the scene that Casey claimed 
confronted him in Florida the following winter: 
Miami beach succeeds in representing in concentrated 
form almost all the things that I most dislike. It is highly 
artificial  … and the human element most revolting large 
numbers of rich and offensive Jews –and generally fat, 
unhealthy and unintelligent people who overdress and 
sit about and eat and drink and gamble, stay up half the 
night… ostentation, silly gossip, physical and mental 
sloth- vulgar and senseless display of wealth…304 
The problem was not just the Catholics and Jews, but 
vested interests everywhere, especially the businessmen, 
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in the United States that were working against an American 
commitment to the war.305 Above all there were the 
isolationist politicians, ‘small minded, provincial, without 
any conception of the issues involved or their implications 
for the future of mankind’.306 
The wildcard affecting both the European and Pacific 
theatres of any future war was the Soviet Union. Aware of 
the pivotal role that the Soviet Union held in the balance of 
global power, Casey made contact with Konstantin 
Umansky, the Soviet Ambassador, although he had learnt 
that the Ambassador was a ‘notoriously unreliable’ 
person.307 However, Casey duly reported to Canberra that 
the Russian had assured him that the Soviet Union did not 
propose to intervene any further in the war and that her 
attack on Finland in the Winter War of November 1939-
March 1940 was based on the strategic need to defend 
Leningrad.  Situated only a few miles from the eastern end 
of the Gulf of Finland, Leningrad, according to the 
Ambassador, was in an impossible defensive position.  
Negotiations with Finland had broken down and thus 
invasion was the only remaining course of action.  At that 
time, the Soviet attack on Finland was regarded by Britain 
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(and Australia) as aggression of a kind similar to the 
German invasion of Poland. Despite assurances given by 
the Soviet Ambassador that his country ‘did not propose to 
intervene any further in this war, with which Russia was 
not further concerned’, Casey remained suspicious of actual 
Soviet intentions.308 Ideally, Stalin would be drawn into a 
war against Japan, unlikely though this prospect appeared.  
The Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland 
offered some prospect of stirring interest in the European 
war at least in certain parts of the United States. As Casey 
noted to his diary, there were ‘the large number of 
Scandinavians in the Middle West influencing the historic 
Middle West tendency to isolationism’.309 Casey was aware 
that the fate of Finland and the threat to Norway, Sweden 
and Denmark was causing both rage and fear. Early in his 
mission, Casey  undertook a speaking tour of the Mid-West 
including Chicago, Madison, Milwaukee and Minneapolis. 
The importance of public opinion there was made clear to 
Casey when the worsening situation developing in Europe 
caused him to reconsider his plans. As he put it to his 
diary: ‘My inclination was to abandon most if not all the 
visits but I am now told authoritatively that this would 
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cause some resentment …’.310  Among those he consulted, 
Berle and British consular officials, who both recommended 
that he proceed, the principal reason given - again 
illustrating the extent of Casey’s being perceived as an 
effective spokesman for Allied interests - was that ‘no-one 
from our side had been in the northern Middle West for a 
long time’ and it was thought necessary to ‘show the 
flag’.311 
That the Mid West was the isolationist heartland was not 
accidental. A substantial segment of Wisconsin’s population 
was descended from German migrants, while other Middle 
West states such as Minnesota had similar northern 
European settlers. Few wished the United States to become 
embroiled in a conflict in Europe, from where they 
themselves, or their ancestors, had fled. Casey ocasionally 
made these visits flying in his own small aircraft and this 
factor alone aroused levels of interest that initially had 
been stirred by Casey’s demeanour. For many Mid-
Westerners, he fitted the perception of an international 
diplomat in manner, dress, speech and the particular 
charm that both he and his wife, Maie, exuded. As Hudson 
suggests, it is possible that the very qualities that created 
something of a barrier in his political relations in the 
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Australian context, perhaps summed up succinctly in the 
phrase, ‘the Australian Anthony Eden’ worked in the very 
opposite direction in the United States. 
Casey’s thirst for useful information led him to engage in 
what might be described as unconventional practices. 
Information was Casey’s stock-in-trade. Early on, Casey 
was very cautious about what information he divulged and 
to whom. He was obviously receiving information from the 
British Embassy, but was unsure about the limits of what 
he could relay to Canberra. Reporting to McEwen on 23 
April 1940 about the enthusiastic British response to an 
American request that its ships might be refitted at 
Singapore, Casey warned: 
I need hardly say that the above is of absolute secrecy. 
My source of information is completely reliable, but 
both my informing you of this and the information itself 
must never be mentioned – if I am to preserve my 
position here.312 
As if regretting that he shared the information, Casey 
concluded by warning that ‘you do not read too much into 
the above’ as the request may have reflected military 
exigencies rather than having a political significance. 
Casey became bolder over time. In a brief note in his diary, 
written in early June 1940, Casey made the revelation that 
he sent copies of his reports to Australia to Bruce in 
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London. The off-hand manner in which Casey discloses this 
practice suggests that he perceived nothing amiss in it:   
It is necessary to put down the background of affairs of 
the last week or so in order to knit together the cables 
that I have sent to Australia and repeated to SMB 
(Stanley Melbourne Bruce).  For the first two or three 
days of the invasion of Holland Belgium, I experienced a 
feeling of depression and foreboding but this passed and 
after that I spent a fair proportion of my time in putting 
heart into people—Allied and neutral.313 
It is conceivable that the practice was in accordance with 
Australian diplomatic procedures existing at that time. It is 
also conceivable that within the new Australian diplomatic 
service, there were no policies or procedures laid down on 
matters such as this. Casey’s reports, copies of which he 
was ending to Bruce, were headed ‘Secret’, denoting a 
clear indication of their status and the restricted circulation 
applying to such documents. There is no indication on the 
messages Casey was sending to the Prime Minister or the 
Minister for External Affairs that a copy was being 
simultaneously forwarded to Bruce in London.  A more 
benign interpretation would be that both men regarded the 
practice simply as an exchange of information. Both were 
Australian public servants, serving their country abroad. It 
was only natural that each saw the need to learn as much 
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as possible about the momentous events that were 
unfolding every day.   
Moreover, the advising of Bruce by Casey was not a one-
way transaction. Casey noted in his diary: ‘I see Lothian 
almost every day and I see the cables that are passing 
direct (or through Lothian, or through Kennedy ) between 
Winston and the President’.314 If Casey  can be criticised for 
passing on information to a colleague, then it is possible for 
the same criticism to be levelled at Lothian, the British 
Ambassador for passing on this correspondence to Casey. 
Indeed, Casey told Mcewen that he showed Lothian his 
letters ‘to check my own impressions’.315Finally, it must be 
remembered that the year was 1940, that France was in 
the process of capitulation and that Britain and the 
Commonwealth were totally alone. In such a time, an air of 
desperation would not be impossible. For the players in 
that conflict, knowing as much as possible would be a 
paramount consideration. 
Yet Casey’s knowledge was evidently far from perfect. After 
Pearl Harbor, Casey was moved to note that one reason 
why the situation was now so perilous was the poor flow of 
information between London and the Dominions over issues 
such as reinforcing Singapore. According to Casey: 
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A fundamental factor in the war situation of today, and 
the last year or so, is that we (the British peoples) 
have failed rather badly in the business of keeping in 
touch with each other – the old problem of bad liaison. 
We in Australia have failed to establish and maintain 
adequate appreciation of what had been going on in 
the minds of the British War Cabinet…316 
Casey himself could hardly be accused of failing to make 
efforts to facilitate just such an exchange of information. 
On ocassions, the information confirmed Casey and 
Australia’s worst fears. Another matter of vital concern to 
Casey was the state of American readiness for war, should 
its leaders decide to intervene on the Allied side. Casey 
well understood that the British navy was the point of 
connection between the security of Britain, the United 
States, and Australia. Casey’s networking skills in pre-War 
Washington enabled him to receive briefings and to 
participate in discussions that might otherwise have been 
denied him. For instance, the Naval attaché at the British 
Embassy, Captain Curzon-Howe explained to him that, in 
early 1939, ‘practically the whole American fleet, 
concentrated at Norfolk, Virginia had been sent to the 
Pacific region’. Casey noted that the United States had 
insufficient ships to maintain appropriate strength in both 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The transfer meant that 
only four old battleships remained in the Atlantic.  
Approved by the President, the transfer reflected an 
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American fear of Japan’s intentions.317 Casey also detected 
a growing realisation in the United States that the Royal 
Navy was primarily responsible for safe-guarding the 
Atlantic and indeed, the continued existence of the British 
Navy was the sine qua non that made American 
isolationism possible.318 While the secret agreement 
between the Admiralty and the United States Navy of May 
1939 allowed American ships to take command of the 
western and southern Atlantic, should war break out 
between Germany and the United States, there was no 
similar agreement for the Pacific where the United States 
studiously avoided committing itself to defending Britain’s 
empire.  
There was much to be concerned about in the statistics of 
the American armed forces, gathered by Embassy staff in 
Washington and conveyed by Casey to Canberra in May 
1940. This report was the first indication that Casey, since 
arriving in the United States, was able to assess American 
offensive capability. He undoubtedly considered that the 
disposition of American aircraft carriers and war ships in 
the Pacific vis-à-vis the Atlantic conveyed an appreciation 
by Washington of the primacy of the Pacific. He reported 
that of the entire American fleets of fifteen battleships, 37 
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cruisers and six aircraft carriers, twelve battleships, 29 
cruisers and four carriers were based either on the Pacific 
coast or at Pearl Harbor.319 This disposition arose from a 
strategic plan by the U.S. Army and Navy and was based 
on the hypothesis that the United States would join the 
European colonial powers in defending their common 
interests in the western Pacific against attack by Japan.   
While the naval strength quoted by Casey might appear to 
be numerically satisfactory, at least in peacetime, it was 
seriously inadequate to cope with any prolonged period of 
hostilities. The strength of the Army, the Army Air Force 
and the Naval Air Force was, in Casey’s estimation, ‘less 
than satisfactory’.320 Casey’s judgments were much too 
benign. The armed forces of the United States in 1940 
were so inadequate that the security of the nation and 
indeed the security of the western world were jeopardized. 
The Official History of the United States Army states that, 
from 1918, the armed forces of the United States 
underwent an almost continuous weakening for a decade 
and a half.  In 1919, the total strength of the Army was 
846,498. It dropped dramatically until, in 1939, it was 
188,565. Twelve months later, as the deterioration of 
international relations assumed such critical importance, 
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the number increased to a paltry 267,767.321 The 
emasculation of the armed forces extended beyond 
personnel. The equipment remaining at the end of the 
Great War became increasingly obsolescent: there had 
been some support for directing resources to a strong Navy 
on the grounds that it was ‘the first line of defence, the 
only really necessary line of defence for the time being’.322 
As Casey put it to McEwen on 8 May 1940, not much could 
be expected given ‘the strength (or lack of it) of the three 
American fighting services. It is not a pleasant picture. 
Clearly the help that America could give quickly if and 
when she comes in would be largely moral’.323 
Casey saw reason for real concern at a statement by the 
Assistant Secretary of War that despite the efforts to build 
up the Army’s resources, ‘some fifteen months would 
elapse after Mobilization Day before even a million men 
could be adequately supplied with the more critical items of 
ordinance equipment…we could raise two or three million 
men but we could not furnish their weapons and supplies in 
less than two years’. There was here a dual problem in that 
not only were the Americans not particularly interested in 
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Australia, the country that so many hoped would prove the 
salvation perhaps of Britain and certainly Australia, lacked 
the capacity to do so.324 
It is clear that Casey made good use of his first months in 
Washington to push back against Washington’s blindness 
when it came to Australia and Australian interests. 
Roosevelt was the target, but the strategy was to influence 
American decision making by working on those individuals, 
such as Berle, and key opinion makers in the media and 
polling, to whom the President might listen. Here Casey 
was not just hard-working, but clearly effective.  
 
                                               
324  Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, The United States Army in World War II. 
Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, Section titled ‘The Study – 
War with Japan’, (Washington D.C: The War Deparment, Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army. 1953), p. 1.  
186 
 
 
187 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: Summer 1940: Casey’s Battle for 
Britain.  
A criticism that has been made of Casey isthat he was 
single-mindedly obsessed with saving Britain when he 
should have pursued the narrower focus of pushing 
Australian interests.The reality was more complex. Casey 
did focus upon saving Britain during the summer of 1940 
when invasion seemed a real possibility.Yet Casey 
justifiably argued that Britain’s salvation was vital to both 
American and Australian interests. Moreover, it was 
because he was arguing for American aid to Britain that 
Casey was able to establish himself in Washington as a 
diplomatic force to be reckoned with. 
Within three months of Casey arriving in Washington, it 
seemed that Britain was on the verge of losing the war.In 
summary, the situation Casey faced at the beginning of his 
term, bleak as it may have been, grew immeasurably 
worse during the following six months of 1940, his first six 
months in Washington. In January, France and Britain 
seemed strong enough to resist any German adventures, 
the Low Countries and Scandinavia had not been attacked 
by the Wehrmacht, Italy had not joined Germany in any 
military sense either in Europe or North Africa and the 
Soviet Union’s relations with Germany remained 
enigmatically neutral while it attempted to cope with 
Finnish resistance to the Soviet invasion.   
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By the end of June, however, France, the Low Countries, 
Denmark and Norway had been overrun by German forces, 
continental Europe was virtually being governed from 
Berlin,  Italy had joined Germany to form the Axis, with 
substantial forces in North Africa, while Finland had been 
forced to capitulate to the Soviet Union, a defeat seen as 
detrimental to the Allies.  The suddenness of the French 
capitulation on 17 June is well illustrated by the assurances 
given to Menzies by Lord Caldecote, the U.K. Dominions 
Secretary, as late as 29 and 30 May that, ‘we should not 
like it to be thought that we regard a French collapse as 
imminent or as other than a possibility’ and that ‘there is 
no reason to assume that anything is radically wrong with 
the French Army’.325 
The month of May 1940 was the crucial time when the full 
enormity of Britain’s isolation as the sole combatant in the 
conflict with Hitler, the only nation still standing, became 
vividly real.  Moreover, following the collapse of France, the 
question of whether Britain would fight on against the 
overwhelming superiority of Germany or succumb to a 
negotiated peace was debated passionately and forensically 
at the highest levels in London. Britain’s leaders were 
deeply divided as they faced the helplessness of being the 
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sole remaining obstacle to the creation of a Nazi Europe.326  
The world awaited the launch of the German war machine 
on a Britain that was clearly unready for a fight for 
survival. 
Churchill became Prime Minister on 10 May 1940; a 
coalition government wasformed against the background of 
German troops pouring into Belgium and The Netherlands.  
Despite the inevitable Cabinet re-shuffle, there was not 
complete confidence in Churchill as leader. Two days 
earlier, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Under Secretary and 
Permanent Head of the British Foreign Office, speculating 
on who would take over if Chamberlain resigned, wrote in 
his diary, ‘Winston useless’.327  One Parliamentarian wrote: 
‘The Tories don’t trust Winston… There seems to be some 
inclination in Whitehall to believe that Winston will be a 
complete failure and that Neville (Chamberlain) will 
return’.328  Nor was there complete unanimity in the new 
leadership team. Lord Halifax, now Foreign Secretary, was 
still entertaining the possibility of negotiating with Hitler.  
Lukacs has documented the intense debates and 
arguments that characterised those three, perhaps four 
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days, of debates and arguments which were confined solely 
to the War Cabinet. Elements in the cabinet, led by Halifax, 
sought for several days in late May to devise some kind of 
accommodation with Hitler, which, while saving Britain 
from the destruction that had been inflicted upon other 
parts of Europe, would turn Britain into a vassal state, 
perhaps even retaining a puppet king (the name of the 
previous king, now the Duke of Windsor was mentioned in 
this context) but essentially governed from Berlin. As early 
as December, 1939, Halifax had told the cabinet that if the 
French dropped out, ‘we should not be able to carry on the 
war by ourselves’.329 
The motivation driving Halifax was not a willingness to 
accede to the demands of Hitler as such, but rather an 
ardent desire to avoid the bloody and destructive 
consequences of a German invasion and a fiercely fought 
battle within the British Isles.  Churchill, in resisting the 
very concept of negotiating with Hitler, either directly or 
through an intermediary such as Mussolini, anticipated that 
Hitler’s demands would be so great, including the handover 
of Gibraltar, Malta, the British Fleet, the naval bases ‘and 
much more’, that resistance leading to defeat could be no 
worse: ‘We should become a slave state, through a British 
government which would be Hitler’s puppet, would be set 
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up’.330 The historian, Ian Kershaw, argues that Britain’s 
decision, in May, 1940, to ‘stay in the war’, that is, to resist 
the expected German invasion and to mount a repulse to 
Hitler’s ambitions:  
was far from being the obvious, even inevitable, decision 
that some subsequent events (and some persuasive 
historical writing) have made it seem. The War Cabinet 
seriously deliberated the choices for three days, with a 
new prime minister still tentatively feeling his way, the 
British army seemingly lost at Dunkirk, no immediate 
prospect of help from the United States and a German 
invasion in the near future presumed to be very likely.331 
Not only was this crucial debate not revealed publicly at the 
time, Churchill, in writing his history of the Second World 
War deliberately omitted all references to it and in fact, 
reported the opposite: ‘Future generations may deem it 
noteworthy that the supreme question of whether we 
should fight on alone never found a place upon the War 
Cabinet agenda.  It was taken for granted and as a matter 
of course by these men of all parties in the State, and we 
were much too busy to waste time upon such unreal, 
academic issues’.332 As Reynolds has pointed out, this 
assertion is strictly correct but seriously misleading. There 
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were no items on the Cabinet minutes headed ‘Surrender’ 
or ‘Negotiated Peace’, but while Churchill wrote that he and 
his colleagues were much too busy to waste time on such 
unreal, academic issues, Reynolds asserts that ‘those 
issues had seemed all too real in May, 1940’ and that ‘the 
way he concealed the debate is the most significant cover-
up in Their Finest Hour’.333 
It is uncertain how much Casey, in Washington, was aware 
of the day-by-day arguments during the crucial week of 24 
to 28 May 1940 and what he knew was most likely to come 
from Bruce, who was close to Chamberlain and Halifax, but 
often at loggerheads with Churchill. Edwards makes the 
point that Bruce and Casey frequently discussed proposals 
before submitting them jointly to Canberra.334  In a ‘Most 
Secret’ message to Menzies, on 16 May, less than a week 
after Churchill’s ascendancy to the prime ministership, 
Bruce wrote that the ‘Present War Cabinet showing more 
initiative and vision than predecessors in preparing to meet 
situation when it arises’.335 
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The Australians had their reservations about political 
developments in London. Just a few months earlier, 
Menzies had savagely criticised Churchill. Obviously deeply 
opposed to Churchill’s strong opposition to any kind of 
negotiations with Hitler, Menzies told Bruce: ‘I cannot tell 
you adequately how much I am convinced that Winston is a 
menace. He is a publicity seeker; he stirs up hatreds in a 
world already seething with them and he is lacking in 
judgment…’336 Casey, though, came to see the positive side 
of Churchill, telling his diary that the messages that came 
from London to the President ‘are clearly dictated by 
Winston himself as they are in his unmistakeable style---
and are very good’.337 Casey was clearly impressed with 
Churchill’s determination to fight and the pressure he was 
attempting to pile on the Americans.  
Lukacs, in attempting to describe the motivations of 
Churchill in those crucial days, quotes some of the Prime 
Minister’s utterances which go some way towards 
delineating the choices that Casey would have perceived: 
‘In these British Islands that look so small upon the map, 
we stand, the faithful guardians of the right and dearest 
hopes of a dozen states and nations now gripped and 
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tormented in a base and cruel servitude’.338 Lukacs claims 
that Churchill saw Hitler and his Reich as incarnating 
something evil and dangerous and saw himself as saviour 
not only of Britain but of much else besides—essentially, of 
all Europe. Lukacs referred to Churchill’s address to 
Parliament on 28 May, in which he spoke of ‘the world 
cause to which we have vowed ourselves’, and his address 
a few weeks later (14 July), when he declared that Britain 
was fighting ‘by ourselves alone, but not for ourselves 
alone’.339  The real import of this message might be 
summed up in the conclusion that Lukas himself reached: 
‘At the end of May 1940 and for some time thereafter, not 
only the end of a European war but the end of Western 
civilisation was near’. 340 
This worsened situation invites the question, how did this 
unexpected and rapid deterioration impinge upon Casey’s 
perception of his role in Washington?  Did the frightening 
prospect of a German invasion of Britain lead him to 
conclude that his efforts should best be directed at 
attempting to convince the Americans of the monumental 
importance of doing everything possible to rescue the last 
bastion of Western democracy in Europe from subjugation 
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by the Nazis?  Or did he adhere to his commission to make 
Australia’s voice heard in the corridors of Washington and 
to make the United States aware of the strategic 
importance of the Pacific region?  
In the summer of 1940, Casey clearly chose not to stick to 
a narrow interpretation of his brief of representing an 
Australia confronting nothing more than a possible threat 
from Japan, but instead broadened his efforts to help 
representa United Kingdom facing almost immediate 
invasion by a real and superior foe. Casey’s encounters in 
Washington and his clearer understanding of the global 
situation led him to reason that the immediate threat was 
not to Australia but to Britain. The threat to Australia from 
Japan was still just that, a threat and one which was not 
universally perceived as grave. There was certainly a 
common thread running through Churchill’s messages to 
his Australian counterpart at this time, that a Japanese 
attempt to threaten Australia was not likely.341 In the face 
of this, Casey could hardly make his first priority the 
gaining of American assurances to assist Australia in such 
an unlikely eventuality. Moreover, a German victory over 
Britain would have dire consequences for Australia because 
of the probable loss of the Royal Navy. Although no one 
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could predict the fate of the British fleets, there was feeling 
that Britain would go to Australia’s aid if invasion occurred. 
As France collapsed, Australian diplomacy attempted all 
means of persuading Roosevelt to do more. According to 
Edwards, it was Bruce in London, in consultation with 
Casey in Washington, who suggested the appeals that 
Menzies made to Roosevelt for assistance in May-June 
1940.342 On 26 May Menzies cabled Casey asking him to 
‘present’ to Roosevelt a heart-felt request for American 
participation in the major disaster unfolding in Europe.  
Much of Menzies’ reasoning had already been canvassed by 
Churchill in his entreaties to the American president but 
Menzies’ command of language was no less arresting than 
his British counterpart and deserves quoting, at least in 
part. Having asked for practical help for Britain in terms of 
military equipment, Menzies tugged at American heart-
strings over its relationship to Australia: 
But quite plainly, and I know that you would wish me to 
speak plainly, without the most prompt material 
assistance from the United States there must be grave 
danger of a state of affairs rapidly developing in which 
the power of Great Britain to defend liberty and free 
institutions is destroyed and in which, we, your English-
speaking neighbours on the Pacific Basin, must find our 
own independence immediately imperilled… There is in 
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Australia a great belief in your friendliness and goodwill. 
We feel that we are fighting for immortal things which 
you value as we do.  On behalf of my own people I beg 
for your earnest consideration and swift action.343 
Like Curtin’s ‘Look to America’ plea the following year, 
Menzies emphasised Australia’s dire vulnerability. To be 
fair, Menzies used his message to emphasise the self-
interest of the United States in not allowing Britain’s world-
wide influence to be diluted. Menzies, a few days earlier, 
had written to Churchill, strongly urging him to approach 
the American president in similar terms.344 Churchill’s reply 
was almost dismissive: ‘Every form of intimate personal 
appeal and most cogent arguments have already been sent 
to Roosevelt…If you and the other Prime Ministers feel able 
to follow up our appeal by a personal appeal from 
yourselves, this would be very welcome to us’.345 
For all his attachments to Britain, Menzies was realistic 
enough to read the signs and these told him that in the 
event of Australia being threatened in the Pacific region, 
Britain, fighting for survival, would be unable to offer 
Australia anything in the way of military or naval support.  
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Yet Menzies struggled in his efforts to find an argument as 
to why the United States should offer to save Australia. His 
subsequent appeal of 14 June 1940 to Roosevelt betrayed 
an ever increasing note of desperation:346 
The friendship of Australia as an integral part of the 
British Empire is of importance to the United States. The 
British and American people have too much in common 
and may I add, too many precious ideas at risk and, of 
importance to the United States in this turbulent world, 
not to realise that, whatever their organic relations 
might be, they are exercising similar functions and that 
safety and development of each is of profound 
importance to the other.347 
It is a matter of conjecture whether Menzies actually 
believed that arguments about the shared heritage of 
Britons, Australians and Americans would carry any weight 
in Washington.  He was acutely aware that Churchill had 
made similar appeals to Roosevelt and yet, for the last six 
months of 1940  Britain had faced the distinct possibility of 
invasion, while the United States virtually looked on, 
Roosevelt trapped from assisting because of the November 
elections. 
The relevance of the Churchill/Halifax debate to Casey’s 
responsibilities lies in the reality that Washington, in fact, 
was the focus of Britain’s only real hope of holding off 
                                               
346 Menzies to Roosevelt, 26 May 1940, A1608. A41/1/5 (ii), NAA. 
347  Menzies to Roosevelt, 14 June 1940, (cablegram) unnumbered,  Documents of 
Australian Foreign Policy, Vol III, Doc. 380. 
199 
 
Hitler. Casey saw his position as especially vital in the 
business of networking because, while the average 
American is ‘a free and spontaneous creature’, by contrast 
‘the average member of the British Diplomatic service is a 
rather shy creature, the product of the British Public School 
system, and definitely not a good and quick mixer’.348 Casey 
implied that he, by contrast, was a very ‘good and quick 
mixer’. He was happy to serve alongside Lothian as, in 
Lothian’s phrase,‘the second blade of the scissors’.349 
Casey offered his advice freely and occasionally struck a 
note of optimism as he looked for an effective strategy to 
lever the United States into the war. Early in June, Lothian 
suggested to him that they (Lothian and Casey) should 
advocate a conference in London to discuss what action 
should be taken if the worst happened, meaning the 
capitulation of Britain. Casey expressed strong opposition. 
He argued that in the absence of actual knowledge of what 
the United States would do, such a conference would be of 
no use. Further, if the United States did ‘come in’, there 
would be a complete change and re-appraisal of strategy.350 
Hull later revealed that Roosevelt’s decision to run for a 
third term was an immediate consequence of Hitler’s 
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conquest of France. He explains it thus: ‘Up to that time, 
the President, in personal conversations with me and with 
some Democratic Party leaders had indicated his 
expectation and wish that I should be his successor’. 
According to Hull, Roosevelt’s decision ‘was an immediate 
consequence of Hitler’s conquest of France and the spectre 
of Britain standing alone between the conqueror and 
ourselves.  Our dangerous position induced President 
Roosevelt to run for a third time’.351 
A week after the invasion of France, Casey told Canberra 
that events of the past few days had profoundly shaken 
American complacency:  ‘(The) whole country, particularly 
Washington, is extremely nervous and depressed at 
realisation of their own unpreparedness and the United 
Sates may be menaced by trend of events in Europe’. Yet, 
while Casey detected a growing belief that while the United 
States should give Britain all possible assistance, there was 
no groundswell of opinion for the United States to become 
a participant in the war. Casey, shrewdly, warned that 
Australia should avoid making any criticism in the press or 
elsewhere of American ‘tardiness’. Nor should Australia 
give any indication that the United States should offer 
assistance to Australia. In the context of the American 
elections, Casey reported that many candidates believed 
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that to speak out what he (the candidate) believes is the 
truth would cost him the Isolationist vote.352  His reading of 
the mood of the American people detected a denial of the 
awesome prospect of the United States remaining the only 
democracy on the globe.353 
Both Casey and Lothian shared the same combination of 
anger and bewilderment when it came to understanding 
the Administration’s refusal to mobilise the American 
people. Lothian reported to London in May:   
The United States is still dominated by fear of 
involvement and incapable of positive action…the war is 
steadily drifting nearer to them and they know it.. they 
are not pacifists (but) are highly belligerent by 
temperament…the President would like to take action 
vigorously on the lines of his own principle ‘Everything 
short of war’…all the other candidates, especially the 
Republicans, none of whom are familiar with international 
affairs, are paralysed by  fear of being charged with a 
desire to get the United States into war…they are 
completely mesmerised by fear of the great god, ‘the 
American Electorate’.354 
 
Or as Casey put it: ‘‘Self-interest’ is the only lever’- and it 
was not clear to me (or to Lothian) … how to arouse this 
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motive’. The ‘motive’ to activate this American ‘self-
interest’ would have to be the preservation of the British 
fleet.355The Roosevelt administration could only have been 
alarmed by a message from the American Ambassador in 
France, William Bullitt, that Britain’s reluctance to dispatch 
more aircraft to France in the last weeks of the German 
invasion of that country was explained by the possibility 
that Britain would use the Royal Air Force and the Royal 
Navy as bargaining points in future negotiations with 
Germany.356 According to Charmley, Roosevelt believed that 
no matter what happened to Britain, such as a negotiated 
peace, the British Fleet must be kept from German hands, 
and become part of the United States fleet.357 The prospect 
of the largest navy in the world falling under control of 
Germany would have catastrophic consequences for the 
United States.  
The view in Washington was that a negotiated settlement 
between Britain and Germany was more likely than an 
invasion. Roosevelt’s long-held opposition to colonialism 
and, in particular, the British Empire, led him to believe 
that to achieve that result, Britain would have to accept 
some form of governance from Berlin.  Under no 
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circumstance would Roosevelt consider American troops 
undertaking any adventure that would have the effect of 
propping up the British Empire.  
A serious flaw in Roosevelt’s argument lay in defining ‘the 
British Empire’. The United States’ longest border was with 
an integral component of the Commonwealth, Canada, 
which, in American eyes, stood for ‘British Empire’.  
Roosevelt had already indicated that any attack on Canada 
would virtually certainly bring an armed American 
response. Moreover, the Bahamas and Jamaica, both 
members of the Commonwealth, were close neighbours of 
the United States and it is difficult to believe that any 
European takeover of such close neighbours would be 
viewed benignly in Washington. In any event, these islands 
were within the ambit of the Monroe Doctrine. 
For Casey, Roosevelt’s position was not clear and in some 
ways, inconsistent. He believed that, privately, Roosevelt 
was far more interventionist than he appeared and that 
simply following public opinion was not the complete 
explanation. Lowenthal has advanced an explanation of 
Roosevelt’s position as a series of fits and starts, whose 
interconnection the President himself denied at the time: 
These policy decisions could be grouped into three broad 
consecutive periods. Each of these periods was 
dominated by a thematic unifying search for a type of 
policy…which shaped what he wanted and what he hoped 
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to avoid.  Each of these periods was ill-defined at the 
outset and was abandoned through the pressure of 
events, requiring the beginning of yet another search.358 
Casey suspected that the American failure to rearm may 
have constituted a more practical reason for Roosevelt’s 
inaction, telling his diary on 5 June 1940 that ‘It may be 
that the President realises that, even if they intervened in 
this war, they have virtually no fighting services to fight 
with-outside the Navy that is virtually stuck in the Pacific’. 
Even so Casey hoped that not only would American 
prestige boost the Allied cause but that ‘they could send a 
few divisions, a few dozen destroyers, a fair tonnage of 
merchant shipping, a few squadrons of aircraft, and could 
help with equipment far faster than they are doing as 
neutrals’.359 
Casey admitted to himself the next day that his 
speculations amounted to no more than ‘wishful thinking’.360  
Of course the question has to be posed of whatmight the 
Americans have done? Immediately after the capitulation of 
France, the sending of a substantial contingent of American 
troops to Britain or the greater involvement of American 
naval units in the Atlantic, specifically to protect merchant 
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ships carrying food to Great Britain, would have been 
achievable without the necessity of a formal American 
declaration of war. There would have been political risks 
involved however, especially in the stationing of American 
troops in Britain. It certainly was not going to happen in 
Roosevelt’s re-election year. 
Casey’sire was accentuated by a letter from Roosevelt to 
Menzies, sent through the Australian Legation and which 
was a reply to a pleading letter that the Australian Prime 
Minister had sent to the President a few days earlier.361   
Roosevelt was effusive but resolute in re-affirming the 
traditional American stance of non-participation in 
countering the spread of Nazism rapidly engulfing Europe. 
The letter was dated 23 June, two days after French 
representatives signed the formal surrender documents at 
Compiegne, thus leaving Britain standing alone. Roosevelt 
put things this way: 
I have given your message my full and most careful 
consideration…I do not fail to appreciate the dangers to 
the United States and to the world implicit in an Allied 
defeat…America’s sympathies lie with Allied 
governments…to the Premier of France, I send my 
assurances of my utmost sympathy…in like manner and 
subject to the same limitations, I want to assure you that 
so long as the peoples of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations continue in the defence of their liberty so long 
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may they be assured that material and supplies will be 
sent them from the United States in ever increasing 
quantities and kinds.362 
Casey, in a reflective mood on 2 July 1940, asked himself if 
nations ever went against their ‘material interests’. The two 
examples of this occurring, he claimed, were the abolition 
of slavery and the free ride that British naval power offered 
to ‘North (and South) America and Australia, South Africa 
and New Zealand’. According to Casey’s figures, the 
Australian taxpayer spent less than one pound per head on 
its defence compared to more than three pounds per head 
for the British taxpayer.363 Whether, British altruism – as 
Casey claimed - was the reason might be debated, but 
Casey’s general point that the British navy carried the 
burden of defence in the Atlantic was difficult to argue 
against.  
All the representatives of Britain and Australia, Casey 
foremost among them, pressed the point that it was the 
Royal Navy which made the MonroeDoctrine viable. 
According to Casey, the American leadership knew the 
truth of this proposition, even if they would not declare it. 
As Casey put it in a letter to McEwen on 4 April 1940: 
Lord Lothian maintains (and he believes that the 
President and others in high places here agree) that for 
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generations until quite lately that it was the British 
Fleet and not the American Fleet that maintained the 
Monroe Doctrine.364 
The Doctrine was promulgated in 1823 and yet it was not 
until ‘relatively lately’ that the United States possessed a 
fleet of any great significance, a fleet capable of enforcing 
some kind of American hegemony over the two American 
continents.  Even in1940, the United States was unable to 
maintain significant fleets in both the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans.  In other words, according to Casey’s reasoning, 
the United States was unable to defend the two American 
continents both on the Atlantic and Pacific sides.365 The only 
practicable arrangement therefore was for Britain to look 
after the Atlantic and the United States, the Pacific.  
The corollary raised the question, why does the United 
States stand aloof from the grave threat facing Britain and 
pretend that the European conflict is of no consequence to 
American security? Casey became increasingly displeased 
at the President’s almost obsessive interest in the future of 
the British Fleet, denoting to Casey that while he was 
unprepared to give Britain meaningful support and 
assistance, he was most anxious to acquire the entire Royal 
Navy should Britain capitulate. From Casey’s perspective, 
the Americans appeared at times almost as vultures circling 
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the carcass of the British Empire. In a diary entry, Casey 
referred to a discussion with Roosevelt on 28 May, 1940: ‘I 
did not, at the time, appreciate the significance of what he 
had to say about the urgent importance of the preservation 
of the British Navy at all costs’. 366 
According to Casey, American concern about the British 
fleet reflected a realisation that it was the same British 
fleet that had been protecting the United States for years 
and that if the British fleet were to disappear, the 
Americans would have to set about defending themselves, 
which Casey said was ‘unthinkable’. Casey quoted with 
approval an observation by Mark Sullivan, a journalist and 
friend of Roosevelt whom Casey cultivated: ‘We have a 
national policy—the Monroe Doctrine.  We think this policy 
has been enforced by the United States Navy.  But it was 
never we who enforced it.  It is the British Navy that kept 
European nations from seizing lands in the Western 
hemisphere.  The British Navy prevented them.  And more 
- to do what the British Navy has done in enforcing the 
Monroe Doctrine for us, you have to command the naval 
bases and bastions from which the British Navy operates’.367 
Casey noted that he had circulated a ‘draft’ hammering the 
point that for the Americans to take over the 
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responsibilities required by the Monroe Doctrine in the 
Pacific, the United States would need to ensure the security 
of naval bases in the North Atlantic. Up until now, the 
Americans had relied upon the British to perform these 
tasks. Casey’s drafting of these ‘talking points’ for 
columnists confirmed not only his growing confidence in his 
powers of manipulation, but also his grasp of strategic 
issues on both the Atlantic and the Pacific sides of the 
world.  
Casey was irritated above all bythe complacency of the 
Americans. On 2 July 1940, Casey, in one of his bleakest 
assessments, told his diary that: 
There is no spirit in the American people today and 
they’ll have to go through hell in the next ten years to 
produce some spirit. Their only concern now is safety 
and self preservation.368 
Indeed, Casey’s diary entries are scathing of the United 
States and Americans to the point where the reader would 
likely conclude that he was as anti-American as Berle was 
Anglophobic. A diary entry from July 1940 was typical of 
his acute sense of American betrayal of a good cause: 
The spectacle is a humiliating one of a great nation 
twittering with indecision and inaction willing to wound 
but yet afraid to strike even in its own defence—
tangled in the toils of domestic political manoeuvring at 
a vital moment—realising that the British are fighting 
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their fight—yet giving inconsequential assistance—
cursing Germany and yet yapping at Britain.369 
Casey became increasingly forthright in July 1940 as he did 
his best to agitate the policy makers. When Under 
Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, speculated about the 
fate of the Royal Navy in the event of a successful German 
invasion of Great Britain, Casey retorted that the navy 
would not surrender but probably immolate their ships in 
attacking German ports, a view that Welles protested was 
illogical. ‘People aren’t logical in such circumstances’, Casey 
persisted, adding that they would change their minds only 
if there was some eventual chance of the United States 
entering the war.370 Casey knew that Welles, and Roosevelt 
if they were relayed to him, would find these words 
provocative. 
Hull told Casey in June 1940, as the full extent of the 
German mastery in Europe became evident, that he was 
under no illusions ‘as to the seriousness of the situation or 
of its implications for America’. He confessed to Casey that 
he had persisted, to the point of boredom, in rubbing into 
Congressmen and Senators what a German victory would 
mean for the United States and that the United States 
would be obliged to do all its negotiations with other 
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countries through Berlin or Tokyo.371  Casey left this 
interview with Hull by claiming that he could see no 
satisfactory end to the present situation unless the United 
States declared war and ‘came in with us’. If this were to 
happen, however unpleasant the next few months would 
be, he believed that the situation could be retrieved by the 
throttling of Germany through the blockade.  Casey records 
that Hull made no direct reply to this other than he hoped 
and prayed that Britain could ‘last out for the next four or 
five months’.372 
Hull recalled the desperate persistence of Casey in June 
1940. Casey told Hull that he (Casey) and S. M. Bruce, the 
Australian High Commissioner, the Australian High 
Commissioner in Britain, were ‘emphatically’ of the opinion 
that Germany would conquer Britain and that he would be 
extremely interested to see the United States declare war 
on Germany.  Casey reasoned that as the United States 
was doing everything possible to sell equipment and 
supplies to the Allies, a declaration of war was an obvious 
corollary and that the effect morally of such a declaration 
would be very great.  Hull promptly replied that it was 
‘unthinkable’ in the present situation’.373 
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Yet, curiously, Casey’s challenging Hull over America’s 
determination to remain out of the war does not sit with his 
remarksin a letter to McEwen of 5 June: ‘It needs all the 
self-command one possesses not to be bitter and 
recriminatory towards this country’.374 Certainly, this latter 
comment fits the perception of his reluctance to express a 
view that would not be kindly received by his listener, a 
reluctance that, on the basis of the two instances quoted 
above, he obviously sometimes foreswore. 
In the dark summer of 1940, Casey reflected not just on 
American inaction, but Australian mistakes. In retrospect, 
he regretted that Australia had neglected participating in 
what he termed, ‘international affairs’, leaving them to 
Britain to handle, instead directing attention on domestic 
affairs and domestic politics. When such matters were 
discussed, ‘the ignorant prejudices of individuals had a field 
day to the exclusion of calm deliberation.  We grasped the 
shadow and let the substance go’. 375 
In his daily dealings with the Administration, Casey 
maintained a formal, gracious demeanour.  Privately, his 
diary discloses a deeply held anger and frustration at the 
reality that Britain stood utterly alone and her survival was 
very much in doubt. Unable to contain his exasperation 
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with American foot-dragging, Casey committed to paper a 
lengthy, considered statement, which he wrote for his own 
personal satisfaction and kept in his diary without sending 
it to anyone:  
I have been at a loss to know what attitude to take. They 
(the Roosevelt Administration) are apparently quite un-
moved, or perhaps it is more correct to say that they 
steadily (sic) refuse to take any action designed to 
awaken the American people to the grim days ahead, at 
the prospect of France and then Britain being over-run.  
One can almost hear them say to themselves, ‘Well, well, 
fancy Britain going down---too bad’.  
The President is the only person who could set American 
public opinion on fire and he apparently won’t do it. His 
broadcast speech on Sunday evening (26 May) was flat, 
full of domestic politics and given at a time, in fact, at 
the exact moment, when he might have given a high lead 
to the country.376 
Casey speculated on the situation that would confront the 
United States in the event of Britain’s capitulation or 
defeat:  ‘They might even have to stand up to the German 
and Italian fleets…or what would be left of them.  They 
might even be asked by the South American republics how 
they proposed to see that the Monroe Doctrine was 
maintained’. He also quoted with approval, an argument 
mounted by the American journalist and commentator, 
Walter Lippmann: 
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This country chose deliberately not to support an 
organised peace---and it chose deliberately not to take 
measures to prevent the war---and it chose deliberately 
not to take measures to support the resistance of the 
Allies.  We have now to pay for the consequences of our 
deliberate choice.  The price will be heavy.  Let us pay it 
like men.377 
Casey also offered an analysis of the slogan that was 
frequently heard, ‘Every help to the Allies, short of war’. ‘It 
is curious’, he wrote, ‘that no one stops to think what this 
expression actually means. It reflects a realisation that we 
are fighting a war in which they are almost as interested as 
we are—and yet we can be killed, we can bear the 
grievous burden of cost—and they will sell us their 
armaments (Casey’s emphases).’378 These comments 
mirrored remarks made privately by Lord Chatfield, British 
Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, that Americans  
would ‘fight the battle for freedom to the last Briton, but 
save their own skins’.379Casey, reflecting upon a strike by 
waterside workers in June 1940 noted that politics ‘brings 
something not much better than scum to the surface…the 
best and most able people avoid politics.380 While the United 
States strenuously opposed any involvement in the 
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European conflict, it was likely that if Britain concluded a 
negotiated peace with Germany, leaving Germany 
undefeated and triumphant in Europe, Britain would be 
vehemently accused in the United States of ‘selling 
democracy down the ocean’, implicitly placing the United 
States in greater danger.  
In a discussion at the State Department, James Dunn, one 
of Hull’s political advisers, told Casey on 16 June, that the 
Pacific Fleet would be transferred from the Pacific to the 
Atlantic. Roosevelt, George Marshall, Chief of US Army.  
and R. Stark, Chief of US Navy,  contemplated moving the 
Pacific fleet from Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic after the fall 
of France. Casey noted to his diary that he took up this 
‘wild idea’ with Berle three weeks before and thought he 
had won the argument. Of course, any strengthening of the 
American Navy in the Atlantic would have provided some 
limited measure of protection of the convoys taking 
armaments and food to beleaguered Britain. On the other 
hand,weakening the American Pacific Fleet would have 
created alarm among those Pacific and Southeast Asian 
nations, mainly colonial and totally unable to defend 
themselves from Japanese attack.  Australia and Britain 
favoured retention of the Fleet in the Pacific, arguing that 
the Royal Navy would always be in superior numbers to the 
German and Italian navies, thus freeing American ships to 
concentrate on the threat from Japan. As Casey saw things, 
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strenthening the American naval presence in the Atlantic at 
the expense of the Pacific ‘would sacrifice vital interests in 
the Far East without corresponding advantages 
elsewhere’.381 
According to Casey, Dunn conceded that the President 
could have done more in establishing American resolution 
to participate in the defeat of Hitlerism.382 Casey inquired of 
Dunn why the President had never informed the American 
people that the Monroe Doctrine could be fully enforced 
only with the participation of the Royal Navy: ‘Columnists 
etc said it, but until the President said it, it would not be 
believed by the mass of the people’.383  Dunn claimed 
simply that the President could not say that. His reasoning 
was that it would have the opposite effect on the American 
people to what was intended, specifically, that there would 
be greater clamour for more ships to be built. Of course, 
this was precisely the effect that Casey sought. In any 
event, Britain’s sinking of the French fleet at Oran on 3-4 
July finally eased the pressure.384 
It was the loss of France that caused Casey, temporarily at 
least, to discard his mask and goad the likes of Hull, 
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Welles, and Dunn to do more to put pressure on Roosevelt 
to enter the war. Yet having often vented his personal and 
undiplomatic anger, Casey recorded to his diary: ‘I impress 
on everyone in sight that it is essential, in our own 
interests, not to show any bitterness.  One’s mind has to 
accept the fact that the reality that has to be faced is 
American public opinion. (Casey’s emphasis.)’ He 
recognised Hull’s view that American public opinion was 
moving, but, to him, ‘most irritatingly slow’.385 Casey had to 
overcome his sense of outrage and get down to work to 
make the United States see where its self-interest lay. 
Yet for all this effort to impress upon the Americans the 
importance of saving Britain, it would be wrong to suggest 
that Casey during the Battle of Britain lost sight of his 
mission of trying to ‘save’ Australia. The intense 
discussions that occurred in May between those holding 
Churchill’s view and those prepared to negotiate in some 
way or another with Hitler were conducted against a 
background of the United States remaining seemingly 
indifferent to Britain’s fate. The American position was 
doubly frustrating to the Australians in that American 
sympathy for the Chinese nationalist cause meant that the 
danger of the United States provoking some sort of 
preciptious reaction on the part of Japan was ever present.  
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The early months of 1940 saw a short-lived easing of 
tensions between Britain and Japan, which enabled the 
transfer of two bomber squadrons from Singapore to the 
Middle East, arousing Australian alarm. The tranquil 
atmosphere in Anglo-Japan relations evaporated with the 
fall of France, when Japanese aggression re-asserted itself 
with the demand for the withdrawal of British troops from 
Shanghai, the closure of the Hong Kong frontier and the 
termination of British assistance to Chiang Kai-shek 
through the Burmese frontier.386 Japan, hitherto hesistant in 
its dealings with Nazi Germany, now sensed that the 
European empires and the United States itself were 
vulnerable. Casey’s balancing of British and Australian 
interests was made easier by the fact that, in the summer 
of 1940, Britain’s goal was to encourage the United States 
into ‘tougher diplomatic, naval and economic measures 
that would deter Japan from war’.387 
Casey never lost signt of the importance of finding out 
what the Americans knew about Japan’s intentions and 
preparations. He told McEwen on 8 May 1940 that: 
I have tried to get information here as to what is going 
on in the Japanese Mandate (Marshall and Caroline 
Islands) but the State Department has very little 
information. It is thought extremely probable that 
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Japan has prepared landing fields and harbour facilities 
for war purposes.388 
As Casey told Canberra early in his Washington 
appointment, protocol demanded that he call upon the 
sixty resident Ambassadors and Ministers, some relevant to 
his country’s interests but most, not. He was mostly 
unimpressed with what he found. Casey’s diary note for 15 
June 1940 confirmed Casey’s awareness of how much the 
British and Australian cause depended on him personally:  
It is a curious thing, but I am the only Dominions 
Minister who is playing any part in the war business in 
Washington. Neither Christie (Canada) nor Close (South 
Africa), nor of course, Brennan (Irish Free State) have 
had, so I am told, any business or communication with 
the State Department or anything in any important 
connection related to the war. It rather confirms one’s 
previous belief that the other Dominions’ Legations are 
“prestige” posts and nothing more.389 
Casey therefore had to be discerning if he were to make 
useful contacts and understand better the strategic 
situation facing Australia.  
Among those with whom Casey connected was the 
Netherlands Ambassador, Alexandre Louden, who, 
recognising the threat common to Australia and the 
Netherlands East Indies initially approached Casey, seeking 
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talks.390 The discussions between Casey and Louden initially 
revolved around a statement issued by the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Hachiro Arita, on 15 April 1940 affirming 
that Japan’s interests lay in a continuation of the trade 
arrangements then existing between the Netherlands East 
Indies and other nations of the region, especially Japan. It 
said that ‘the Japanese government was deeply 
concerned…at any aggravation of the war in Europe that 
might affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies’. 
The State Department speculated that the statement was 
either a warning to both sides, Germany and Britain, to 
leave Japan alone, or on the other hand, creating a 
justification for sending its own forces south.391  Hull warned 
against any nation intervening because, as Hull put it:  
‘Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands or 
any alteration of their Status Quo by other than peaceful 
processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, 
peace and security not only in the region of the 
Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area’.  He 
reminded Japan of the notes exchanged as long ago as 
November 1908, confirming their policy to maintain the 
status quo in the Pacific region, reaffirmed by both nations 
as well as Britain and France in the signing of the 
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(Washington) Treaty in 1921, specifically respecting the 
rights of the Netherlands and their ‘insular possessions’ in 
the Pacific.392 Hull described the Netherlands East Indies as 
‘very important to the international relationships of the 
whole Pacific Ocean’ and that many countries, including the 
United States depended upon the NEI for essential 
commodities.  
Casey’s view of Hull’s statement expressed some 
disappointment but it was ‘still most useful’. It at least 
recognised an American interest in the southwest Pacific, 
the region of primary relevance to the security of Australia. 
It was an early introduction for Casey to the complexity of 
the American-British-Dutch relationship. The British 
preference was for a united front of the ‘ABD powers’ 
aimed at dissuading Japan from any further aggression in 
South-East Asia. Britain needed oil from the Netherlands 
East Indies and as much help as possible to support 
Singapore. There would be no guarantees from the United 
States, however, because an attack on Dutch or British 
possessions would not in itself engender the American 
public to support a war against Japan.393 The fate of the 
Netherlands East Indies was a priority for Casey who put it 
most starkly on 2 July 1940 when he noted that ‘the 
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destiny of the Netherlands East Indies [was] inseparable 
from the destiny of Australia’.394 
Casey argued the case, long before it was widely accepted, 
that to think of the war as comprising various 
compartments that could be dealt with in isolation would be 
a major error. The Pacific could not be left ‘to the wolves’.395 
Australia was not remote from the unfolding conflict, but 
vitally connected. In conversation with Casey in April 1940, 
Under-Secretary Welles read out a long list of the naval 
strengths of those nations that might be considered 
‘potentially opposed’ to Japan… Britain, Australia, France, 
the United States and the Netherlands.  Naval craft from 
these nations, according to Welles, were in or close to 
Singapore, the Philippines and Hong Kong. No doubt 
impressed with the combined fire-power of these warships, 
Casey assured Welles that the Australian government was 
attempting to make Darwin into a fleet anchorage, some 
sort of complementary naval station to Singapore. For 
Casey any military use that the Americans might have in 
mind for an Australian harbour was a welcome 
development.                                                                         
More sobering was the belief expressed by Hornbeck that 
Japan had no limitations on its ambitions to expand its 
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sphere of influence and to fulfil its ‘mission on earth to 
spread Japanese culture, commerce and authority’. 
Moreover, he believed that Australia and the Netherlands 
East Indies fell within the ambit of Japan’s eventual aims, 
even if Japan was presently ‘bogged’ in China. Hornbeck 
was far from reassuring on the matter of Japan actually 
invading Australia when he noted that he did not believe 
that Japan would have the opportunity to launch ‘a big 
southward jump’ in the direction of the Netherlands East 
Indies during the present war. Casey reported to Canberra 
Hornbeck’s view that ‘it is one matter to seize and another 
to hold’.396 There could have been no comfort in these 
words in Canberra. 
One task Casey set himself was to attempt to discover if 
isolationism was relative, that is, would the United States 
enter the war more easily in the Far East Pacific region or 
in Europe? This was a legitimate activity for a diplomat but, 
given the sensitivity of the Administration to what it 
defined as propaganda, there were risks of Casey 
jeopardising his close relationships with senior American 
officials by examining and discussing such a highly political 
issue. Casey pondered his options in a long letter to 
McEwen on 8 May 1940. He concluded that Australia’s 
desire ‘to curb Japanese ambitions’ was reflected in United 
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States policy, but whether Japanese aggression would 
bring the United States to a ‘force of arms’ was the great 
unknown. Casey stated that ‘it was my own impression’ 
that the bulk of the United States Navy would remain in the 
Pacific rather than the Atlantic. The latter would continue to 
be the responsibility of the Royal Navy. This was proved 
mostly true although one quarter of the American fleet 
would find its way to the Atlantic. Casey also took solace in 
the fact that ‘just as Australia was anxious about Japan, so 
must Japan be anxious about the United States’.397 As for 
practical steps that the Australians should take. ‘Britain and 
Australia should do all they can to help America ‘express 
herself’ in the Pacific’. This meant that in relation to ‘the 
Pacific islands that the United States wants to use’, Britain 
and Australia ‘should be very liberal in this matter and let 
America use what Islands she wants’.398 
The issue that proved virtually insoluble from the outset 
was whether to adhere to the British line of appeasing 
Japan or whether to join the Americans in displaying 
sympathy for the Chinese cause.399 From Hornbeck, Casey 
learned that American opinion strongly sympathised with 
China in the war against Japan: there was no sympathy for 
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appeasement of Japan, yet no readiness to offer 
guarantees to Britain or Australia in the event of further 
Japanese aggression. Hornbeck in his conversation with 
Casey on 25 June 1940 assured the Australian that Japan 
was not ready ‘to do anything about Australia’. It infuriated 
Casey that Hornbeck was full of praise for Chinese 
resistance, but did not recognise that it was Britain and 
Australia that were risking war by supplying China through 
Burma while the Americans debated whether to abandon 
the Pacific altogether by moving their fleet to the Atlantic. 
Casey wanted the Americans to commit to negotiations 
that would at the very least put at stake American 
commercial relationships with Japan.400 
This was a delicate balancing act even for someone as 
nimble as Casey. Australia was in a difficult position given 
that it had to do all in its power to avoid contronting Japan 
without firm American guarantees. Gaining some reliable 
commitment to Australia from the United States in the 
event of war with Japan was the goal, albeit a very distant 
goal in the first half of 1940.Confirming the tenebrous 
prospects facing Australia, the Chief of the Australian Naval 
Staff told the War Cabinet on 18 June, that in the event of 
an Anglo-Japanese War, without American support, there 
would be no point in attempting to hold Darwin. Further, 
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that if British naval forces and bases in the Far East were 
defeated and captured, Japan could bring Australia to 
terms by sea power alone without the need for 
invasion.401On 28 June 1940, Australia learned that the loss 
of the French fleet meant that Britain, temporarily at least, 
could not reinforce Singapore.402It was vital that the 
American fleet remained in the Pacific. As Casey told his 
diary on 26 June 1940: 
I have been much concerned in recent days with trying 
to hammer out proposals for what we should in the Far 
East , in view of great change in situation arising out of 
French fleet position and obviously uncertainty of US 
government as to whether or not to move their fleet to 
the Atlantic. 
 
Casey’s campaign to interest the United States in the 
strategic value of Australia was based upon the concept of 
Australia and its neighbours as offering outstanding 
strategic assets for American strategy. In other words, the 
national interests of the United States would be served by 
coming to Australia’s aid. Casey’s emphasis on the 
strategic considerations of the United States demonstrated 
not only his differences with the thinking embodied in 
Menzies’ appeal but his keen understanding of Roosevelt’s 
thinking.As for the message itself, it was in part that Britain 
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was in desperate need of support. The other part of the 
message was that Australia was a valuable strategic asset 
for the United States. 
 
In his cable to the Department on 28 June, Casey set down 
the arguments he was employing, ‘publicly and privately’ 
about Australia: 
 
1. Significance immensely greater than our population 
implies by reason of size, resources, location. 
2. Outpost of Western civilisation in Pacific Ocean. 
3. Purchases billion dollars worth of American goods last 
twelve years against 300,000  (pounds) exports to 
America. 
4. Australia is not a liability to its friends as witness last 
war and this war. 
5. Australia, with increasing population and strength will 
have increasing contribution to make towards 
economic development of the Pacific area. 
Glad to have other ideas in this connection.403 
Four of the five points appealed to American self-interest. 
Casey’s first point – Australia’s size, resources and location 
– was the centrepiece of his gospel. Even the notion of 
Australia as an outpost of Western civilisation implied that 
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Australia could serve the United States as an outpost in a 
military setting.Casey’s message too revolved around the 
connection of the oceans and islands around Australia to 
the area of principal American strategic concern. As Casey 
put it to his diary in terms that he was using in his private 
diplomacy and public speeches:  
Australia is the bridge between the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans. Some columnists speak glibly of the possibility 
of letting the Netherlands East Indies go – without 
realising that it isn’t the Netherlands East Indies alone 
but the whole western Pacific that will go if the NEI 
‘goes’.404 
 
At this time, American thinking looked at the Philippines as 
its base for war against Japan, but Casey was providing his 
American listeners with a Plan B. Australia had many 
advantages---English speaking, several good port facilities, 
beyond the range of Japanese bombers, and the potential 
for dozens if not hundreds of air strips.  
 
Casey’s battle for Britain was then a challenge, but not a 
case of choosing between Britain and Australia. From 
Australia’s perspective, everything depended upon the 
United States aiding Britain, while strengthening its 
commitment to the Pacific. The question was how to press 
this argument upon the Americans. Casey had quickly 
realised the ineffectiveness of the argument that Australia  
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was  worthy of assistance as a white, European outpost in 
Asia. He was only too aware that Roosevelt had remained 
quite unmoved when Churchill had appealed for assistance 
in mid 1940, citing the reason that if Britain, the last 
outpost of democracy in Europe, fell to the Nazi tyranny, 
the world would enter upon a dark period of oppression 
that would even threaten the very existence of the United 
States.  Menzies’ appeals of May and June 1940 were 
similarly predicated on the nobility of a European nation in 
a sea of Asian settlements. Roosevelt clearly took little 
notice of this reasoning. Instead, Casey pressed the case 
that the United States needed Britain to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine and needed Australia if it were forced into 
a war against Japan.  
 
It was a common interest for the Americans to rearm, for 
the American fleet to base itself in the Pacific, and for the 
United States to look upon Australia as a potential base in 
the south-west Pacific. Moreover, Casey’s battle for Britain 
had planted him firmly within the circle of influential 
Americans discussing policy. Casey coped with his 
frustration by working ever harder at networking the 
Administration and other power brokers. He could not 
change the American position but he had made the 
necessary contacts and set down the basic message of his 
gospelabout the importance of Australia for the next, and 
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ultimately more important phase of his mission. 
 
231 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: Autumn and Winter 1940-41. 
Preparing for the Pacific War. 
 
Casey was desperate to influence events once the 
November election gave Roosevelt his third term. Indeed a 
change in Casey’s strategy was evident from the late 
autumn of 1940 and reflected an appreciation of the 
growing threat from Japan.  This change in focus led him to 
vary another segment of his strategy, that is, the targets, 
the people and institutions who might, in some way, 
influence the direction of American thinking. The focus of 
his activities would no longer be directed at convincing the 
Americans that the survival of Great Britain was essential 
to the security of the United States.  Instead, Casey now 
faced the task of explaining the vital role that Australia 
must play in repulsing the common threat of a rampant 
Japan in the Pacific. 
For Britain, the military situation improved in Europe in the 
autumn of 1940. Crucial for Britain was the dismantling of 
the so-called ‘invasion fleet’ on the French coast. Various 
intelligence reports from a wide range of sources signalling 
a build-up of German military strength on the eastern 
boundaries pointed to the possibility that Hitler was 
deferring, if not abandoning the cross-channel invasion and 
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was contemplating if not planning an attack on the Soviet 
Union.  Churchill’s somewhat prolonged refusal to concede 
that the danger to Britain had passed by the late autumn of 
1940 was still in evidence in 1941. Even in his broadcast of 
23 June 1941, Churchill argued that the German invasion 
of the Soviet Union was no more than a prelude to another 
attempt to invade Britain. Documents captured by the 
Allies at the end of the war fixed the date of Hitler’s 
decision to postpone indefinitely the invasion of the British 
Isles at 17 September.405 Publicly, in Britain, the conclusion 
that the invasion had been deferred if not abandoned was 
suppressed, the Cabinet believing that the War effort would 
be lessened if the threat of invasion no longer existed.  
On 9 August 1940, Churchill and Roosevelt met at 
Newfoundland accompained by advisors – Welles, Hopkins 
and Cadogan. The ‘Joint Declaration’ or ‘Atlantic Charter’ 
that resulted on 14 August 1940 looked forward to a world 
freed from Nazi tyrrany. On the other hand, this first 
meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt changed little on 
the ground. There is a conflict between what might be 
termed contemporary, private, and deep resentment of the 
inaction of the United States on the part of individuals like 
Churchill, Lothian, Cadogan and Casey and some of the 
historical commentary, which is far more sympathetic to 
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Roosevelt and his administration. Norman Davies, for 
example, refers to Roosevelt ‘shoring up Britain’ in its 
moment of need. Moreover, while ‘watching Britain’s ordeal 
with sympathy, and aware of the fact that it was not in 
America’s long-term interest for Britain to go under’, 
American aid had to be ‘surreptitious’.406 Davies leaves us 
wondering exactly what this ‘surreptitious’ aid actually was. 
Frequently, the ‘Destroyers for Bases’ deal is quoted as the 
example of Roosevelt’s courageous and generous 
assistance. In August 1940, the United States gradually 
settled on a plan that would give Britain some fifty old 
destroyers in return for 99 year use of certain British bases 
in the Atlantic and Caribbean. This was only token aid. 
Slow, obsolescent and clearly beyond their use-by date for 
the major purpose for which they were built but still useful 
for slow convoy duties, they would have been of little 
practical value in the event of a German invasion. In any 
event, Roosevelt offered them to Britain on 2 September, 
1940 and they did not actually commence being handed 
over for some weeks, by which time, the threat of invasion 
had all but passed. Their chief effect was to establish which 
side the United States was on.  
 
Other accounts refer to Roosevelt’s authorising assistance 
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to Britain, but the outcomes are questionable.407 Burns, for 
example, cites Roosevelt’s granting Churchill’s request that 
a British battleship, HMS Malaya, badly damaged by a 
torpedo while escorting a convoy, be repaired in an 
American shipyard.  Whether this comprised significant aid 
is open to debate. On the other hand, it must be 
acknowledged that even token aid created a great many 
political problems for Roosevelt. Within the United States, 
the destroyers deal led to a lively argument. Professor 
Herbert Briggs and Professor Edwin Borchard claimed that 
Roosevelt had acted unconstitutionally, the ‘gift’ being a 
violation of America’s neutral status.408 
 
Yet, as Reynolds has put it, there was ‘from July to October 
1940… a remarkable Anglo-American rapprochement’ 
characterised by the growing belief in the United States 
that Britain would survive and ‘the increasingly pro-British 
tone of American public statements on the war’.409 Casey’s 
optimism that the United States might ‘come in’ with 
Britain in the war against Nazi Germany had proved wide of 
the mark. However, his tireless efforts to promote the 
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British war effort clearly contributed to this growing 
rapprochement and made the US much more open to this 
new development. 
Both Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, and 
General George Marshall, the Army Chief were putting 
pressure on the President to begin planning for the 
inevitable entry of the United States into the European 
conflict. Marshall’s arguments were based on first-hand 
reports on the military situation in Britain, submitted by 
Generals Emmons and Strong, who concluded that ‘sooner 
or later, the United States will be drawn into this war’. This 
conclusion was given greater weight by reason of the same 
two officers finding that morale in Britain was high and that 
Britain may well have had the ability to withstand, if not 
repel invasion on its own.410 Marshall brought his report to 
the notice of the Standing Liaison Committee, the 
coordinating group of the Departments of War, Army and 
Navy on 23 September, 1940.411 
In the United States, earlier suspicions of Japan had 
hardened into an article of faith that Japan was 
contemplating aggression. Hoyt fixed the date of Japan’s 
articulation of its ambitions as October 1921 when a group 
of young army officers made a secret agreement, effective 
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when they reached senior staff level, to reorganize the 
Japanese army and to define the area which Japan needed 
to fulfil her needs and ambitions. These comprised Siberia, 
China, India, South east Asia, Indonesia, Australia and New 
Zealand.412 
From an Asian perspective, the American invasion of the 
Philippines with the defeat of Spain in 1898 added a new 
ingredient into the already potent mix.  The rulers of Japan 
and China perceived the United States as a threat to their 
own emerging nationalist ambitions.  Hunt and Levine 
define the beginnings of Japan’s hostility as specifically 
directed to the United States and as early as the nineteenth 
century. The American occupation and subjugation of the 
Philippines, Hawaii, Midway and Pearl Harbor and the 
conflict with Germany over Samoa looked to China and 
especially Japan to be naked American empire-building and 
constituting a threat to other Asian and Pacific nation 
states: 
As Japanese and Chinese observers clearly saw, the 
United States had become an imperial presence in 
eastern Asia.  The very fact of conquest dramatically 
signalled the emergence of a powerful, confident 
country on the shores of the western Pacific.413 
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Japan was in a far stronger position to flex its muscles 
against the new arrival than was China. Japan was 
conscious of its own lack of colonies, in contrast to the 
substantial colonial empires of the Western powers which 
constituted a basic foundation for international status and 
prestige. After World War One, Japan suffered indignities 
that fed the sense of resentment at the failure of Western 
Powers to recognise Japan’s true standing or what Japan 
perceived as her true standing, internationally. The 
Versailles conference rejected Japan’s request for a racial 
equality clause in the League of Nations Charter. Japan 
perceived the Washington Naval Agreement as unfair, 
despite the fact that it had the effect of strengthening 
Japan’s relative standing in the Pacific. The Japanese 
Exclusion Act of 1924 severely restricted Japanese 
immigration to the United States and matched the 
Australian White Australia Policy in its anti-Japanese 
provisions. It was unsurprising therefore that these 
obstacles were perceived in Tokyo as deliberate attempts 
by Western Powers to keep Japan firmly in place.  During 
the years between the end of World War I and the 
beginning of World War II, the Versailles Treaties granted 
Japan trusteeship rights over strategic Pacific Islands. 
Small groups of Japanese Army and Navy officers were 
diverted to study international situations that could 
translate into armed intervention by the United States. The 
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United States’ disarmament and its withdrawal from its 
‘temporarily close association with the European colonial 
powers’, after 1920, also contributed to the balance of 
power in the Pacific region swinging in favour of Japan.414 
Yet the difficulty for Australia was that the Atlantic always 
appeared to take priority over the Pacific in the minds of 
American military planners. Casey continued to work on the 
State Department, especially Hull, Berle, and Hornbeck 
with a view to manoeuvring the United States into a 
greater commitment to the Pacific. Berle certainly sought 
out Casey for information. In September 1940 with the 
Japanese taking over French Indochina, Berle noted to his 
diary: 
The Australian Minister came in, at my request; I asked 
him whether they could supply any arms to Indo-China, if 
we replaced them. He said he would try to find out but 
they were steering pretty clear of it.  In a sense this is 
typical English; they want the Far East held down and 
they need that very badly. But they resolve somebody 
else shall do it and take the rap for it.  This is permissible 
in the Australian case, I suppose, since they might not be 
able to resist.415 
Following the ‘Destroyers for Bases Deal’, there were 
rumours in Washington that the United States might take 
over more British bases. Berle’s diary entry of 20 
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September 1940 clearly indicates Berle’s recognition of 
Casey’s growing influence at the highest level of the 
Washington Administration and simultaneously a fear of 
what that influence might mean:  
The various conversations which Secretary (of State), 
Hull is having with Lord Lothian (British Ambassador) and 
Mr Casey, the Australian Minister, are exciting a great 
deal of comment.  Everybody suspects that another 
Anglo-American naval base deal may be in the making, 
which will give us joint occupation of the bases running 
all the way from Singapore around the Pacific.416 
Berle argued that  ‘I think that there probably is danger 
that the British will try to do some such thing as that—
since this would in substance imply that we were to defend 
the British Empire in the Far East—from some unnamed 
point in the Indian Ocean’. Yet Berle noted that if the 
matter of joint bases in the Far East were being discussed, 
he hoped that it would involve ‘the southern Pacific route, 
not accessible to the Japanese fleet’.417 At least there was 
recognition here that the desirability of bases and lines of 
communication safe from Japanese attack was paramount. 
Casey attempted to increase his influence by offering Berle 
opinions that differed from official British sources.In 
October 1940, Berle committed to his diary his surprise at 
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Casey’s criticism of the frequency with which Britain 
supplied misleading figures of the resources she held in the 
Far East. Casey claimed that the figures were understated 
by about half. Berle’s long-held suspicion of Britain’s 
motives and duplicity, no doubt, lay behind his observation 
that in relation to the misleading figures: ‘This may be that 
they are merely giving the first line plane resources, which 
is not quite cricket, because the Japanese have only second 
rate stuff. Or it may be that the British are piling on the 
agony hoping to get more out of us, which I think is 
probably the case’. Putting aside Berle’s poor opinion of 
Japanese aircraft, an erroneous belief common to 
American, British, and Casey’s thinking, it was significant 
that he found Casey’s criticism of Britain, ‘interesting’ and 
Britain’s subterfuge ‘not quite cricket’, a colloquialism, 
unusual for an American to use, but quite appropriate in 
that context.418 It is apparent that by this stage people like 
Berle and Hornbeck were recognising Casey as an 
independent thinker, someone with worthwhile ideas to 
offer in their discussions and a clear understanding of the 
global aspects of the war. 
Casey was privy to confidential sources. On the day before 
the United States Elections of 5 November 1940, Casey 
cabled Canberra that he had learnt, without revealing his 
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source, that Japan believed that the United States might 
well engage in a Far East conflict but that they would do 
so, ‘hesitatingly and too late’. Casey judged that 
intelligence to imply that if Japan acted with speed, both 
the United States and Australia would ‘be faced with a fait 
accompli’.419  The following week, Casey reported to 
Canberra that he had finally told Berle of this intelligence.420  
Given the frequency he met with Lothian, the closeness of 
the relationship and that each shared confidential matters 
with the other, it may be assumed that the intelligence had 
emanated from British sources. Less than three weeks after 
learning of that intelligence, on 22 November 1940, Casey 
had a night visit from Hornbeck.421 Casey had called upon 
both Hornbeck and Berle earlier that day and Hornbeck’s 
unexpected visit was to inform Casey that he, Hornbeck, 
believed that Japanese forces were concentrating at Hainan 
and Southern Formosa so as to be ready to move by sea to 
an unknown destination, possibly Saigon or Camranh Bay. 
Hornbeck considered that Singapore should be reinforced 
by British and/or Australian aircraft. He was not in favour 
of American ships visiting Australia or Singapore, which he 
believed would be too provocative. In reporting this new 
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intelligence to Canberra, Casey emphasised Hornbeck’s 
sensitivity about being quoted.422 
Hornbeck’s after-hours visit to Casey may be explained by 
his reluctance to be seen by his colleague, Berle, as 
supplying confidential information to Casey. In any case, 
important inferences may be drawn from these two 
incidents.  Firstly, Casey’s informing Berle of intelligence of 
which Berle was unaware indicates the extent to which 
Casey had established valuable contacts and enjoyed sound 
relations with sources of such intelligence. Secondly, 
Hornbeck’s night visit to Casey suggests that Casey clearly 
had positioned himself as an important broker of 
information and was perceived that way on all sides in 
Washington. 
The passing of the Selective Training and Service Act in 
late October 1940 at least signalled American recognition of 
the fact that it might soon need more substantial armed 
forces. By November 1940, senior officers of British, 
American and Dutch forces had formed a committee to 
discuss what Casey termed, ‘matters of high 
strategy’.423Hull wrote in his memoirs: ‘I held several 
conversations with Lothian and Casey at the beginning of 
October to lay the basis for exchanges of information 
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among the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand 
and the Dutch East Indies concerning the forces available 
in the Far East to resist a Japanese attack’.424  There is no 
substantive proof that Casey was a key figure in these 
discussions, but in the light of Hull’s reluctance to do 
anything provocative and given that Lothian was unwell 
and not proactive in expressing Britain’s concern over 
developments in the Pacific, Hull’s  notations may be 
regarded as a further example of Casey’s leadership and 
influence.The involvement of senior naval figures in the 
discussions clearly indicated that while the President might 
disown such claims, the Navy was considering and 
implicitly devising strategy for a future conflict. The 
presence of British and Dutch representatives, moreover, 
hinted that the Pacific was the region under discussion. 
Clearly, the chief interest surrounded the devising of a 
strategy for the expected conflict with Japan.  
Casey certainly had ample opportunity to develop his 
knowledge of strategy and military technology in the 
autumn of 1940. On 16 October 1940, Casey spoke with 
the President, Hull and Knox. Casey learned about new 
developments in air-engine manufacturing from Knox. 
From the President, Casey learned about American interest 
in a ‘more southerly air route between USA and Australia’ 
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and establishing bases at various Pacific locations and 
Christmas Island.425 This was thinking that Casey could only 
encourage given that a great deal of American thinking and 
resources was directed at shoring up the Philippines. Casey 
summed up his message in a note to his diary on 22 
November 1940: ‘Guam no fleet facilities. Little at Manilla. 
Southern route to Australia and New Zealand all the more 
important’.426 
It was in the aftermath of the November election that 
Admiral Harold Stark in a celebrated Memorandum penned 
on 12 November 1940, outlined what became known as the 
‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy. Stark recommended that in a 
two-front war the United States would give priority to 
defeating German over Japan. Stark, who had access to 
deciphered Japanese codes, took the view that Australia 
and New Zealand were not part of Japan’s imperial 
ambition at that point. Much more likely was that Japan 
would attempt to conquer Hong Kong, Singapore and the 
resource-rich Malaya peninsula. Here too, his Memorandum 
was well informed.  
Neither Stark nor Marshall opposed the granting of further 
aid to Britain. Stark went so far as to argue that an 
American goal should be the prevention of the ‘disruption 
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of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation 
implies’.427 Stark was so confident of the strength of the 
arguments that he and Marshall had advanced that he told 
Admiral J.O. Richardson, Commander in chief, United 
States Fleet, that the President would ‘give some definite 
pronouncement on it in order that I may send you 
something more authoritative than I otherwise could do’.428 
Roosevelt did nothing of the sort. Nonetheless, Stark had 
now made it clear that the Navy expected American 
involvement in a world war.  
Casey’s diary made no mention of the Memorandum, but 
his subsequent activity could be viewed as representing an 
attempt to water down the ‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy and 
to emphasise the threat from Japan in the Pacific.At one 
level, Casey was clearly in sympathy with a strategy that 
prioritised American and British cooperation in the Atlantic. 
‘Beat Hitler First’ would become a cornerstone of the 
military alliance between Britain and the United States.429In 
a private letter to Menzies in November 1940, Casey 
confessed that he still saw the greatest menace to Australia 
as the possibility of Britain being beaten in Europe. Casey 
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viewed Britain’s commitment to the Pacific as the most that 
could be hoped for under the circumstances:  ‘…I think the 
British government’s statements regarding ensuring the 
safety of Australia and of Singapore are satisfactory…’ 
430The hope at that time remained for Australia somehow to 
avoid war with Japan. Casey realised at the same time how 
important it was to get the balance right in judging the 
German and Japanese threats: Japan would become 
Casey’s priority. 
Casey certainly had ample opportunity to make his ideas 
known to American military planners. He was in frequent 
contact with officers of the War Plans Division of the Army 
and the War Plans Division of the Navy. When Commander 
Henry Burrell, the Royal Australian Navy’s Director of 
Operations and Plans arrived clandestinely in Washington 
on 17 November 1940 to take part in high-level naval 
discussions, it was Casey who introduced Burrell to Berle, 
Hornbeck, Welles, Knox, and Stark.431It was not just high 
level policy-makers that Casey met in this period but those 
who a year later would be called upon to join the fight 
against Japan. On 25 November 1940, Casey took Burrell 
to see Sherman Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence and later 
that day had Burrell dine with Admiral Walter Anderson, 
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American Chief of Naval Intelligence, Commander Heard, 
also American Naval Intelligence, Stanley Goble who was 
the Australian liaeson with the Air Training Scheme, and 
Admiral Herbert Pott formerly of the Royal Navy now the 
Air Attache for the British Embassy in Washington.This last 
week in November 1940 was a busy time in terms of 
information gathering and cross fertilising the American, 
British and Australian information channels. Casey’s diary 
entry for 24 November 1940 did not mention Burrell, but 
noted simply ‘Lunched with General Marshall Chief of 
General Staff’. The same day as he lunched with Marshall, 
Casey had his first talks with Lothian after the latter’s 
return from London.432 
Because of his predilection for meeting as many senior 
political, media and government leaders as he could, Casey 
would have become aware of the shades of differences of 
views held in Washington. In his report to Canberra on 17 
November, 1940, he referred to the views of Knox in 
favour of ‘preventive strategy’ involving the deployment of 
American, British, Dutch and Australian warships to deter 
Japan from embarking on hostile actions.  He also quoted 
Knox as favouring a substantial American naval force to 
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visit Singapore, a tactic constantly opposed by the 
President and Hull as too provocative.433 
Casey’s interview with Hull on 12 November 1940 revolved 
around Hull’s interest in the ‘British naval and commercial 
shipping situation’, which Casey put into the context of 
Hull’s anxiety about the Far East. This was a few days after 
Roosevelt’s re-election, a time when the Roosevelt 
Administration could have been expected to be more open 
and more enthusiastic about closer relations with Britain. 
Yet, American interest in the British Fleet clearly suggested 
a continuing fear that Britain might conduct negotiations 
with Germany in order to avoid the bloodshed and 
destruction of an invasion, but where the Fleet became one 
of Hitler’s prizes. In this interview, Casey, not one to miss 
an opportunity, asked Hull if American warships would visit 
Australia and/or Singapore in the near future.  Casey was 
being mischievously cute with this question. He had no 
reason to suppose that the Administration had changed its 
position. Avoiding a direct reply, the Secretary reasoned 
that placing American ships at Manila and sending British 
ships and Australian aircraft to Singapore would be a 
greater deterrent to Japan. Hull suggested that it might be 
possible for the United States to provide the aircraft, 
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presumably involving payment.434 Hull’s avoidance of giving 
a direct reply to Casey’s request, in contrast to Knox’s firm 
belief that U.S. Navy ships should, in fact, visit Singapore, 
was another example of the differing views coming out of 
Washington. In his discussion with Hull, Casey argued that 
Britain’s having to reinforce Singapore’s defences, ipso 
facto, meant lesser resources being made available to 
‘other important areas’ that were actual theatres of war.435 
In a long session with Hull on 3 December 1940, it became 
evident to Casey that the Secretary of State had adopted a 
far more sympathetic stance concerning Britain’s plight. 
Although the danger of invasion had passed and, with it, 
any possibility of negotiations between Germany and 
Britain, the loss of so many merchant ships in the Atlantic 
created a new and dangerous phase. That, anyway, was 
one of the explanations Hull offered for the new American 
attitude. Hull claimed to have spent much time impressing 
the gravity of the situation upon members of the Cabinet, 
the Defence Advisory Commission and leaders in the 
Congress. In reporting the conversation to Canberra, Casey 
said that he had emphasised to Hull the anxiety of the 
Australian government about Japan’s next move. In the 
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context of Australia placing a ban on the export of scrap 
iron, Hull did not offer any concrete support.  
This lack of tangible aid continued to irritate the British and 
the Australians.The President delivered, on 27 December 
1940, his ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ speech, which 
emphasised again that the United States was not about to 
fight in foreign wars, but rather to supply the ‘implements 
of war’. Roosevelt claimed that the United States would 
provide ‘real resistance’ by strengthening those peoples 
attempting to resist the Axis invaders.Picking up a phrase 
uttered by Jean Monnet, the French resistance leader, 
Roosevelt ended his speech with a call to the American 
nation: ‘We must be the great arsenal of democracy’. This 
phrase was meant to give heart to Britain. The British 
leader saw it differently: as one historian has put it, ‘In 
London, Churchill fumed and fretted’.436  The Prime Minister 
was uncertain exactly what the President planned in the 
way of neighbourly assistance. As Churchill put it, 
‘Remember, Mr President, we do not know what you have 
in mind, exactly what the United States is going to do and 
we are fighting for our lives’. 437 By any measure, this 
expressed serious displeasure and concern on Churchill’s 
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part, an attitude that must have surprised Roosevelt. 
Churchill’s mind was exercised by the American insistence 
that so much of this aid had to be paid for and that the 
costs were rapidly running down British gold reserves. 
Casey, on a ‘show the flag’ visit to Florida, remained 
unmoved by the ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ speech. It may 
have represented an advance on Roosevelt’s part towards a 
more helpful attitude towards Britain, but, realistically, it 
was a very small advance.438 
The scepticism is unsurprising because Roosevelt’s 
intentions are difficult to read, even with the benefit of 
hindsight. Two factors lend themselves to a questioning of 
the timing of this harder American attitude.  Firstly, the 
Presidential elections were out of the way giving Roosevelt 
the opportunity to adopt a more belligerent attitude to the 
Axis powers at a lower political cost.  Secondly, the 
postponement, if not the abandonment of a German 
invasion of Britain, certainly known by both London and 
Washington enabled Washington to adopt a more pro-Allied 
attitude knowing that the United States would not have to 
deliver on its fine words.  
Roosevelt’s State of the Union message delivered in 
January, 1941, spoke of the post-war world and of the 
need for ‘four essential human freedoms’. The 
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historiography of the message, its title fixed as ‘The Four 
Freedoms Declaration’ often has Roosevelt signalling a 
gradual but determined march to take the United States 
into what was expected to become another World War. Yet, 
a careful reading of the message does not necessarily lead 
to that conclusion.  Roosevelt spoke of the four freedoms, 
speech, worship, freedom from want and from fear as 
attainable within his lifetime and not as some distant 
vision. It was the immediacy of this grand idea that led to 
the conclusion that the United States would have to take 
up arms in order to achieve the adoption, world-wide, of 
these freedoms.  Inspiring as the sentiments may have 
been, they fell far short of providing any real expectation of 
a change in America’s neutral position. The timing of the 
Four Freedoms Declaration, so soon after the crucial 
Presidential elections was a quintessential Roosevelt ploy, a 
lofty statement that would satisfy the Interventionists and 
hold them off for a further period and at the same time, 
reassure the Isolationists that military intervention was not 
on the Administration’s agenda. 
On the other hand, the promised material support for the 
Allies appeared more likely after the Lend Lease Bill was 
introduced into Congress on 10 January 1941. Lend Lease 
would become law despite an intense opposition campaign, 
mainly from Republicans, spurred on by a grass roots 
group known as America First, claiming a membership of 
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over 800,000.439Casey, infuriated by what he regarded as 
empty gestures and posturing on the part of the United 
States, at least saw signs of hope of more useful 
assistance. Casey noted in his diary entry of 9 March 1941 
that ‘Lend Lease Bill passed Senate last night 60-31. Great 
sense of relief.’440 Casey was quick to make apparent 
Australia’s readiness to participate in the scheme. The 
following day, he hosted a dinner at the Legation where the 
dinner guests comprised Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau, Head of U.S. Steel and later of Lend Lease, 
Edward Stettinius, Berle and two naval officers, Admiral 
Pott and Admiral Turner.441  Clearly, Casey was intent on 
getting some key players together. 
The task for the Americans now was to devise ways in 
which Lend Lease would fit into an ultimate victory 
programme and on 10 April 1941 the Secretary of War 
outlined the procedure to be followed under the Lend Lease 
Act.442 
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Lend Lease was not the only important event from Casey’s 
perspective.  The Plan Dog memo written by Chief of Naval 
Operations, Harold Rainsford Stark, in 1940, recognised the 
possibility of the US being involved in war in both Europe 
and the Pacific. He formulated ideas on coping with the 
possibility, although recognising the need to ‘Beat Germany 
First’. Stark’s recommendation urged the President to 
approve US service chiefs holding talks with their British 
counter-parts, something the British had desired for some 
time.443 
Roosevelt approved Stark’s recommendation and the 
‘American British Conversation’ or ABC 1, ran from January 
to March 1941 and involved high level military delegations 
from both sides of the Atlantic. As Bridge has noted, Casey 
successfully had Burrell attached as an observer with the 
British military delegation.444 This no doubt is part of the 
explantion as to why Casey was able to report to Canberra 
accurately on the two main developments of relevance to 
Australia. Firstly, as the Stark Memorandum (Plan Dog) 
prefigured, the strategy was to ‘Beat Hitler First’ and to 
conduct a ‘holding war’ in the Pacific. Secondly, the 
Americans, against strong opposition from the British, had 
decided that Singapore was important but not vital in any 
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conflict. This was the message conveyed by Casey to 
Canberra on 23 February 1941. While the United States 
was prepared, if necessary, to move ships from the Pacific 
to what it perceived to be the more important Atlantic 
theatre of the war, the expectation was that British capital 
ships would use this opportunity to reinforce the Far East.445 
The sweetener for Australia was, as Bridge put it, for the 
first time there was recognition that holding Australia was 
crucial to any war against Japan.446 
Casey did his best to make his case for Singapore, which 
the British delegation at ABC 1 considered vital for both 
India’s and Australia’s security. Casey was ill during the 
early days of the ABC1 talks.  He was in hospital with 
influenza from 22nd January to 1st February, followed by a 
week’s convalescence.  It is difficult at this stage to 
contemplate if this affected Australia’s arguments at the 
talks, whether his voice added to that of the British would 
have made a difference regarding Singapore.  It must be 
remembered that Burrell was present during this period so 
Australia’s opinions were represented.  Casey met with 
Halifax on 4th February when he advised caution in issuing 
invitations to the Embassy at this time because of the 
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atmosphere surrounding the Lend Lease Bill.447 It is obvious 
that he had the ability to ‘bounce back’ from ill health as he 
visited both Halifax and Hornbeck on 14th February and 
Cordell Hull the next day.448  Among the many American 
contacts Casey made were two psychologists, Dr. Hadley 
Cantril and Dr. Lloyd Free, researching what Casey termed, 
‘the whole poll idea’. Clearly fascinated by the potential for 
political adaptation, Casey was interested to learn that, 
under the auspices of the Office of Public Opinion Research 
at Princeton University, the two were seeking to 
understand why vast numbers of Americans responded 
positively to simple prompts such as ‘Constitution’ and 
‘Panama’.  Casey reported their interest in finding out the 
American reaction to prompts connected to the ‘South West 
Pacific’ such as ‘Australia’ and ‘Singapore’.449 
Casey continued to garner poll results from Cantril and on 
17 February 1941 excitedly reported a ‘most interesting 
public opinion poll… in respect of the Far East’, copies of 
which he sent to Halifax, Hull, Hornbeck, and Frankfurter. 
The reason for Casey’s elation was that Americans had ‘a 
much greater appreciation of the value of Singapore than I 
had thought possible’.450 More than half those polled 
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favoured American support for Singapore. For Casey, 
polling was an opportunity to exploit the public mood. He 
optimistically, as it turned out, proposed that Willkie, the 
defeated presidential candidate in November, include 
Singapore on his itinerary for the latter’s proposed trip to 
Australia. On 19 February, 1941, he wrote the following in 
his diary:                            
I have been spreading the Gospel far and wide lately---of 
the great importance of Singapore.  There is a tendency 
in some quarters here to regard the various theatres of 
war in watertight compartments and not from a global 
standing. The connection between Singapore and the 
main theatres in Europe and the Mediterranean has to be 
emphasized.451 
To emphasise Singapore and the mistaken notion that 
Europe and Asia were utterly distinct theatres of war was 
to argue for moderation in the application of the ‘Beat 
Hitler First’ strategy favoured by the Americans at ABC 1. 
For now this was a battle that Casey could not win. The 
conclusions of ABC1  were the nucleus of the ultimate total 
strategy for the war. Yet Singapore was for Casey worth 
pursuing in the worrying context, as Horner has put it, that 
Australia’s ‘security was in the hands of American 
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strategists who were more interested in the Atlantic than 
the Pacific’.452 
There were other battles that Casey did win. Casey became 
an even more crucial intermediary during the northern 
winter because of the sudden death of Lothian on 12 
December 1940. Like Casey, Lothian was highly suitable for 
the task of winning friends in Washington.  Churchill once 
described him thus: ‘In all the years I had known him, he 
gave me the impression of high intellectual and aristocratic 
detachment from vulgar affairs. Airy, viewy, aloof, 
dignified, censorious, yet in a light and gay manner, he had 
always been good company’. Yet, by late 1940, Lothian, 
visiting Britain, had become, according to Churchill, a 
changed man, deeply conscious of the peril facing 
Britain.453Cadogan noted in his diaries that in Washington, 
Lothian had become subject to drowsiness.  Clearly 
suffering from an undiagnosed illness, he refused medical 
attention because of his Christian Science beliefs and died 
shortly after.454 Lothian’s death led to the American officials 
using Casey as a liaison with Britain.455 Indeed, there was 
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speculation in the American press that Casey would be 
Lothian’s replacement as British ambassador.456 
Instead Casey played a dominant role in ensuring the 
rejection of tentative soundings from London as to whether 
David Lloyd George, the elderly, former Prime Minister, and 
an advocate of appeasement, would be acceptable to the 
American Administration. In a Memorandum of 
Conversation, Berle described Casey’s position on the 
proposed appointment as ‘violently opposed’.  Berle 
discerned that Casey believed his objections conveyed to 
London had had considerable influence in causing Lloyd 
George’s name to be withdrawn; at the very least Casey 
made it clear to Churchill that there was no support for 
Lloyd George among the Americans or Dominions.457 
Lothian’s eventual replacement was the taciturn Lord 
Halifax. A former Viceroy of India and with an imposing 
aristocratic background, he yet lacked the easy affability 
that Casey was able to call upon when the occasion 
demanded. His interests were said to be hunting and the 
Anglican Church, resulting in his nickname of the Holy Fox. 
Halifax reported to Churchill that he found the Americans 
and the American form of government difficult to deal with. 
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In a personal letter to the Prime Minister dated 13 March, 
1941, Halifax complained about ‘how terribly disjointed is 
the whole machinery of government.  I don’t think the 
President ties up awfully well; I am quite certain Harry 
Hopkins doesn’t and as for government departments, they 
might almost as well be the administration of different 
countries…’458 
Nor did Halifax hit it off with Hull. Between February and 
May 1941, Hull was secretly meeting the Japanese 
Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, for wide-ranging talks 
without even telling the British, a situation that infuriated 
Halifax when he found out.459 It was not within Halifax’s 
capacity to engage in the kind of politicking or the new art 
of public relations employed by Casey. One of Casey’s 
goals in spring 1941 was to bring Halifax into discussions 
with the Americans about practical issues such as the 
location of fleets and new deals over bases. Hull was, it 
seems, referred to by his Assistant Secretary, Dean 
Acheson, as ‘the old man from Tennessee’; he was 
extremely shy and felt quite intimidated by Halifax. 
Acheson described the situation thus: ‘[Hull] regarded 
Halifax as a combination of  the holder of an ancient British 
peerage, Viceroy of India and a British Foreign Secretary, 
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all rolled into one and he was scared to death of him’. 
Casey was asked if he could do anything about it. He 
initially raised it with Halifax, whose immediate reaction 
was: ‘I hope he’s not as scared of me as I am of him’. 
Casey arranged a small dinner party for Hull, Halifax and 
himself with an additional guest, Norman Davis, known to 
both. Food and drink were carefully chosen and Casey and 
Davis met beforehand ‘and acted as honest brokers who 
made the running until the other two warmed up’. 
Apparently, the diffidence between the British Lord and the 
Tennessean Secretary of State evaporated thereafter.460 
Casey was pleased with his efforts, describing it as ‘a most 
useful evening indeed’. According to Casey, Halifax ‘tried 
my ‘bases’ proposal’ and received a favourable response 
from Hull. Casey was also pleased that he found himself on 
the same side as Hull in opposing any transfer of American 
naval vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic.461The fact that 
the Australian Minister was routinely engaged in 
conversation with influential policy makers about military 
strategy helped to ensure that Australia remained part of 
the strategic conversation even after the Stark 
Memorandum. For a small nation that had had no previous 
diplomatic representation in the United States, Casey was 
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clearly taken seriously by those responsible for the highest 
levels of American strategic planning. 
When Casey arrived in the United States, it was made clear 
to him that Australia was not part of any American 
strategy. A year later, the situation had clearly changed.  
The secret British and American Staff talks (ABC-1) that 
took place in Washington in the first three months of 1941 
made clear the American expectation of entering the war 
on the Allied side. While both sides agreed that the first 
task would be to win the war in Europe, defending the 
British Commonwealth’s interests in the Pacific became a 
priority nonetheless. It was at this point, according to 
Burrell’s report of 7 February 1941, that the Americans 
acknowledged that Australia and New Zealand had to be 
held by the allies. The implication, perhaps, was that if 
Britain could not ‘save’ Australia, then the United States 
might.462 In any case, it is clear that, once the danger of an 
invasion of the British Isles had passed, Casey’s priority 
was focusing American attention on the Pacific and the 
importance of Australia in defending American interests 
there.  
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CHAPTER  SEVEN: From the Menzies visit to the Pearl 
Harbor Attack. 
 
Throughout 1941, Japan’s war-like intentions were obvious 
to more astute observers, but there was no agreement 
among the Allies about what to do. After prolonged secret 
talks with three senior Japanese representatives, Hornbeck 
concluded that Japan wished to reduce her forces in China 
so as to have these forces available ‘for possible activities 
in some other direction’, which might be against British, 
Dutch, Soviet or even American interests.463 Japan’s non-
aggression treaty with the Soviet Union,signed in April 
1941, suggested that Japan was securing its northern 
frontier for the purposes of a southward invasion. On the 
other hand, the rapid progress of the Wehrmacht into the 
Soviet Union after the invasion on 22 June, 1941 invited 
the conclusion that Japan would use the opportunity to 
attack the Soviet Union on its eastern flank at a time when 
the latter was fighting on its western front for its very 
existence. The alternative view held that the treasures of 
oil and rubber, freely available in the south-east Asia 
region were vastly more vital to Japan’s future. 
This uncertainty over Japan was the shadow that hung over 
the visit of Menzies to Washington in May 1941. A measure 
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of the greater sympathy for the Allied cause was reflected 
in confidential Briefing Notes prepared by the State 
Department for use by the President for the Menzies visit. 
These Briefing Notes are not often cited in the literature, 
but are important because they confirm that a change in 
American thinking about Australia had occurred. 
Significantly, the notes were prepared in the Department’s 
Division of European Affairs, but were studied by Berle 
before they reached the President. In fact, the Briefing 
Notes’ reflection of the frosty nature of American-Australian 
relations might be seen as Berle’s contribution. The notes 
give insights into the relationship between the two nations, 
Australia and the United States, including frank judgments 
that relations had been highly unsatisfactory, at times, 
‘even acrimonious’, that a ‘trade war’ existed between the 
two countries, and that the United States had ‘black listed’ 
Australia. 
However, the State Department now saw other issues as 
relevant in the event of hostilities erupting in the Pacific 
region.  Washington obviously believed that the long-
standing issues that had inhibited closer relations between 
the United States and Australia for many years were no 
longer relevant. What was crucial was dealing with the 
growing aggressive nature of Japan.464From Washington’s 
                                               
464 ‘Briefing Notes’, File 847.00 and File 1191-2, Reel 23, 711-99, Archives of the 
State Department. 
266 
 
perspective, the two long-standing problems besetting the 
relationship were Australia’s refusal both to allow American 
air services to land in Australia and to permit direct radio 
telegraph communications between the two countries. The 
notes described the long delays in telegraph services 
between the United States and Australia: 
Telegrams either go by radio via Canada or by cable via 
Canada or Great Britain…the average delay on telegrams 
transmitted by radio originating in Australia and destined 
to (sic) the United States is five and one half hours. The 
American company, RCA had had a traffic agreement 
with Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd. since 
October, 1931 for the establishment of a direct radio-
telegraph circuit but the Australian government had not 
issued the necessary licence.465 
 
Equally as inimical to the relationship were the poor trading 
arrangements, born of the excessive tariffs maintained by 
both countries: ‘It would be difficult to say which country 
has been more at fault in this regard’. The State 
Department notes clearly admit that the United States bore 
the major responsibility for the ‘trade war’ by its Tariff Acts 
of 1922 and 1930, which imposed excessive duties on 
Australia’s principal exports to the United States, notably 
wool. 
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The Australian refusal to grant landing rights to Pan 
American Airlines arose solely from Australia’s insistence 
that Britain be granted reciprocal rights to land in Hawaii. 
The American objection was based on the  reality that  the 
only landing field in Hawaii was in the American Naval 
Station at Pearl Harbor, thus presenting grave security 
risks. The State Department noted that opening Hawaii to a 
British airline would enable that airline to operate a round-
the-world service, a distinct commercial advantage and one 
that the United States would strenuously resist. A year 
earlier, Casey complained to Berle that the British side had 
given away ‘landing rights at Fiji and Auckland – and had 
nothing in return’.466The ‘Briefing Notes’ revealed that while 
the lack of a direct service between the two countries had 
been difficult from a ‘purely commercial point of view, in 
the present emergency, a direct service becomes doubly 
important, not only for the United States and Australia but 
for the whole British Empire’. 
This statement is important for two reasons. Firstly, the 
reference to the ‘present emergency’ at a time (8 May, 
1941) when the United States was neutral and the Pacific 
War was seven months away. Secondly, the notes referred 
to the British Empire in a manner that could be interpreted 
as showing concern, a departure from the conventional 
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understanding that Roosevelt believed that the Empire 
should be broken up. It is only by a careful reading of the 
notes that the American position is fully understood. 
Clearly, the Roosevelt Administration was aware of the 
distinct possibility of Japanese-inspired conflict in the South 
Pacific and was attempting to create some sort of 
understanding with Australia that would facilitate American 
participation, if not intervention.  Equally clearly, the 
United States was envisaging greater communication with 
and an improved relationship with Australia.  Access by 
aircraft was an obvious means of establishing and 
maintaining that understanding. Important too was the 
need for rapid communication between the two nations.  
The identification of the need for direct radio telegraph 
facilities between the two nations signalled the growing 
American awareness of the approaching conflict in the 
Pacific. 
The new importance of Australia is on display in the 
language of the notes: ‘Should the United States become 
involved in war, particularly in the Far East, instantaneous 
telegraph communication with Australia would be of the 
utmost importance’. The same sentiment is expressed 
again: ‘It is obviously desirable and helpful in cultivating 
closer ties between the United States and Australia, quite 
aside from mutual defence needs, to improve the 
communication facilities between the two countries’. The 
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import and the motivation of the briefing notes thus 
becomes apparent. The United States was forecasting the 
role that Australia would be required to play in the events 
expected to unfold within the very near future.  
The significance of the ‘Briefing Notes’ lay in it confirming 
Burrell’s reports from ABC 1 that Australia had become part 
of the American strategy for the expected war in the 
Pacific.  Equally significant was the fact that this document 
was driven not by the American military or naval 
authorities but by the State Department. It is possible to 
speculate that the new-found American recognition of 
improving relations with Australia and the importance of 
Australia in Pacific defence strategy owed something to 
Casey’s energetic wooing of the State Department andits 
senior officers. 
The Briefing Notes criticised what it perceived as Australia’s 
attempt to ‘establish its independent position vis-à-vis the 
United States and at the same time, expect us to accept 
her playing the Empire game in such a manner’.  However, 
they concluded by emphasizing that ‘the current general 
situation offered an unusual, probable (sic) unique 
opportunity for attempting to solve, by moderate liberality, 
a deep-rooted conflict which puts a severe strain on United 
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States-Australian relations in general—political as well as 
economic’.467 
Casey left nothing to chance in terms of cementing 
relationships upon the arrival of Menzies in Washington. His 
gathering of Washington’s important people reveals the 
effectiveness of his networking. For example, in a letter to 
the Assistant Secretary of State that began ‘My dear Adolf’, 
he gave Berle a list of those who would be attending ‘an 
informal men’s dinner (black tie)’ at the Australian Legation 
to meet the visiting Prime Minister, Menzies, on 9 May, 
1941, signing the letter, ‘Dick Casey’. The list included 
Vice-President Henry Wallace, Secretary of War, Henry 
Stimson, Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson and 
Special Adviser the President, Harry Hopkins, along with 
other members of the Diplomatic Corps.468 
The Menzies visit proceeded smoothly. Casey did his best 
to bring his intelligence up to date, noting to his diary the 
day before Menzies arrived: ‘Lunched alone with Mr 
Stimson (Secretary of War). He wanted to explain his point 
of view rearding United States fleet proposals. We also 
discussed Philippines’.469No less an importantmeeting 
occurred on 12 May 1941 when General Marshall and 
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Admiral Stark came to the Australian Legation to talk with 
Casey and Prime Minister Menzies. Casey would not have 
passed up this opportunity to spread his gospel that it was 
Australia that offered great benefits to American power in 
the Pacific. While Marshall and American strategy were still 
focused on somehow defending the Philippines and 
confining any Asian war to the ocean north of the equator, 
they would certainly not have been spared Casey’s 
reminders about what a strategic asset Australia 
represented in the event of war with Japan. There were 
follow-up visits to Casey from American miltiary leaders. 
On 9 June 1941, Admiral  H.E. Kimmel, Commander-in-
Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, and one of his planning 
officers Captain MacMorrow, called at the Legation to see 
Casey for a ‘useful confidential discussion on Pacific’.470 
Impressing upon the Americans the importance of the 
Pacific, despite the ‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy, was one of 
Casey’s priorites. Another was seeking to encourage the 
Americans to look beyond the Philippines in the context of 
the looming Pacific War. Having made so many important 
contacts in Washington, Casey would have learnt of the 
existence of various colour-coded war plans created by a 
Joint Committee of the United States Army and the United 
States Navy. War Plan Orange was a strategy designed to 
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deal with hostilities that were expected to break out in the 
Western Pacific involving a Japanese attack on the 
Philippines and Guam, both American protectorates. As 
early as 1905, Japan was perceived as the likely adversary 
in the Pacific, a belief that persisted, with varying degrees 
of conviction, until proven correct by the outbreak of the 
Pacific War in 1941. The Army and the Navy were required 
to develop their own tactical programs in accordance with 
the overall strategic concepts and objectives. Theoretically, 
the existence of clearly defined War Plans would have 
made it impossible for an outsider, such as Casey, to 
attempt to influence the political will of the United States in 
the specific area of military strategy. In reality, the color 
plans never achievedwhat was hoped for and expected. 
Moreover, they were drawn up by serving and retired 
members of the Army and Navy, albeit of senior rank such 
as General Pershing and Admiral Dewey, but with 
insufficient political input. 
In fairness, there exist many different opinions on the 
value of the War Plans. Miller has claimed that ‘War Plan 
Orange, the secret program of the United States to defeat 
Japan, was, in my opinion, history’s most successful war 
plan’.471 On the other hand, the Army’s official history 
described these plans as far from realistic and hence little 
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more than staff studies.472 No War Plan was ever enacted 
by Congress or signed by the President. From the very 
beginning, American planning was based upon two major 
factors, firstly that the hostilities with Japan would be 
essentially a naval war and secondly, arising from that, a 
world class naval station and harbour was needed in the 
Western Pacific. Subic Bay or Manila Bay in the Philippines 
were invariably nominated for that role.Both propositions 
were problematic. The development of aircraft and aircraft 
carriers demolished the belief that hostilities with Japan 
would be entirely naval.  Secondly, the declared need for a 
major naval base in the Western Pacific and the conclusion 
that the Philippines were the only possible place reflected 
poorly on the thinking that went into the creation of War 
Plan Orange. There was never a realistic chance that the 
Philippines were defensible.   The agreements reached at 
the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922 allowing 
Japan the smallest ratio of  5:5:3 in capital ships 
eventuated in Britain and the United States conceding 
Japan the right to strengthen her Pacific possessions while 
denying the two Western countries the right to fortify their 
Pacific bases.  In the words of a United States naval 
authority: ‘Thus went all chance of defending the 
Philippines and providing a military sanction for American 
                                               
472 Mark Skinner Watson, ‘The War Department. Chief of Staff.’  p. 87. 
274 
 
policy’.473At the first meeting of the Joint Board in 1919, 
after one of the many reviews, a Naval member, Captain 
Yarnell, questioned how could war plans be developed 
without a national policy being defined? What were 
America’s interests in the Far East? If there were to be 
hostilities, would they be restricted to a limited war or was 
it the intention to decisively defeat the enemy? Could the 
Philippines be held and at what cost? By 1922, Yarnell had 
concluded, ‘it seems certain that in the course of time the 
Philippines and whatever else we may have there will be 
captured’, thus anticipating precisely the events of 1941-
1942.474  A senior Army officer, Brigadier (later General) 
Embrick argued that the Philippines ‘had become a military 
liability of a constantly increasing gravity… [that] the early 
dispatch of our fleet to Philippine waters would be literally 
an act of madness’.475 
Between 1924 and 1938, Plan Orange was revised many 
times but the essential features remained unchanged. In 
April 1935, American strategic planners concluded that not 
only was Japan hell-bent on expansion of its empire, but 
that she could be defeated by the United States only in a 
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long, costly war, in which the Philippines would early be 
lost. The American response would take the form of ‘a 
progressive movement’ through the mandated islands, 
beginning with the Marshalls and Carolines, to establish ‘a 
secure line of communications to the Western Pacific’. 
Australia, despite its harbours and resources, was evidently 
too distant and too far south from where the Americans 
expected a Japanese attack, that is, the Philippines and the 
island of Guam. The vast expanses of the thinly-populated 
Pacific raised the question of whether the makers of 
American national policy were prepared to incur the 
obligation of engaging in such a war.476 
The revision of January 1938 recognised that the Royal 
Navy had responsibilities in the Pacific through Britain’s 
access to the valuable resources in Australia, Malaya, 
Borneo and elsewhere. The 1938 Plan raised the possibility 
of greater co-operation between the navies of the United 
States and Britain in the event of war in the Pacific. 
Nonetheless, the Philippines always took priority over 
Singapore as the anti-Japan base in the Pacific, a situation 
that Casey was still complaining about bitterly in the weeks 
that followed Pearl Harbor.477 
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If the majority of the Naval hierararcy sought to prioritise 
holding the Philippines, the Army leadership was much 
more sceptical.478As the World War broke out, War Plan 
Orange was succeeded by a series of Rainbow Plans, 
predicated on the belief that the next war would involve 
multiple countries and not just the United States and 
Japan. Rainbow Plan 1 aimed at preventing violation of the 
Monroe Doctrine, Rainbow Plan 2 the defeat of ‘enemy 
forces’ in the Pacific, while remaining ‘in concert’ with Great 
Britain and France. Rainbow Plan No. 3 provided for the 
‘protection of United States’ vital interests in the Western 
Pacific by securing control in the Western Pacific as rapidly 
as possible’.479 Whatever the plan, the belief that the 
Philippines could serve as the American base in the west 
Pacific in the events of war with Japan was held 
simultaneously with the fear that the Philippines could not 
be held in the face of a sustained Japanese attack.  
In February and March 1941, as the ABC 1 talks took place, 
Marshall and Stimson now expressed some confidence that 
the Philippines could be held once reinforced with the new 
B-17 Flying Fortress bombers. These long-range bombers 
could target Japan and help to deter an attack on 
Singapore.The effective takeover by Japanese forces of 
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French Indochina in July 1941 was the background for 
Roosevelt strengthening American resolve to hold the 
Philippines.480 On 31 July 1941 General Marshall made the 
statement that defending the Philippines was American 
policy.481 The command of American forces in the 
Philippines was given to General Douglas Macarthur. 
Ensuring that the United States did not restrict itself to 
prioritizing the Philippines therefore became the key 
element of Casey’s mission in the months leading up to 
Pearl Harbor. It was a welcome development for Casey 
when, on 2 August 1941, he called on General Spaatz 
(Chief of U.S. Army Air Corps) and General Scanlon (U.S. 
Army Intelligence) regarding ‘their desire for information re 
airfields in North Australia and the islands’.482 Casey was 
someone that the Americans clearly found necessary to 
bring into the discussion on this issue. Casey’s diary for 11 
October 1941 records, ‘Called on President and had hour’s 
talk, mainly on the part the Philippines may play in Far East 
and on economic aims in the future.’483 Casey advised 
Canberra that the President held out no hope of a 
permanent peace with Japan. Casey noted that the 
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previous belief that the Philippines could not survive had 
been reviewed and it was now considered that the 
garrisons there could hold out for a longer period enabling 
Philippines-based aircraft to deter Japanese movement 
southward towards Singapore.484Casey’s report of the 
meeting, sent to Canberra that night, indicated that the 
President spoke, at length, on ‘the changeable attitude by 
the U.S. Army and Navy’ towards the Philippines.485The 
President, obviously aware of the doubts over whether the 
Philippines could be held, asked if Australia, in the event of 
war with Japan, might consider the practicability of 
Australian air squadrons operating from North Borneo, in 
order to co-operate with the United States air forces based 
in the Philippines. This was in itself a significant victory. It 
was recognition that the United States could not base its 
strategy solely on its holding the Philippines. 
Menzies’ hold on the Prime Ministership was always on a 
knife edge and he resigned on 27 August 1941. Arthur 
Fadden became Prime Minister for 40 days and when 
Wilson and Coles, two disaffected pro-Menzies 
backbenchers, crossed the floor, Labor came to power in a 
minority government. It would be wrong to see the 
removal of the United Australia Party from office as a 
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decisive turning point in Australia’s relationship with the 
United States. There were important elements of 
continuity, foremost among which was Casey himself who 
remained in Washington.  In fact, Casey had initiated in a 
cable of 5 October, 1941, the possibility of ‘returning home 
for consultation’, motivated in part, claims Bridge, by the 
prospect of assessing his chances of becoming UAP 
leader.486 When this was denied Casey continued the 
diplomacy and the public relations campaign aimed at 
elicting greater commitment from the United States to the 
security of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and therefore to 
Australia.  
The new Australian Prime Minister John Curtin and his 
Minister of External Affairs, Evatt, became involved in 
strategic discussions almost immediately. Long before he 
released  ‘Australia Looks to America’ in December 1941, 
Curtin was well aware of how far the Australia-United 
States military relationship had advanced under the 
previous government. On 13 October, 1941, Curtin, as 
both Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Co-
ordination,Curtin presented to the Australian Advisory War 
Cabinet a United States’ request for Australia’s assistance 
in various military matters. Curtin used the report to 
emphasise the increasing interest the United States was 
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exhibiting in Pacific defence. Curtin was clearly aware of 
American plans. He cited various proposals:  supplying 
equipment and technical assistance to make Rabaul a well-
defended anchorage for possible use as a base for 
American fleet operations against the Caroline Islands and 
Japanese lines of communication passing eastward of the 
Philippines; American interest lay in establishing a chain of 
landing grounds suitable for heavy bombers between 
Honolulu and New Zealand, Australia, Malaya and the 
Philippines; advising the United States about conditions in 
New Caledonia,  New Hebrides and the Solomons; and of 
increasing numbers of American planes arriving in Australia 
on their way to the Philippines.  
The American requests were agreed to, some in principle 
subject to further investigation, but all were regarded 
favourably.487 Although American service personnel were to 
staff the airfields for American aircraft, the request sought 
supplies and equipment including oil and gasoline, bombs, 
and ammunition. The motive for the American involvement 
was to facilitate the strengthening of the Philippines, but 
Australia’s growing stature in American thinking was plain 
to see. In a message to Churchill in late October, Curtin put 
the view that were the Commonwealth nations forced into 
a conflict with Japan, ‘we will certainly have done all we 
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can to deter her (Japan) and our defensive position in the 
Eastern Hemisphere will be all the stronger for the 
measures that have been taken’.488 
Three days after this request, the Advisory War Cabinet 
received advice from Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British 
Commander-in-Chief, Far East when he attended their 
meeting on 16 October 1941. He told them that the whole 
region of south-east Asia, comprising Burma, Malaya, the 
Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand and the 
Philippines comprised one strategic area. The defence of 
one affected the others. It was a perspective that reflected 
Casey’s message to the Americans for much of the 
previous year. Yet, on other matters, Brooke-Popham 
proved to be wide of the mark. He assured the War Cabinet 
of the increasing strength of British forces in the Far East, 
with Malaya growing from strength to strength. The most 
welcome and the most inaccurate news of this message 
was that Japan probably was about to attack the Soviet 
Union rather than move south.  As Brooke-Popham put it, 
‘Russia’s preoccupation with the war with Germany 
presents an opportunity for Japan to rid itself of the 
Russian threat’.489 
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This optimistic view was abroad in Washington as well. 
Casey reported to Canberra that senior American service 
quarters believed that Japan was about to attack the Soviet 
Union and that the United States would remain neutral, so 
long as British and American interests were not also 
attacked.490As late as 25 October 1941, Casey was 
recordingWelles as having ‘a fairly hopeful attitude about 
the Far East, particularly about the probability (he thinks 
improbabililty) of their going south’.491Yet, talks between 
Hull and the Japanese representatives, Admiral Nomura 
and Special Envoy Kurusu, aimed at reducing the tensions 
between Japan and the United States, were achieving 
nothing.492 Contrary to the views held by some senior 
American service chiefs,Casey told Canberra in mid-
November 1941that Japanese-Anglo-American relations 
were  ‘heading fairly rapidly for a break’.493 
Japan’s refusal to withdraw her troops from Indo-China and 
the American refusal to lift or reduce the restrictions and 
allow Japanese access to raw materials constituted major 
obstacles to a lessening of tensions. On 21 November, in a 
long message to Curtin, Casey trawled over the 
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circumstances in which war in the Pacific might break out.494 
If Curtin and Evatt had entertained the hope that war with 
Japan would likely be avoided, Casey’s latest message 
would have demolished that hope.   
Casey, meanwhile, was furiously pursuing all avenues to 
speed up Australia’s rearmament. Australia was an 
important beneficiary of Lend-Lease and Casey was not 
afraid to make his views about delays in the supply of 
equipment. He told Edward Stettinius, who was in charge 
of Lend-Lease, on 17 September 1941 that ‘it was in his 
hands whether or not there was an Australian mechanised 
division in the field in mid-1942’.495 In October 1941, he 
involved Welles, Hopkins and the President in a discussion 
of how well the Australians were using American-made 
machine tools.496 In November 1941 Casey congratulated 
himself on the fact that ‘we have been getting our 
requisitions approved and orders placed at 2 to 3 times as 
great a rate, relatively, than any other beneficiaries, 
including the British’.497 
Casey hoped for an ‘incident’ that brought the United 
States into the war but feared above all a situation where 
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an embittered Japan struck out at British and Dutch 
interests with no guarantee of American assistance. 
Negotiations between Japan and the United States reached 
an impasse in November, and the United States knew from 
its MAGIC (US ability to collect and interpret Japanese 
secret codes – hugely helpful in US devising strategy) 
intercepts that a date had been set in Tokyo for talks to 
come to an end. The United States had imposed ever 
tougher sanctions upon Japan. This was not a welcome 
development for the Australians who still hoped to buy 
time, avoid war with Japan altogether, or make sure that 
the United States, Australia and Britain entered a new war 
together.  
Evatt, previously unimpressed by the Japanese threat, now 
as Minister and armed with Casey’s intelligence, warned 
Parliament of the threat of war. Yet the Australians were 
still unclear as to how soon the collision with Japan might 
come. Casey on 29 November reported that a southward 
advance of a significant Japanese taskforce was 
expected.498At the same time, Evatt was greatly cheered in 
the last week in November 1941 by Casey’s revelation that 
a draft proposal from Hull to the Japanese offered a modus 
vivendi that exchanged a retreat of Japan from its recent 
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conquests in exchange for a resumption of trade.499 The 
modus vivendi required that neither side would advance 
further in Asia or the Pacific. To Casey’s chagrin, the modus 
vivendi was not ultimately part of the proposals that went 
to Japan. Casey blamed not only Japanese militarism but 
an intransigent Chinese nationalist movement for the 
removal of the modus vivendi, viewed in China as making 
too many concessions.500 From that moment it was simply a 
matter of where and when Japan would strike. 
At the end of November, Casey reported on a long 
interview he had had with the Secretary of State. Casey 
told Curtin and Evatt that Hull now believed that relations 
with Japan had gone beyond the diplomatic stage and that 
so far as the United States was concerned, the matter was 
now up to the Army and Navy. Casey also noted that Hull 
had taken to using the word ‘we’ in the sense of the United 
States and British Commonwealth countries, a very 
encouraging signal.501 
Although he was careful to keep Canberra closely informed 
of his activities and, just as importantly, of what he learnt, 
it was obvious that Casey was on a fairly long leash. Casey 
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sought Canberra’s approval for variouscourses of action but 
the initiative was usually his own. An example was his 
private meeting with Special Japanese Envoy, Saburo 
Kurusu, and the Japanese Ambassador to the United 
States, Admiral Kichisaburo,on 30 November 1941. In this 
case, Casey and Evatt had the same objective of 
miraculously postponing the looming war.502 Bridge notes 
that Casey was the last diplomat to negotiate with Kurusu 
on the eve of Pearl Harbor. This was, as Bridge points out, 
not naivety on Casey’s part, but a shrewd manoeuvre to 
remind the United States that Australia was in the front line 
of any Japanese attack and that the Americans had given 
no guarantee to Britain or Australia in relation to a 
Japanese attack on Malaya. Just such a guarantee did 
emerge on 1 December 1941.503 If nothing else, this last-
gasp conversation highlighted Casey’s stature in 
Washington and his capacity to achieve results that worked 
in Australia’s favour.  
Casey’s focus in 1941 was the looming Pacific War. He 
could not, by his own efforts, reverse the ‘Beat Hitler First’ 
strategy or American reliance upon the Philippines, let 
alone prevent a war with Japan. Yet the time spent by 
Casey and the energy employed - interviews, writing, 
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dining, talking – propounding the interest of Australia and 
the role it could play in the war effort kept Australia’s 
stratetic value in plain sight of the military planners. The 
aftermath of Pearl Harbor would make all those Casey 
ideas suddenly relevant.  Decision makers – both political 
and military - who had been hearing Casey’s reasoned 
arguments and discussions in a wide range of meetings and 
gatherings found that ideas that were ‘filed’, but not 
actually dismissed, were now worth serious consideration, 
politically and strategically. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Curtin and Casey. 
Bridge has made the point repeatedly that Casey was 
‘looking to America’ long before Curtin put his name over 
these words in his statement of 27 December 1941. 
YetCurtin is the measuring stick by which most Australians 
still think about Australia’s alliance with the United States. 
In traversing the path of the Australia-United States 
relationship in the crucial years of 1942 to 1945, Curtin 
looms large. If in fact, Casey did contribute to that 
formulation, the question arises, how do Casey’s efforts 
compare with Curtin’s?  This might be seen as a fair 
question because Curtin has been afforded the accolades.  
A key sentence in Curtin’s‘Australia Looks to America’ 
statement put Australia’s international relatioships in stark 
perspective: ‘Without any inhibitions, I make it quite clear 
that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our 
traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom’. This 
sentence has become the symbol both of Curtin’s foreign 
policy and indeed, of Curtin himself. The phrase is 
continually linked to Curtin and has entered the Australian 
political lexicon.  The conventional wisdom is clearly based 
on the fact that within days of ‘Australia Looks to America’, 
thousands of American servicemen, growing to hundreds of 
thousands, plus ships, equipment and aircraft began 
arriving in Australia.  
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Thus, the phrase ‘Australia Looks to America’, which 
summed up neatly Australia’s position in the crucial days 
following 7 December, constitutes one of the foundations 
upon which Curtin’s status rests. The belief about Curtin 
ultimately led to his being perceived as the saviour of 
Australia.504 Yet, the appellation is not justified. When 
Curtin issued that statement on 27 December, the Pacific 
War had been raging for almost three weeks. On this 
reasoning, nearly three weeks elapsed before Curtin 
expressed these fears and sought American assistance.  
This is clearly absurd.  
The Japanese attacks on 7 December, plus the German 
declaration of war upon the United States four days later, 
virtually destroyed the isolationist cause and forced the 
hitherto neutral United States to become a combatant. As 
Casey put it on 8 December 1941: ‘The Japanese attack 
has welded this country into one as nothing else could 
possibly have done’.In the days following Pearl Harbor, 
General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States 
Army, took charge of the response to the Japanese attack. 
Lyon claims that it was Marshall himself who decided that 
the major American base to counter the Japanese attack 
would be in Australia.505  Upon reflection, it might seem 
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obvious that it could hardly have been anyone else. While 
Roosevelt and Churchill may have been the political 
strategists for the United States and Britain, it was Marshall 
who was the chief military strategist for the Allied counter 
attack, certainly at that early stage of the war.  
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Marshall pensioned off his 
old guard in order to promote some of the bright young 
officers he had met during his career, includingDwight 
Eisenhower. Eisenhower won much favourable comment 
over his brilliant conduct of war games in Louisiana in mid 
1940, which led to his immediate promotion to brigadier 
general.506 Marshall brought Eisenhower to Washington 
urgently. Arriving at Washington’s Union Station on Sunday 
morning, 14 December, one week after Pearl Harbor,  
Eisenwhower found the War Department almost empty 
except for Marshall, who told Eisenhower to put down on 
paper a plan. Eisehower submitted a plan to Marshall the 
same day. Marshall rejected it, and told Eisenhower to 
make corrections. The new plan, completed by Eisenhower 
on 17 December, was sent to Marshall who approved it for 
transmission to Roosevelt the same day.      
It was Marshall who described in broad detail, the size, 
composition and time requirements of the American 
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response and told Eisenhower, to commit the proposals to 
paper, filling in some numerical blanks in the ordinance 
requirements, what might be termed ‘the nuts and bolts’.  
He even included in his briefing the proposal that was then 
being floated around Washington to persuade the Soviet 
Union to take a belligerent stand against Japan and provide 
aid to those nations and areas under Japanese attack.507 
Eisenhower’s recommendation was to ‘use Australia as a 
base’, which would entail making ‘certain of the safety of 
Australia itself’. 
As Gelber has pointed out, Marshall’s response to 
Eisenhower’s recommendations about the Philippines – ‘do 
your best to save them’ – on the surface, at least, 
suggested no great urgency.508 Yet the plan itself suggested 
an overwhelming reliance upon the Australian land mass. 
In his briefing, Marshall ignored the much-vaunted Rainbow 
Plan created for precisely this purpose. What he did include 
was a model of clear, concise directions that became the 
basis for the United States’ conduct of the war in the Pacific 
and had the consequence of converting Australia into a 
vast arsenal that would, in effect, remove any possibility of 
Japanese forces invading the country. It is worthwhile to 
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quote the Marshall/Eisenhower Plan, called ‘Steps To Be 
Taken’, in full:  
SECRET 
Assistance to the Far East. 
Steps to be taken.. 
Build up in Australia a base of operations from which 
critical supplies (planes and ammunition) and personnel 
can be moved into the Philippines—probably entirely by 
air.  Speed is essential. 
Influence Russia to enter the war, at least give us secret 
use of certain Siberian air fields. 
Pursuit planes. 
Move carrier with Army Pursuit planes, pilots, 
ammunition and bombs from San Diego to Brisbane, 
Australia. 
Send fastest commercial vessel immediately available 
on West Coast, with pursuit planes, pilots, ammunition 
and bombs to Australia. 
Ferry planes from Australia into Philippines. 
Heavy Bombers 
Move heavy bombers (B-24)—via Africa to Australia to 
set up a combined fighting-transport service from 
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Darwin to Philippines. Also send B-17 heavy bombers in 
small groups across Pacific via the southern ferrying 
route from West Coast to Australia, if Christmas Island 
and Fiji fields can be used. 
Transport Planes. 
Establish in Australia, a transport plane ferrying service 
to move ammunition and supplies from Brisbane to 
Darwin, and possibly into Borneo or Manila. 
Bombs and Ammunition. 
Initially, utilize the bombs and ammunition now in 
Australia, others to be carried on carriers and fast 
merchant vessels with planes.  Establish fast merchant 
ship supply service from U.S. to Australia for 
maintenance.  Ferry by plane from Australia to 
Philippines.509 
Clearly this was the moment at which Australia was 
‘saved’. Australia, not even on the radar as a base for the 
United States when Casey arrived in Washington in March 
1940, was now central to American thinking. Of course, it 
was the ‘incident’ of Pearl Harbor that had brought about 
the transformation. Yet the situation had arrived at the 
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point anticipated by Casey, who had worked so hard at 
disseminating his gospel of Australia being viewed as vital 
to American strategy in the looming war. Of course, there 
is no direct evidence  that Casey inspired Marshall’s 
thinking. Yet Marshall had met Casey before Pearl Harbor 
and was involved in many discussions with senior military 
figures who had also been in communication and 
negotiations with Casey. Casey’s entreaties and 
suggestions about an American base in Australia were now 
relevant to detailed American planning at the highest level. 
On the very day that he approved of the 
Marshall/Eisenhower plan, 17 December, Roosevelt called 
Casey to the Oval Office to tell him that he had read 
Curtin’s offer to ‘co-operate with the United States forces in 
the provision of a naval base at Rabaul and aerodrome 
facilities in territories under the control of the 
Commonwealth and at New Caledonia’, which Casey had 
delivered to the President on 13 December.510 Roosevelt 
explained that the United States regarded the whole south-
west Pacific as one area. As the President acknowledged, 
this notion that ‘the South-West Pacific is one unit’ was 
Casey’s theme over a long period.511 The war had to be 
regarded from ‘a geographical rather than a national point 
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of view…and that the defence of Australia and its outlying 
islands were just as important as the defence of the 
Philippines’, although Roosevelt believed that the 
Philippines were more immediately threatened. The 
President told Casey that they hoped to use Ausralia as the 
place to establish a bridgehead and a base.512  Roosevelt 
told Casey to ‘please tell your government that we have 
already started’ on the matters raised in Curtin’s message 
of 13 December.  
As of 17 December 1941, there was presidential approval 
for Australia to become a major base for the American 
response to Japan. If Stimson is to be believed, Australia 
as a base had been locked into American thinking for some 
time.513 This was the goal to which Casey had clearly been 
working, essentially since he arrived in Washington, but 
which he had especially pushed in 1941. The Plan was as 
much Marshall’s as it was Eisenhower’s. The plan was also 
Casey’s. Casey had for the past two years, spoken to as 
many service people as he possibly could, always with the 
same message, the relevance of Australia in any plan for 
Pacific security.  Given Casey’s indefatiguable energy, this 
message became well known to the various service people 
and became relevevant when the full import of the 
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Japanese attack began to sink in. Like Marshall, most of 
the important military leaders in the United States had 
heard first hand the Casey ‘Gospel’. 
If there is at the very least a plausible case that Casey had 
influenced events positively from the perspective of the 
‘saving’ of Australia, the same cannot be said of Curtin’s 
‘Look to America’. That Don Rogers, Curtin’s Press 
Secretary, wrote this statement is now well established. 
Rogers wrote it for Curtin, it was published over Curtin’s 
name and, as Rogers explained to this author, it 
represented Curtin’s thinking at the time.514 At that time, 
Curtin had enough to occupy his time without drafting 
press messages. It is unlikely that he would have 
anticipated that it would become the historically significant 
document it has. 
‘Australia Looks to America’ fulfils none of the criteria for 
being regarded as a definitive or significant document of 
national importance.  Firstly, it was not drafted by any 
senior member of government, but by the Prime Minister’s 
Press Secretary: the press release was merely scanned by 
the Prime Minister before being sent to the newspaper.515 
Secondly, it was written by Rogerssimply in response to a 
                                               
514 I conducted two interviews with Rogers in 1977. Recordings of those interviews 
are held by the author and the Australian Museum of Democracy, Canberra.   
515  See also James Prior, ‘How Curtin Became a War Casualty’. National Times, 
February 6-11, 1978, p. 25. 
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request by the Editor of the Melbourne Herald for a New 
Year message and was published on 27 December.  Cyril 
Pearl, the editor of the new (Sydney) Sunday Telegraph, 
saw what he considered was a new slant on the war effort, 
a switch in Australia’s allegiances, and ran it the next day. 
Pearl made a decision to concentrate on Australia seeking 
aid from the United States rather than the real message, 
that is, of Australia seeking aid from both the United States 
and the Soviet Union and encouraging an ‘all in’ effort on 
the home front.  
Thirdly, it was never sent to the President, or indeed, 
anybody. It was essentially a Press Release written for one 
newspaper. Fourthly, while it conveyed to the people of 
Australia a clear message that the war situation was rapidly 
deteriorating and that American and Soviet help was 
needed, Curtin knew at the time that it was issued that the 
United States was about to establish a major base in 
Australia.  Essentially the American President had 
personally told both Casey and the Australian government 
of American strategy involving Australia. In the two weeks 
between Roosevelt’s decision to approve the Marshall plan 
and the issuing of ‘Australia Looks to America’, Curtin was 
informed of the dimensions of the American aid in some 
detail. Initially, the information had come to him in a 
cablegram from Casey, within hours of Casey’s being 
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informed by the President himself, that he regarded 
Australia as a bridge-head and a base.516 
There are at least two puzzling aspects of Curtin’s appeal. 
The first is what Curtin hoped to achieve with his American 
audience? Curtin may have intended ‘Australia Looks to 
America’ as an attempt to keep the United States focused 
upon the Pacific and Australia. Evatt would later claim that 
the Labor government was shocked when it found out 
about Roosevelt’s agreement to the ‘Beat Hitler First’ 
strategy. On the other hand, Bridge has shown that the 
Australian government did, in fact, know of the ‘Beat Hitler 
First’ policy within days of its formulation. While there has 
always been a degree of conjecture over the precise timing 
of Australia’s learning of the policy, Bridge notes that Casey 
notified the then acting Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, in 
February 1941 that Roosevelt had made it quite clear that 
in the event of the United States becoming involved in a 
war with Japan, it would have to be ‘a holding war’.To fight 
a war with Japan would be a dangerous diversion of forces 
and material from the main centre of operations, which in 
his (Roosevelt’s) view was ‘the Atlantic and Great Britain’.517  
It would be inconceivable for Curtin and the Labor 
                                               
516 Casey to Department of External Affairs, 17 December 1941, NAA (cablegram) 
1162, A981, War 33. 1. 
517  Carl Bridge,  ‘R.G. Casey, Australia’s First Washington Legation’, p. 184. 
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members of the Advisory War Cabinet, although still in 
Opposition, to be ignorant of this.  
It could be argued, with validity, that Curtin’s issuing of the 
statement on 27 December was nothing more than a 
declaration of the Prime Minister informing the people of 
Australia where their future lay. The difficulty with that 
argument, however, is that, from the very beginning, the 
statement was regarded as an open appeal for the United 
States and the Soviet Union to come to the aid of Australia. 
Curtin made no attempt to place the statement in its 
correct context. In other words, the statement was 
misinterpreted and was, in fact, believed to be something it 
was not. The blame for this lies not so much with the way 
the statement was treated by the press but more by the 
way it was written.  
No matter how it is read, Curtin’s ‘Australia Looks to 
America’ statement remains an appeal, a public appeal to 
the American and the Soviet governments. Nowhere does it 
acknowledge that Australia was about to become a huge 
American base. It remains a matter for conjecture why, in 
drafting the statement, Rogers clearly constructed it that 
way. More importantly, it remains a matter for conjecture 
why Curtin, in approving of its release, chose to not even 
hint that massive American help was on the way. It is 
impossible to avoid the conclusion that in the matter of 
establishing a sound relationship with the American 
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President, Curtin made a serious error of judgment in 
publicly calling for American aid when he already knew the 
details of the American strategy involving Australia. 
Indeed, as already stated, American forces had arrived in 
Australia on 22nd December 1941.518 
Roosevelt read it for the first time at the end of December, 
when it was repeated in sections of the American press. 
The statement was published there on 28 December, 
1941.519 The most frequently quoted sentence, ‘I make it 
clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs 
about our traditional links or friendship to Britain’, 
appeared in the second paragraph of both The New York 
Times and Washington Post reports. Yet, Casey’s diary for 
that week makes no reference to it perhaps because he 
soon learned that Roosevelt was extremely displeased. 
Maie Casey recounted how President Roosevelt had called 
Casey to the White House and told him that if he thought 
that this statement would ingratiate Australia with the 
United States, he (Roosevelt) assured him that it would 
have the opposite effect.  Maie Casey claims that the 
President insisted that his words were to be regarded as 
                                               
518 The first American servicemen to arrive in Australia did so on 22 December, 
1941, dis-embarking from five troopships escorted by the USS Pensacola. The 
convoy was originally destined for the Philippines but was re-directed to Brisbane. 
519New York Times, 28 December, 1941, p. 11 and Washington Post,  28 
December, 1941, p. 4. 
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personal and not part of the official record.520 Undoubtedly, 
this is the reason Casey neither made a note in his diary 
nor informed the Prime Minister. His silence on the matter 
for the rest of his life accorded with what he regarded as 
the honourable thing to do. The President had told him in 
confidence. Casey kept that confidence, despite the fact 
that Roosevelt’s thoughts were of profound political and 
historical significance.  
Hudson deals only briefly with Casey’s reaction to it. Casey 
committed to paper (but not his diary) his belief after 
talking to Roosevelt about it, and after the President put 
him under ‘a seal of secrecy’ that not only was the 
statement counter-productive, but was seen in Washington 
as almost treason against the major ally, Britain.  Hudson 
found this (undated) ‘scrap of paper’ in a safe in Casey’s 
house eight years after his death while researching the 
biography.521 
Maie Casey recollected that ‘Look to America’ did not just 
offend Roosevelt, but also caused Casey anger and 
embarrassment.522 It might be profitable to dwell on that 
sentence for a moment. Curtin’s strongly worded plea for 
                                               
520 Maie Casey, Tides  and Eddies, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 69. This 
statement appears in no official records.  
521  Hudson, Casey, p. 135. 
522  Maie Casey, Tides and Eddies, (Hammondsworth:  Penguin. 1969) p. 83.  
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American assistance does not differ greatly from the 
message that Casey had been expressing from the time 
that he arrived in the United States.  Curtin, however, used 
language that was far more assertive and demanding, far 
more aggressive even, reflecting the changed context. In 
Curtin’s defence, Japan had commenced hostilities and the 
threat to Australian survival was real and growing daily.  
It must be recognised that Casey too often needed to be 
assertive and insistent. This invites the interpretation 
therefore, that if Casey was embarrassed and angered it 
may well have been at the reactions to Curtin’s statement 
within the United States and Britain, and not to the 
statement itself. In other words, given Casey’s passionate 
dedication to an American involvement in the conflict with 
the Axis powers, first Germany and subsequently Japan, 
the more probable grounds for his embarrassment or anger 
could have been the blunt, direct language used in the 
statement, language far removed from the felicitous 
periphrasis of his world of diplomacy.  
The second puzzling aspect of ‘Australia Looks to America’ 
is that it was directed as much to Stalin as to Roosevelt. 
Curtin’s ‘Australia Looks to America’ is in two parts. The 
first deals with Australia’s foreign relations, the second part 
deals with the need for Australia, internally, to go on a war 
footing. The whole tenor of the statement reveals Curtin’s 
belief that the war in the Pacific would be fought by a 
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combination of the Soviet Union, the United States, the 
British Commonwealth, Dutch and Chinese forces. As 
Humphrey McQueen has pointed out, the strength of the 
appeal to the Soviet Union is no less than that of the 
appeal to the United States.523  Of the thirty paragraphs of 
prose and the stanza of four lines that make up the Curtin 
statement, four deal with the justification of Australia 
seeking Soviet assistance, while three deal with the 
justification of Australia seeking American assistance. Two 
paragraphs refer to both nations.  The summary within the 
statement reads: ‘Summed up, Australian external policy 
will be shaped towards obtaining Russian aid and working 
out, with the United States as the major factor, a plan of 
Pacific strategy, along with Britain, Chinese and Dutch 
forces’.  
Curtin’s emphasis in his appeal on the seeking of Soviet aid 
at a time when the Soviet Union was fighting for survival is, 
at first glance, mystifying. Curtin’s statement explained it 
this way: ‘As the Australian government enters 1942, it has 
behind it a record of realism in foreign affairs’. Specifically, 
Curtin pointed to what he called ‘a forthright declaration in 
respect of Finland, Hungary and Romania’ and which he 
said was followed by a declaration of war against those 
                                               
523  Humphrey McQueen, Japan to the Rescue. Australia’s Security Around the  
Indonesian Archipelago during the American Century, (Melbourne: Heinemann, 
1991), p. 1. 
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countries by the Democracies. Curtin was clearly putting 
forward the proposition that Australia could reasonably 
expect Soviet assistance because Australia had responded 
positively to the Soviet request for a declaration of war 
against Finland, Hungary and Romania. This is how Curtin 
put it: ‘We felt that there should be no half-measures in 
our dealings with the Soviets when that nation was being 
assailed by the three countries mentioned’. Then came the 
argument for a negotiated pay-off:  ‘Similarly we put 
forward that a reciprocal agreement between Russia and 
Britain should be negotiated to meet an event of 
aggression by Japan. Our suggestion was then regarded, 
wrongly as time has proved, as premature. Now, with equal 
realism…we should be able to look forward with reason to 
aid from Russia against Japan’.  
The historian Peter Lyon described the urge to secure 
Soviet intervention in the war against Japan as ‘a 
preposterous notion’.524 It was, after all, only eight months 
since Stalin had signed a five-year neutrality pact with 
Japan. This was truly a pact that worked admirably for both 
countries.  The Soviet Union, already suspicious of 
Germany and unsure of German intentions, specifically the 
possibility of a massive German invasion from the west, 
desperately wanted its eastern boundaries secure. Japan, 
                                               
524  Peter Lyon, Eisenhower. Portrait of the Hero, (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company, 1974), p. 93. 
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for its part, needed just as desperately to keep her 
northern flank secure to facilitate a drive south.  The pact 
therefore, was in the national interests of both the Soviet 
Union and Japan. The subsequent German invasion of the 
Soviet Union did not violate the Soviet-Japan Neutrality 
Pact.  Strained it no doubt but its preservation became 
even more vital to Soviet interests as the Wehrmacht 
stormed to the very gates of Moscow.  Nothing could have 
been more inimical to Stalin’s interests than a belligerent 
Japan on her eastern borders.  Yet Curtin described as 
realistic an expectation of Soviet aid in the fight against 
Japan. 
To be fair, Soviet intervention against Japan was a matter 
that was being discussed in Washington, London and 
Canberra throughout 1941. In a letter to Curtin in late 
October, 1941, a day after he had called on Hornbeck and 
Loy Henderson of the Russian desk at the State 
Department, Casey reported to Canberra that there was 
information that Japan might shortly attack the Soviet 
Union.525  Rather than extend southward, Japan would 
exploit the opportunity offered by Russia’s precarious hold 
on its Eastern borders.  From Australia’s point of view, this 
could not be regarded as anything but favourable. A Japan 
engaged in fighting with the Soviet Union would be hardly 
                                               
525   Casey to Department of External Affairs, 17 October 1941, NAA (cablegram) 
865, A981: Far East 26A. 
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likely to launch further aggressive moves involving 
Australia.  In a submission to the Australian War Cabinet, 
Evatt proposed taking steps to seek the appointment of ‘a 
Russian Consul-General’, citing the following reasons: (a) 
The necessity for giving the fullest material and moral 
support to Russia and continued Russian resistance 
(against the Wehrmacht), (b) Common political interests, 
in particular the consideration that Soviet policy in respect 
to Japan in the (Near) East is important to Australia and (c) 
the potential importance  of Australian-Russian trade.526 
In Australia especially, the possibility of conflict between 
the Soviet Union and Japan was such an attractive one that 
a variation emerged. Rather than await Japan to strike the 
first blow, the Soviet Union might launch a massive attack 
on the islands of Japan, in other words, beat Japan to the 
first and possibly killer blow. Curtin raised the matter of 
Soviet-Japan relations at a meeting of the Australian War 
Cabinet on 10 November. He proposed that Japan be 
warned that any attack by her on the Soviet Union would 
be resisted by the British Commonwealth, irrespective of 
the attitude of the United States.  All members present 
were in agreement, although noting the New Zealand 
government’s preference for caution and adopting a wait 
and see policy. Unable to speak for the whole of the 
                                               
526  Dr. H. V. Evatt, 4 November 1941 War Cabinet Submission, Agendum 
367/1941, Documents of Australian Foreign Policy, Vol. V, Document 96, p. 160. 
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Commonwealth or indeed to communicate directly with 
Japan, the War Cabinet simply conveyed to London the 
recommendation that such a warning be issued to Tokyo.527 
This would have been no surprise to London. Curtin had 
sent a similar message on 4 November.528 
As the expectation of a Japanese attack on Australia 
heightened, Casey’s interest in pressuring the Soviet Union 
to rattle the sabres at Japan also grew.  Four days after the 
Pearl Harbor attack, when Britain, the United States and 
Australia were emerging from a state of shock, Curtin 
cabled London: ‘We think time has now arrived to make 
earnest attempt to obtain Russia’s intervention’.529  Casey 
cabled Curtin three days later (14 December) that the 
‘great importance of active Russian co-operation against 
Japan’ was fully realized in Washington but that an 
American approach had met with a negative reply by 
Stalin. Casey reported however, that in conveying Stalin’s 
rejection, the Soviet Ambassador suggested to Hull that if 
the United States and Britain were able to make some kind 
of ‘offers’, Russian co-operation against Japan might be 
forthcoming.530 It seems that this faint offer by the Soviet 
                                               
527 Canberra to London, War Cabinet Submission, 2680. 134/1941, NAA 
528  Curtin to London, 4 November 1941, A981. Japan 169 iii, NAA 
529  Curtin to London, 11 December 1941, (cablegram) 789, A981: War 33, 
Attachment B, NAA 
530 Casey to Curtin 14 December 1941, (cablegram) 1145, A981, War 54, NAA 
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leadership to join the Allies against Japan in return for 
some kind of ‘offer’ or deal was seized upon by the Curtin 
government with enthusiastic alacrity. 
Whatever hopes that Casey had of the Soviet Union 
launching a preemptive strike against Japan received no 
support when he called upon the new Soviet ambassador, 
Maxim Litvinov, on 16 December 1941. Litvinov had served 
as foreign minister for a decade and knew the Japanese 
situation well. He told Casey that ‘a declaration of war on 
Japan would necessitate moving probably 20 divisions to 
Siberia’.531 Litvinov noted that he could not see how 
attacking Siberia would be in Japan’s interests either. Yet it 
must be acknowledged that hopes of Soviet military action 
against Japan remained very much alive in Allied thinking 
in 1942. After a meeting with Litvinov on 14 February 
1942, Casey noted that ‘of set purpose I did not make any 
reference of Russia attacking Japan or Japan attacking 
Russia’ for the State Department advised against provoking 
the Russians in this way’.532 Yet clearly, Russian 
intervention in the war was something that the Allies in 
general hoped to see as they scanned the international 
horizon. Equally clear is the fact that Curtin’s appeal had as 
little effect on Stalin as it did on Roosevelt. 
                                               
531 Casey Diaries, 16 December 1941. 
532 Casey Diaries, 14 February 1942 
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No man is without flaws and Curtin had his. His failure to 
anticipate  Roosevelt’s vexation at the issuing of ‘Australia 
Looks to America’ demonstrated either a level of 
insensitivity that jeopardised the relationship or a 
recklessness justified by the dire situation in which 
Australia found itself. Casey could have responded in a way 
that was less than complimentary to Curtin but it was not 
in his nature to go down that path. Of course it is often 
pointedout in Curtin’s defence that ‘Look to America’ was 
designed to remind the United States of Australia’s own 
challenges and simultaneously to challenge the ‘Beat Hitler 
First’ decision, taken by Churchill and Roosevelt earlier in 
the year. Curtin strongly believed that Australia must have 
the fullest say in Pacific strategy.533 Even so, it is surely a 
myth that ‘Australia Looks to America’ was the catalyst that 
loosened Australia’s ties with Great Britain and created, 
that is, gave birth to, the American Alliance. As a corollary, 
Curtin’s identification with the creation of the American 
alliance is undeserved.  
This conclusion needs to be acknowledgedif Casey’s 
contribution is to be fairly judged. In dealing with Curtin, 
much of the literature has been of an unquestioning 
character.  Few writers have referred to Roosevelt’s 
annoyance at the publication of ‘Australia Looks to America’ 
                                               
533  Day, The Politics of War, p. 227. 
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at a time when Curtin was aware of the American decision 
to convert Australia into the jump-off base for the 
American offensive.  Roosevelt could have concluded that 
Curtin, by issuing a virtual public appeal while knowing that 
the crucial decision had already been made and that, within 
a very short time, huge numbers of American servicemen 
and impressive quantities of American materiel would 
appear in Australia, was guilty of self-promotion and 
creating the belief that he exercised a powerful influence 
over the American President. 
The kindest interpretation of Curtin’s knowledge of the 
precise details of the American strategy at this time makes 
‘Australia Looks to America’ seem less sincere and less 
convincing. A stricter interpretation would invite 
speculation about his attitude to and his relations with the 
Australian people. In wartime, it is not common for matters 
of strategy to be conveyed to the civilian populace. The 
Australian people at this time, late 1941, early 1942, 
however, were seriously concerned about the future of the 
nation and indeed, their own safety.  The rapidity at which 
Japanese forces were moving southwards, approaching the 
Australian continent, created a state of anxiety. Colonel 
Gerald Wilkinson, who had been appointed British Liaison 
Officer with General MacArthur, in 1941, wrote in his diary 
that when he arrived in Australia from the Philippines, 
MacArthur had informed him that in 1942, Curtin had ‘more 
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or less offered him the country on a platter’. Wilkinson’s 
own view was that Curtin was ‘badly panicked and most 
un-statesman-like at the time’.534 It might be reasonable to 
suppose that the nation’s leader, who obviously 
appreciated the dire situation more than the civilian 
population, would assure the people that help was on its 
way, rather than keep them in the dark.  
An interpretation of the sequence of events leads to the 
conclusion that Curtin had no significant role in the final 
American decision. This is not to deny the major role he 
took in the subsequent Pacific War. His battles with 
Churchill, his standing up to Roosevelt, the leadership he 
displayed as leader of the Australian people in their gravest 
hour have ensured his place as an outstanding and 
courageous figure in the history of Australia.  Yet it is 
difficult not to agree with the minority of commentators 
who look past Curtin when seeking an explanation of the 
alliance between Australia and the United States.Yet, as 
World War Two fades into history, Curtin’s name and 
reputation continue to be invoked as much for the 
establishment of the alliance as they do for his wartime 
leadership role. As a consequence, the reputation of Casey 
and his role in establishing the alliance between the United 
States and Australia has been seriously underestimated.In 
                                               
534 Papers  of Gerald Wilkinson, April, 1943, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill 
College, Cambridge (Wilkinson Collection.) 
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effect, both Curtin and Casey were giving the same 
message. Yet, it is a matter of record that Curtin’s 
message, in contrast to Casey’s, failed to have any effect in 
the United States. 
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CHAPTER NINE: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath 
 
It needs to be noted that some, mostly American, writers 
have chosen to overestestimate Casey’s influence with the 
President. The surprise Japanese attack on American 
warships and defence installations at Pearl Harbor on 7 
December 1941 traumatised the United States and has 
generated a vast body of literature.535  As well, there have 
been reports by the nine official investigations and 
enquiries into the attack, with the enquiry conducted by 
Senator AlbenBarkely regarded as the most comprehenisve 
and authoritative.536  Central to the interest is the 
incredulity that a nation as powerful as the United States 
could be taken by surprise so easily.  It could be expected, 
therefore, that much of the literature attempts to seek out 
a culprit or culprits upon whom the blame might be placed 
for this ‘day that will live in infamy’.537 
Within eight weeks of the attack the local Army and Navy 
Commanders, General Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel, 
                                               
535 Louis Morton,  Pearl Harbor in Perspective:  A Bibliographical Survey US Naval 
Institute proceedings, LXXXI, April, 1955., pp. p. 461-468,   
536“Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Pursuant to S.Con. Resolution 27, 79th 
Congress”.  Report and Hearings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the 
Pearl Harbor Attack.  Congress of the United States, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1946)  Hereafter referred to as PHA Report and PHA Hearings. 
537 President Franklin D. Roosevelt ‘Address to Congress 8 December’ New York 
Times, 9 December, 1941, p.1  
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had been relieved, their careers and reputations 
permanently destroyed. Far from settling the issues raised, 
however, their removal only heightened the interest and 
stimulated the search for explanations.  Senator Barkley, in 
introducing the resolution into the Senate for the final 
investigation, which began in November, 1945, said that 
the first purpose of the Congressional investigation was 
that of ‘fixing responsibility’ for the Pearl Harbor disaster 
‘upon an individual, or a group of individuals, or upon a 
system under which they operated or co-operated, or failed 
to do either’.538 
The final days of a neutral United States proved to be a 
period of infinite interest to American historians and 
writers.  For Casey in Washington, it was a period of 
intense activity, a time in which he employed his diplomatic 
skills and his networking habits to the utmost and a period 
he seemed to enjoy. However, the historiography of that 
momentous period contains references to Casey that to this 
day have remained a mystery.  The suggestion has often 
been made that on the afternoon of 6 December 1941, less 
than 24 hours before the Japanese attack, Casey called at 
the White House with British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and 
conferred with President Roosevelt for an undisclosed 
period. What creates the mystery is that there is no record 
                                               
538 Congressional Records, 6 September, 1945, 8479-8480 
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of such a meeting ever having taken place.  It is unlikely 
that Casey would have conferred with the American 
President and not reported the meeting to Canberra.  Yet, 
there is no mention of it in Casey’s reports, diary, nor in 
the files held in the National Australian Archives. White 
House records contain no mention of it and the State 
Department searched twice through all relevant documents 
and found nothing. 
An unrecorded visit to the American President by a 
relatively junior diplomat would not normally be of great 
interest to historians.  Casey’s supposed visit, however, 
became important for several reasons.  Casey had access 
to the President and to the highest levels of the Roosevelt 
Administration to a degree greater than might be expected 
of a representative of a small nation member of the British 
Commonwealth. Australia’s foreign policy sometimes 
echoed Britain’s, yet Feis has noted that Americans were 
not as habituated to regard the aims of the Dominion of 
Australia with the same respectful suspicion as those of 
Britain and that Casey, accordingly, sometimes ‘found the 
path smoother that his British colleagues (did)’.539 
Moreover, Casey, just a few days previously, had 
undertaken talks with the Japanese Ambassador, 
Kichisaburo Nomura and the Special Envoy, Saburo Kurusu, 
                                               
539 Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor,  p. 135. 
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in an effort to break the deadlock that had arisen in the 
United States-Japan talks.  Although Casey had the 
approval of the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr. 
H. V. Evatt to undertake the talks, the initiative was 
entirely his own.540 
From the viewpoint of many critics, Roosevelt was overly 
influenced by Churchill and privately, at least, anxious to 
lead the United States into war.  From that position, 
several theories may be developed, ranging from the belief 
that despite ample knowledge that Pearl Harbor was about 
to be attacked, the Administration purposefully left it 
exposed and allowed the attack to happen, to another 
belief that the Administration manipulated and maneuvered 
Japan into attacking by deliberately placing the bulk of the 
Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor as an inviting and tempting 
target. This latter ‘conspiracy theory’ is described by 
Kenneth S. Davis.541 
A visit by an Australian diplomat who was close to the 
British Ambassador and who shared Britain’s desire to see 
the United States enter the war became significant when 
no record of their conversation was kept and indeed, when 
all evidence of the visit was missing.  The visit, moreover, 
was supposedly made less that twenty-four hours before 
                                               
540 Evatt to Casey, 29 November 1941, (cablegram) 178, A0981, NAA. 
541 Kenneth S Davis, Experience in War (MacMillan: New York, 1956). 
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the Japanese planes roared over the Hawaiian Islands. One 
American study, in bemoaning the absence of any record of 
the conversation, concludes: ‘This phase of the pre-Pearl 
Harbor crisis is so poorly documented that it has invited 
very compromising interpretations’.542 The American 
historian, Ladislas Farago, put it higher, calling the visit a 
‘mission’: ‘The Casey mission to FDR continues to remain 
one of the mysteries of the pre-Pearl Harbor diplomacy’.543 
The works referring to the Casey ‘visit’ multiplied over time 
and featured prominently in at least nine substantial 
books.544 
The initial reference at the PHA Hearings to the Roosevelt-
Casey meeting emerged when S. W. Richardson, the 
General Counsel assisting the Congressional Committee, 
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learnt of a cablegram that Casey had dispatched to Curtin 
and Evatt on the evening of 6 December at 9.30 pm.  
Richardson claimed that the cablegram discussed the 
procedures to be followed by Roosevelt in relation to a 
message he was proposing to send to Emperor Hirohito.545 
In May 1946, Richardson, acting through the State 
Department, asked the Australian Legation in Washington 
for information about Casey’s cablegram of 6 December.  
He did not ask for an actual copy.  The Legation’s reply, 
dated 22 May and signed by L. R. McIntyre, stated, inter 
alia, ‘the message was dispatched from Washington at 9.30 
pm on 6 December 1941.  The information contained 
therein regarding the procedure to be followed by the 
President had come orally from the President late in the 
afternoon of 6 December’.546 
The reply then went on to convey Roosevelt’s concurrence 
to a joint warning that Britain and the Commonwealth 
nations proposed sending to Japan. It added that Roosevelt 
had decided to send a message to Emperor Hirohito and 
that if no reply was received from the Emperor by Monday 
evening, the President would issue a warning on Tuesday 
afternoon or evening.  Roosevelt had asked that the British 
                                               
545PHA Hearings,  Part 14, pp. 631-632. 
546 This quotation comes from the Pearl Harbour Attack Hearings and not from 
Australian sources.  The Australian Embassy in Washington and the department 
files held by the NAA have been checked but no record can be found of McIntyre’s 
letter of 22 May 1946. 
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Commonwealth warning be held over until Wednesday 
morning, that is, after his own warning had been delivered 
to Tokyo.547 What made the Australian message so 
interesting to the congressional Committee was that 
Roosevelt’s reported proposals were contrary to the advice 
he was receiving from the State Department. 
The wording of the reply from the Australian Legation in 
Washington seems to support the view that Casey had 
spoken to the President on that fateful afternoon. 
Furthermore, it is the Australian Legation report and 
nothing else, which was the basis for the speculation and 
conjecture in the above-mentioned histories of the period. 
It is now clear that the Casey visit did not take place.  The 
advice contained in the letter of 22 May 1946 from the 
Australian Legation was correct but ambiguous and was 
seriously and consistently misinterpreted. 
The key to establishing if Casey visited the White House on 
6 December 1941, and, if he did, what was discussed, lies 
in his cables to Curtin and Evatt on the same date.  Casey 
dispatched three cablegrams to Australia that day, 6 
December, all addressed to Prime Minister Curtin and 
External Affairs Minister Evatt.  The times of dispatch 
indicate that nothing more than the actual time each was 
logged out of Washington. The first was sent from 
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Washington at 3.00 am, the second at 3.57 pm and the last 
at 9.30 pm. This latter cablegram is the one paraphrased 
by the Australian Legation.  The complete text of that 
cablegram, Casey to Curtin, is as follows: 
Washington, 6 December 1941. (9.30 pm) 
President sent for British ambassador late this afternoon 
to say that he was telegraphing Japanese Emperor (text 
follows in my immediate following telegram). President 
said that if he received no answer from Japanese 
Emperor by Monday evening he would give ‘warning’ to 
Japanese government on Tuesday afternoon or evening 
and suggests that in these circumstances British and 
others give their warnings on equivalent of Wednesday 
morning Washington time. 
The above time table is likely to be speeded up if the 
Japanese move more quickly. The President said that he 
was sending a confidential message to the Thai Prime 
Minister saying that the United States Government would 
regard it as a ‘hostile act’ if Japan attacked Thailand, 
Netherlands East Indies, Malaya or Burma. 
News is being published tonight here of two large heavily 
escorted convoys (totaling 35 ships escorted by 8 
cruisers and numerous destroyers) having been seen this 
morning to S.E. of Point Camau (the southern point of 
Indo-China) steaming westward towards Gulf of Siam. 
American estimates of numbers of Japanese troops in 
Southern Indo-China are also being given to press 
tonight, British Ambassador tells me that the President 
does not believe that the Japanese will make an 
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aggressive move as soon as the Secretary of State 
does.548 
That cablegram from Casey, with its clear indications in the 
first sentence of the first paragraph and in the last 
sentence of the final paragraph, that it was Halifax, the 
British Ambassador who had spoken to the President was 
subsequently paraphrased by the Australian Legation, inter 
alia, as follows:  ‘The information contained therein 
regarding the procedure to be followed came orally from 
the President late in the afternoon of December 6’.549 
The information had certainly come orally from the 
President, but not to Casey.  If the Australian Legation in 
1946 had been precise, it would have told the 
Congressional Committee that the information had been 
reported by Casey what had been told to him by the British 
Ambassador.  It was this simple lack of precision in 
language paraphrasing that created the belief by the Pearl 
Harbor Attack Congressional Committee that Casey had 
visited the White House ‘late in the afternoon of December 
6.’ and had received certain information ‘orally from the 
President’.    
It is well nigh unbelievable that for so many authors the 
history of the events leading up to the outbreak of the War 
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in the Pacific could have been so distorted by a poorly 
written paraphrase.  Equally as astounding is the widely 
held view (certainly by the nine writers listed above) that 
Casey, a representative of a relatively small nation, could 
have played such a vital role at such a crucial time.  
Conspiracy theories aside, there is however ample evidence 
of Casey’s influence in the winter of 1941-42. The attack on 
Pearl Harbor by no means heralded Casey’s exit from the 
Washington scene. His major task, working towards an 
American participation in ensuring Pacific security had 
obviously been completed beyond the best he could have 
possibly hoped for. It was to Casey that senior American 
service chiefs turned as they sought to bring order from the 
chaos and morale shattering events of 7 December. Casey 
came to fulfil the responsibilities of a major participant in 
the overall military planning as the American service chiefs 
battled to evolve a coherent and viable counterforce 
against the might of the Japanese Empire. It was Casey 
who knew intimately the resources and territorial 
characteristics of the Southwest Pacific. In the days and 
weeks following Pearl Harbor, Casey became involved in 
the implementation of the American counterattack, a 
recognition of the status he had achieved in Washington. 
The frenetic rounds of meetings between Casey and 
American military leaders after Pearl Harbor were proof of 
his ever increasing importance. Although the Australian 
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Legation, by this time, was staffed by military, air and 
naval attaches, their roles revolved around implementing 
decisions taken at a joint United States/Australia political 
level. It was Casey who had to pull the political strings as 
best he could.    
Gelber has pointed out that after Pearl Harbor, doors in 
Washington were opened to Casey to the degree that the 
Australian representative found himself in the regular 
company of the likes of Roosevelt, Churchill, and the senior 
miltiary figures now running the war.550 In fairness to 
Casey, it should be pointed out that he already had a great 
deal of access and that many of those whom Casey spoke 
to after Pearl Harbor were the same individuals whom 
Casey had cultivated in the months leading up to this long 
anticipated ‘incident’. On the other hand, the doors now 
opened wider and with greater frequency. 
Casey stayed in Washington until 1 April 1942. It must be 
said that this was the gloomiest period of the Pacific War 
for the Allied cause. The Philippines came under attack 
almost immediately after Pearl Harbor. Malaya was clearly 
vulnerable and its defenders badly panicked. The 
Americans and British at the Arcadia discussions in 
Washington agreed that there would be an ABDA (America-
British-Dutch-Australia) command stretching from Burma 
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to the Philippines and, as a last-minute inclusion, south to 
the western part of northern Australia, including Darwin. 
The north east of Australia was included in the ANZAC 
area. The Japanese capture of Singapore on 15 February 
1942 brought a premature end to ABDA and the ANZAC 
area, which would be transformed into the South West 
Pacific Area under General MacArthur who was to move 
from the Philippines to Australia. By mid February, the 
Japanese had taken the Philippines and Singapore, a 
guerilla war was under way in Timor, New Guinea was 
under threat and the Japanese had provided shattering 
evidence of their newfound strategic reach and their 
capacity to harm Australia by capturing the 8th Division of 
the AIF at Singapore and bombing Darwin four days later. 
The turning of the tide in the Pacific would not arrive until 
the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June 
1942.  
Casey’s private thoughts in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor 
suggest an abiding incomprehension and disdain of the 
superficiality of American preparedness and the American 
response to Pearl Harbor, especially when compared with 
the manner in which Britain had reacted to being pitched 
into war in 1939. As Casey put it on 9 December 1941:  
The President spoke on the radio to the nation this 
evening. His speech did not carry the fire and 
conviction that the occasion demanded...several 
minutes recounting of the individual countries that had 
325 
 
been attacked without warning, which to me pointed 
the lesson that USA should have been more prepared, 
at Hawaii and elsewhere, to be attacked also without 
warning.  The lesson of a dozen countries seems 
to have been wasted on them  (My emphasis.)   
Everyone I’ve met yesterday and today amongst senior 
American officials, Chief Justice Stone, Sumner Welles 
and several others have shown mortification and anger 
at the Hawaiian disaster.  Not the least among them 
said that if the world can be saved, Britain would save 
it. Her bearing and steadfastness, without chatter, after 
the fall of France, 18 months ago, was a model for all 
people. 
While Casey noted that the Japanese attack had galvanised 
the Americans into action, he seemed to doubt that the 
Americans had the necessary spirit to recover. As he told 
his diary: 
11 December, 1941. I called on Harry Hopkins at the 
White House.  He looked very sick.  I saw him in his 
combined bedroom-office…my main object in seeing him 
was to seek to impress him with the idea that it would 
be wise to see that the President’s mind was not 
bombarded with pessimism and depression by the U.S. 
Army and Navy, who are mighty likely to be very 
down.551 
Casey continued to wear his mask, however, balancing his 
obvious disgust at the failure of the United States to 
anticipate Japan’s break-out in the Pacific with pep talks 
about the readiness of Australia and Britain to help. Casey 
noted in his diary notation of 29 December 1941 that, since 
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7 December, his work had completely changed and that he 
was now nearly 100% engaged with Army, Navy and Air 
people and not diplomats or the State 
Department.552American resources were far from limitless. 
There were now manpower shortages, shipping shortages 
and all manner of equipment shortages. There were 
endless meetings with military people about all manner of 
military supplies that Australia desperately needed – 
shipping, aviation fuel, Kittyhawks and tank production 
occupied much of the discussion. After Pearl Harbor, Casey 
had to help supply Australia with much-needed materials of 
war while pursuing ever more vigorously his campaign to 
ensure that Americans did not lose sight of how much they 
needed Australia. His diary hints at the difficulties that 
Casey faced given that Australia was one priority among 
many and not the most immediately threatened.  
In December 1941, the United States and Britain were 
concerned mainly about the Philippines and Singapore 
respectively. Both great powers were convinced – rightly as 
it turned out – that Australia was not part of Japan’s war 
plans at that stage. Japan’s purpose was to prevent the 
Americans using Australia as their base and bridgehead by 
threatening ports, airfields and sea lanes. This was not how 
matters were viewed in Australia or by Casey, for whom a 
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Japanese invasion seemed a very real and growing threat. 
Often Casey had to work Australia into the conversation 
when his interlocutor had other priorities in mind. On 16 
December 1941, for example, Casey had what he described 
as ‘useful talks to McCloy (Under Secretary of War) about 
plans to reinforce the Philippines. Casey recorded that he 
‘renewed my suggestion to him about supply ships to 
Australia with relevant ammunition and spares for all 
American ships that might be using Australia as a base. He 
said he’d get on with it…’553 The next day, Casey records 
seeing ‘General Arnold (Head of US Army Air Corps) about 
the United States aircraft that may be using or passing 
through Australia’. Typically Casey would deal with the 
person in charge, in this case Arnold, and then his 
subordinates; after seeing Arnold, Casey notes 
‘subsequently saw Col. John J. York… and got full 
particulars’.554 
At his meeting with the President on 17 December 1941, 
Casey was thanked for his tireless pressing of the 
messsage that ‘the South West Pacific is one unit’. Less 
reassuringly, Roosevelt told Casey that ‘Australia was just 
as important as the Philippines’ but that ‘the Philippines 
had a strategic position that might well save the whole SW 
                                               
553 Casey Diaries, 16 December 1941. 
554 Casey Diaries, 17 December  1941. 
328 
 
Pacific’.555 On 18 December, Casey saw Admiral Stark who 
was most keen for an ‘agreed strategic plan for us all in the 
Pacific and Far East. Very well disposed…’556 Casey was less 
pleased with his meeting with Stimson on 19 December 
1940, complaining afterwards that: ‘it is noticeable that 
Singapore is always put a bad second in comparison with 
the Philippines.557 Yet, as Bridge points out, Stimson’s own 
diary suggests that a much more positive message 
emerged from this meeting. Stimson told Casey that should 
the Philippines and Singapore be lost, the United States 
would be ‘making Australia our base, and fight it out 
there’.558 Casey set himself the task of constantly reminding 
the Americans how important was Australia to their plans. 
Events moved so swiftly that it was impossible to record all 
his activities in his diaries.559 Yet no day went past without 
Casey dealing with an influential service chief or 
functionary. Casey met with Marshall at least four times 
after Pearl Harbor: 29 December, 1941, 6 January, 1942, 
25 January, 1942 and 5 March, 1942. These meetings with 
Marshall appear to have proceeded smoothly. Marshall was 
not an easy man to impress. He was a cold, aloof person, 
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‘remote and austere’, according to Eisenhower, a ‘man who 
forced everyone to keep his distance’. President Roosevelt 
had tried at their first meeting to slap him on the back and 
call him ‘George’. Marshall drew back and let the President 
know that the name was ‘General Marshall’ and ‘General 
Marshall’ it remained.  He had few intimate friends. When 
he relaxed, he did it alone.560Casey experienced no such 
difficulties dealing with Marshall if his diary entry of 25 
January 1942 can be believed: 
I saw General Marshall (Chief of U.S. General Staff) on 
(the) same matters on which I saw the President 
yesterday---the situation in S.W. Pacific, and American 
reinforcements.  I had nearly an hour with him on this 
and related subjects.  He is a very approachable and I 
should think, a  balanced  sane individual.561 
It was just as well that the relationship began well. After 
the fall of Singapore, Casey on 20 February had ‘not an 
easy interview’ with Marshall and Arnold in the light of 
Curtin’s decision to recall the 6th and 7th Divisions of the 
AIF from the Middle East.  Churchill’s decision to ignore 
Curtin’s entreaty and to send both Divisions to Burma, 
provoked a furious response from Curtin which had the 
desired effect of Churchill reversing the decision.  In a 
cable from Churchill, dated 23rd February and sent by 
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Deputy Prime Minister clement Attlee, the Prim562e Minister 
wrote, “My decision to move it northward during the few 
hours required to receive your final answer was necessary 
because otherwise your help, if given, might not have 
arrived in time.”563  This message infuriated Bruce, wh9 
considered it arrogant and appalling.564 Casey handled this 
thorny issue as best he could and immediately went to 
Hopkins to help break the news to Roosevelt. Perhaps 
Casey’s personal touch helped to ensure that the American 
reaction to the Australian decision to bring its troops home 
was much more muted than Churchill’s. 
 
The conversations with key military and political leaders 
became even more intense as the war progressed. Casey 
needed to be ready for discussions about the entirety of 
the war effort. On 26 January 1941, Casey noted that he 
talked to Admiral Ernest King about US naval forces 
designated to hold the ‘Anzac area’. Then, on 27 January, 
he talked to Arnold about ‘air requirements of New Guinea 
area’. Arnold agreed that the ABDA area needed to be 
extended to New Guinea as far as New Caledonia. 
According to Casey, it should also include the northern part 
of Australia. Casey’s diary entry of 2 February 1941 tells 
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how Hopkins had sought him out: 
 
Long talk to Harry Hopkins, at his request, late in the 
afternoon. He was obviously seeking to get a picture of 
the whole war against Japan, on which I aired the facts 
and my views on the facts for some time. He appeared 
to want to hear the ABDA area discussed – the Anzac 
area… also what Australia is seeking in the way of 
fighter aircraft. He phoned General Arnold while I was 
there in an endeavour to help this along.565 
 
This connection to Hopkins and the capacity to get Arnold 
on the phone immediately was unlikely to have been 
something that the average diplomat in Washington could 
achieve. Casey complained that not only were resources 
stretched to breaking point, but there was no centralised 
body towhich Casey could petition about Australia’s needs. 
Casey up until the end of his appointment had to make his 
‘daily peregrinations round dozens of offices –seeing a 
series of highly placed individuals about our problems’.566 
These talks sometimes ended, as Casey would put it, 
‘unsatisfactorily’. For the most part, Hokpkins’ influence 
and networks were the best support that Casey could rely 
upon.  
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There were many failures, although Casey was always 
quick to seize upon possible alternatives. Almost from the 
announcement of Lend Lease, Casey had hoped for the 
construction of tanks in Australia with a mechanised corps 
emerging some time in 1942. It became obvious that this 
would not happen, Casey on this occasion blaming 
decisions made in Australia rather than American priorities. 
On 6 March 1942, Casey noted that he urged the British 
Tank Mission representative ‘to use any means of getting 
some medium tanks early. He made useful suggestion that 
we offer to take some without 75mm guns’.567  While the 
Australian Army was anxious for a tank capable of 
matching the Germans, Casey was desperate to have any 
tanks at all that were at least capable of matching it with 
the Japanese.568 Casey needed to be pragmatic and 
facilitate solutions and compromises in conditions where 
resources were in short supply. 
Casey as ever was deeply concerned about his position in 
the trading of information in Washington. He learned in 
February that information from Australian sources had 
found its way into Tokyo radio broadcasts. Casey was 
sufficiently worried to press Welles to ‘speak to Marshall, 
King and Arnold in the sense that they could continue to 
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talk to me with safety’.569 Here, Casey believed that the 
situation was retrieved. On 13 March 1942, Casey noted 
that he had ‘a confidential talk with General Marshall. 
Appears to have no reservations as to what he tells me’. 
On 26 March, Casey noted that he ‘Saw General Marshall, 
talked about world problems’.570 
 
Historians have recognised that Casey was often on the 
right side of these strategic debates. As Bridge points out, 
during the Arcadia talks involving both Roosevelt and 
Churchill after Pearl Harbor, Casey successfully pressed the 
case for a unified command in the new South West Pacific 
theatre.571 Horner notes that reacting to plans for the new 
theatre, Evatt objected that Casey was off on a ‘frolic of his 
own’ only to find that the naval chiefs backed Casey.572 On 
2 February 1942 Casey expressed satisfaction that the 
Americans were now planning to use ‘the Indian Ocean 
Route (Seychelles, Diego Garcia Cocos)’, the route that 
Casey insisted that the Australian Air Department survey in 
1939. According to Casey, he had painted a ‘picture of the 
possibility of the Imperial Air Route being cut – at which 
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everyone laughed’.573 On 16 February 1942 following the 
fall of Singapore, Casey described talking to General Arnold 
about ‘the Australian situation generally’. Casey summed 
up the position regarding Australia succinctly enough: 
‘Where else can the situation be retrieved?’574 This had been 
Casey’s message for a very long time and now in the 
desperate situation of the late winter of 1942, its 
importance was becoming increasingly obvious. Here Casey 
struck a tone of vindication, as well as desperation. 
Australia still needed to make its voice heard given the 
competing demands upon American decision makers. On 3 
March 1942, Casey described his two principal troubles to 
Stimson, the lack of a body – as distinct from a series of 
individuals - where South-West Pacific matters were 
discussed and the fact that Australia was in danger - yet 
the necessary war materials were not being shipped to 
Australia.575 On 12 March 1942, he had talks with Roosevelt 
about ‘the message for Mr. Curtin about the co-ordination 
of all the air strength in Australia under one leader’.576 While 
his last months in Washington were fraught in terms of the 
storm surrounding his move to the Middle East, Casey 
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continued to keep the key American strategists informed 
about Australia. Immediately before his departure,Casey 
described how he handedmilitary appraisals coming from 
Australia directly to the key American military decision 
makers: 
I saw Dill and Marshall and King – and handed each of 
them a copy of the Australian Chiefs of Staff 
appreciation of the situation in and near Australia- 
received from Australia by telegram this morning. I 
gave Marshall an extra copy for Arnold. It is a 
document of the highest importance and it is essential 
for all these four men to have it.577 
 
As he left Washington, Casey noted in his diary that: ‘There 
is no more diplomacyto be done. The job here in future will 
be a military liaison job far below the top level…Marshall 
and King are going to run the war’.578 
 
Casey was perhaps offering a self-justification for leaving 
Washington before the war was won. On the other hand, 
Casey’s multiple gifts of strategic vision, superior 
networking skills,and mastery of technical military detail 
made him a crucial asset to Australia after Pearl Harbor.If 
his task were to save Australia, he could be well satisfied 
with his efforts.Casey came from and spoke of a country 
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and a region that hitherto had not been in the American 
field of vision, in contemporary jargon, ‘not on the radar’. 
He opened up a field of vision of great strategic potential. 
Significantly, of the discussions Casey had with President 
Roosevelt, more than half occurred in the days and weeks 
immediately after America had entered the war. These 
talks indicate how important Australia had become in 
American strategic planning and that Casey was the 
individual to whom the Americans turned for advice and 
support. 
It would be a mistake to argue that the obvious usefulness 
of Australia to the Americans after Pearl Harbor meant that 
Australia would be able to significantly influence the 
running of the war. Curtin and Evatt would find it very 
difficult to make an Australian voice heard in the crucial 
strategic debates.579 Yet Casey’s activity in the months that 
followed Pearl Harbor provided further evidence of his 
infuence and capacities as a diplomatic all-rounder. His 
understanding of and contribution to Allied strategy, his 
mastery of military detail, and his successful networking 
enhanced Australia’s visibility at a time when American 
strategists were scrambling to find a way to bring about 
victory in the Pacific War.  
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CHAPTER TEN: Conclusion 
 
Casey was a remarkable diplomatic all-rounder whose 
experiences were drawn from the military, business, 
academic and political worlds. There is clear evidence that 
he was capable of thinking strategically in both political and 
military terms. The two years he spent in Washington were 
years in which he sought to ‘save’ Australia. Just how 
difficult a task that this was found expression in the 
message that Casey received upon arriving in Washington 
that Australia was not part of the American strategic 
picture. Perhaps sensing that Manila and Singapore would 
be lost in the first months of a Pacific war, Casey’s 
message was that Australia was not distant from the 
conflict that might well break out in the Pacific.  
Although Casey was arguing with civilians and politicians 
such as Hull, Berle, Hornbeck, Acheson, and Roosevelt, he 
was arguing a case that was essentially strategic. His aim 
was to impose a strategic mind-set or vision on his 
American interlocutors who seemed beguiled by public 
opinion and dismissive of the existential danger to the 
United States. In 1941, Casey was beginning to move from 
this political Washington elite so as to work directly on 
Marshall, Arnold, Stark and King who would lead the fight 
on fields of battle that were crucial to Australia’s survival. 
Casey understood better than most that the oceans around 
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Australia and the large landmass of Australia itself might 
well be those fields of battle. Casey needed all the 
imagination, intelligence, and persistence he could muster. 
Casey’s endeavors on Australia’s behalf while leading the 
legation in the United States required of him a careful 
reading and understanding of the American position in the 
fraught world situation, as well as qualities that could be 
summed up as sound judgment.  Also necessary was the 
energy to implement all that he believed necessary. 
 
Casey’s activities at the top levels of the British 
government introduced him to the world of international 
relations, diplomacy and the personal attributes to 
effectively negotiate in the context of competing interests.  
All that experience was employed in full measure during his 
two years in the United States. Casey approached the 
United States with three different lines of attack. Firstly, 
through diplomacy, then almost simultaneously, through 
public opinion, that is moving the American people to see 
the need for greater American involvement in the conflict 
and finally, after diplomacy and public relations had 
achieved results, engaging the military. The data 
enumerating the interviews he conducted with the 
President, the Secretary of State and the Assistant 
Secretaries, other senior members of the Administration, 
newspaper publishers, radio network proprietors and 
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perhaps most important of all, the heads of the military 
and the navy reveal the extraordinary range and scope of 
his activities, undertaken for one purpose, to influence 
events.  
In the summer of 1940, Casey directed his efforts at 
appraising America of the mortal dangers confronting 
Britain and the dire effects such a loss would have on the 
rest of the word, especially the United States. Once the 
threat to Britain had passed, Casey sought to involve the 
United States in the affairs of the Pacific-Asia region with a 
view to ensuring American involvement in the long-
expected conflict with the Empire of Japan.The evidence 
suggests that Casey was a rare example of a Dominion 
representative in the United States who stirred up the 
decision-makers of Washington, who attempted to make 
some impact upon American strategic thinking.  Even 
before Pearl Harbor, Casey’s endeavours brought him in 
contact with every influential figure and relevant 
organisation in the United States at that time. That he was 
accepted and recognised as a person of importance in the 
Oval Office, the State Department, the British Embassy, 
and senior American naval and militarydiscussions; that his 
opinions were sought and listened to by the major 
American newspaper and radio executives; and that he 
spoke frequently to major and local organizations all point 
to the fact, that, in contemporary parlance, he fought way 
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above his weight. His diplomatic skills and the fact that so 
many Americans, in a range of levels, listened to him, 
enhance his achievements. 
The question needs to be asked as to whether all those he 
spoke to would have been prepared to include him in their 
reference groups if his views were of no relevance?There 
can be no doubt that Casey was hugely active in 
propagating greater American involvement in Pacific affairs.  
The results of those activities may be impossible to gauge.  
The essence of diplomacy is that things are done quietly, 
secretly, without public disclosure. Yet the evidence 
appears overwhelming that the barn-storming did in fact, 
influence American thinking at the highest levels. 
A constant theme of Casey’s public speeches and private 
urgings during 1940 and 1941 was the establishment of an 
American interest and presence in the Pacific. The 
conversion of Australia from an under-populated outpost of 
Empire into a vibrant American base virtually ensuring 
protection from Japanese invasion was undoubtedly 
Casey’s underlying motive, but was not something that 
could be openly discussed in those terms. In all his 
discussions with American officials or at least those 
concerned with overall strategy, Casey was at pains to 
emphasise that the various theatres of war were vitally 
connected, a point that Roosevelt recognised as central to 
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Casey’s message. The American wartime reliance upon 
Australia as a base confirmed Casey’s foresight. 
Coinciding with Casey’s years in the United States, there 
was a seismic shift in the thinking of the military and 
political powers of the United States in the two-year period 
leading up to Pearl Harbor. As Casey predicted, it was the 
pressure of events that drove the process and an ‘incident’ 
that got the United States into the war. Yet it was Casey 
who patiently explained the strategic dimension of the 
Pacific War to his listeners in a way that prioritised 
Australia. The Marshall/Eisenhower plan might have been 
drawn up by Casey himself were he given the opportunity 
to do so.  
The competing claims about the relative roles of Curtin and 
Casey as instigators of the Australia-America Alliance may 
each be contested.  Moreover, they invite the valid 
question; need there be any ‘father’ or progenitor of the 
Alliance?  Yet it has to be recognised that the decisions by 
the United States, after the shock of 7 December, owe a 
significant debt to the foresight and persistence of one 
man, Richard GardinerCasey.  
Casey’s nimble and effective strategy and his well 
developed networking skills enabledhimto become a 
dynamic and effective force representing Australia in the 
corridors  of American power at a time unique in Australian 
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history when the future of the nation was uncertain. Casey 
would often be accused of lacking  political acumen. Yet his 
approach to American politics was shrewd and exemplary. 
He eschewed the flowery language of civilisational bonds. 
Instead, he was tireless in his efforts to sell Australia as a 
base for American power in the Pacific. In his efforts to 
court public opinion and persuade American leaders, Casey 
was interventionist, he was assertive, too persistent to be 
ignored. He employed tactics and adopted an overall 
strategy that had clear and explicit aims. Significantly, he 
did all this without stirring up resentment, without earning 
a reputation as an interfering pest. 
The aim of this thesis was to identify what Casey did, if 
anything, to involve Australia in the American strategy for 
winning the Pacific War.  The lack of recognition lies in 
Curtin’s rather than Casey’s name being attached to what 
really mattered in terms of the United States-Australia 
alliance, the transformation of Australia into an American 
base. As the good news from Hopkins recorded in Casey’s 
diary on 22 December shows, Casey did in fact receive 
plaudits at the time even if his reports to Canberra failed to 
emphasise their significance.  His reports frequently have 
the characteristics of British understatement.  What is clear 
and beyond argument is that the final decisions of the 
Americans, the end result, even exceeded Casey’s 
ambitions. 
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From an historical point of view, it is unfortunate that there 
is no official, weighty Proclamation conveying a Presidential 
or Congressional Declaration guaranteeing massive 
American support for Australia.  Instead, we have Hopkins’ 
verbal assurance, pledging virtually the same thing.  It is 
clear that the American decision to make Australia the 
jumping-off base may have been formalised in the days 
immediately following Pearl Harbor but it was a decision 
that followed years of discussion and examination, in which 
Casey played a crucial role.  The corollary of all that is that 
Casey is due some recognition that hitherto accrued to 
Curtin. 
In summation, Casey’s endeavours and his influence were 
a real, tangible fact of life in pre-war America.  It is 
impossible to measure quantitively the extent of that 
influence.  All that can be said is that is existed, proof 
enough to conclude that Casey’s reputation deserves 
greater recognition of the contribution he made to the joint 
Australia/America effrort in the Pacific War, an effort which 
justifies revision of that reputation.Casey was not an 
insignificant player in the diplomatic game that led to the 
wartime alliance between the United States and Australia, 
but rather an influential participant whose contribution, 
albeit difficult to determine quantitively, was real. The 
position of Casey in the framework of Australian history 
therefore assumes a new relevance, one that recognises 
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his vital role in the fact that the United States looked to 
Australia in December 1941. 
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APPENDIX A 
The Task Ahead by John Curtin.  The Herald (Melbourne) 
27 December 1941 
That reddish veil which o’er the face 
Of night-hag East is drawn… 
Flames new disaster fro the race? 
Or can it be the Dawn? 
So wrote Bernard O’Dowd.  I see 1942 as a year in which 
we shall know the answer. 
I would, however, that we provide the answer.  We can and 
we will.  Therefore, I see 1942 as a year of immense 
change in Australian life. 
The Australian Government’s policy has been grounded on 
two facts.  One is that the war with Japan is not a phase of 
the struggle with the Axis powers, but is a new war.  
The second is that Australia must go on in a war footing. 
Those two facts involve two lines of action – one in the 
direction of external policy as to our dealings with Britain, 
the United States, Russia, the Netherlands, East Indies and 
China in the higher direction of the war in the Pacific. 
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The second is the reshaping, in fact, the revolutionising, of 
the Australian way of life until a war footing is attained 
quickly, efficiently and without question. 
As the Australian Government enters 1942, it has behind it 
a record of realism in respect of foreign affairs.  I point to 
the forthright declaration in respect of Finland, Hungary 
and Rumania, which was followed with little delay by a 
declaration of war against those countries by the 
Democracies. 
We felt that there could be no half-measures in our 
dealings with the Soviet when that nation was being 
assailed by the three countries mentioned   
Similarly, as we put forward that a reciprocal agreement 
should be negotiated to meet an event of aggression by 
Japan.  Our suggestion was then regarded, wrongly as time 
as proved, as premature. 
Now, with equal realism, we take the view that while the 
determination of military policy is the Soviet’s business, we 
should be able to look forward with reason to aid from 
Russia against Japan. 
We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the 
democracies against the three Axis powers, and we refuse 
to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be 
treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict. 
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By that it is not meant that any one of the other theatres of 
war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia 
asks for a concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at 
the Democracies’ disposal, determined upon hurling Japan 
back. 
                                             * 
 
The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific 
struggle as primarily one in which the United States and 
Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the 
Democracies’ fighting plan. 
Without any inhibitions of any kind I make it quite clear 
that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our 
traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom. 
We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces.  We 
know the ;constant threat of invasion.  We know the 
dangers of dispersal of strength.  But we know too that 
Australia can go, and Britain can still hold on. 
We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go, 
and we shall exert all our energies toward the shaping of a 
plan, with the United States as it s keystone, which will 
give to our country some confidence of being able to hold 
out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy. 
Summed up, Australia external policy will be shaped 
toward obtaining Russian aid, and working out, with the 
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United States as the major factor, a plan of Pacific 
strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces. 
                                            * 
 
Australian internal policy has undergone striking changes in 
the past few weeks.  These, and those that will inevitabnly 
come before 1942 is far advanced, have been prompted by 
several reasons. 
In the first place, the Commonwealth Government found it 
exceedingly difficult to bring the Australian people to a 
realization of what, after two years of war, our position had 
become.  Even the entry of Japan, bringing a direct threat 
in our own waters, was met with a subconscious view that 
the Americans would deal with the short-sighted, under-fed 
and fanatical Japanese. 
The announcement that no further appeals would be made 
to the Australian people, and the decisions that followed, 
were motivated by psychological factors.  They had an 
arresting effect.  They awakened in the somewhat 
lackadaisical Australian mind the attitude that was 
imperative if we were to save ourselves, to enter an all-in 
effort in the only possible manner. 
That experiment in psychology was eminently 
successful, and we commenced 1942 with a better 
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realization, by a greater number of Australians, of 
what the war means than in the whole preceding two 
years. 
The decisions were prompted by other reasons, all related 
to the necessity of getting on to a war footing, and the 
results so far achieved have been most heartening, 
especially in respect of production and conservation of 
stocks. 
I make it clear the experiment undertaken was never 
intended as one to awaken Australian patriotism or sense 
of duty.  Those qualities have been ever-present;  but the 
response to leadership and direction had ;never been 
requested of the people, and desirable talents and 
untapped resources had lain dormant. 
Our task for 1942 is stern.  The Government is under no 
illusions as to “ something cropping up” in the future. 
The nadir of our fortunes in this struggle, as compared with 
1914-1918, has yet to be reached. 
Let there be no mistake about that.  The position Australia 
faces internally far exceeds in potential and sweeping 
dangers anything that confronted us in 1914-1918. 
The year 1942 will impose supreme tests.  These 
range from resistance to invasion to deprivation or 
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more and more amenities, not only the amenities of 
peacetime but those enjoyed in time of war. 
                                              * 
Australians must realise that to place the nation on a war 
footing every citizen must place himself, his private and 
business affairs, his entire mode of living, on a war footing.  
The civilian way of life cannot be any less rigorous, can 
contribute no less than thaqt which the fighting men have 
to follow. 
I demand that Australians everywhere realise that Australia 
is now inside the fighting lines. 
Ausralian governmental policy will be directed strictly on 
those lines.  We have to regard our country and its 
7,000,000 people as though we were a nation and a people 
with the enemy hammering at our frontier. 
  
Australians must be perpetually on guard;  on guard 
against the possibility, at any hour without warning, of raid 
or invasion;  on guard against spending money, or doing 
anything that cannot be justified;  on guard against 
hampering by disputation or idle, irresponsible chatter, the 
decisions of the Government taken for the welfare of all. 
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All Australian is the stake in this war.  All Australia must 
stand together to hold that stake.  We face a powerful, ably 
led and unbelievable courageous foe. 
We must watch the enemy accordingly.  We shall watch 
him accordingly.   
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